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Foreword
T
he distinctly different conditions in advanced and emerging market economies pose significant risks for the
global financial system. Recovery in advanced economies continues to be tenuous even as inflation concerns
emerge. In the US, QE2 is scheduled to end by June 2011, and there is uncertainty about the post-QE2
scenario. The European Central Bank raised its main interest rate, for the first time since July 2008, in April 2011 in
a move aimed at combating incipient inflation signals across the Eurozone. Heightened sovereign risk concerns,
particularly in the Euro region, and fears of adverse fallout on the financial sector further cloud the sentiments. For
the emerging economies, on the other hand, inflation is emerging as a key concern amidst strong domestic demand,
rapid credit growth and large capital inflows.
India was one of the earliest movers in tightening the monetary policy to address inflationary pressures. A
shift from absorption mode to injection mode since March 2010 has seen an effective rise in policy rates by 400
basis points. Bank lending rates firmed up responding to monetary policy signals as banks progressively passed on
the increased costs. Global commodity prices, particularly oil, and performance of the monsoon are the key risk
factors to inflation management in the months ahead. A slight moderation in growth is projected for the current
year. Pressures on the expenditure side in the form of higher subsidy bill may pose further challenges for fiscal
management.
Though the current account deficit for 2010-11 is expected to be around 2.5 per cent, a few external sector
indicators suggest some deterioration. While FDI flows have been muted, net FII flows remain strong and ECB
flows have seen a significant rebound. Consequently, un-hedged positions of corporates accessing foreign currency
funding need to be monitored both by the banks from the credit risk angle and by the systemic regulator from a
stability perspective.
The Indian financial sector has remained stable. Banks are well capitalised; the Reserve Bank continues to be
vigilant and has taken certain prudential as well as macro-prudential measures in order to enhance the soundness
of the banking system. While the focus of regulating the non-banking space continues to be on leverage and systemic
interconnectedness, a comprehensive review is underway to revisit certain broad principles that underpin the
regulatory architecture keeping in view the economic role and heterogeneity of this sector and the recent international
experience.
The two-tier institutional arrangement in the shape of Financial Stability Development Council (FSDC) and
its Sub-Committee, for monitoring financial stability on an ongoing basis has been operationalised. Both the main
FSDC and its Sub-Committee have so far held two meetings each. Apart from making an assessment of the
developments in financial markets and the financial system, the deliberations have focused inter alia on strengthening
the financial conglomerates monitoring framework, addressing regulatory gaps and inter-regulatory issues related
to systemic risk.
Within the Reserve Bank, a number of initiatives have been taken to improve the financial stability analytics
to take full account of the different sources of systemic risk. Though systemic risk measurement is in its early
stages of evolution, an effort has been made to identify, monitor and address systemic linkages through network
analysis model and analyse soft spots in the system using banking stability measures. Reflecting deepening inter-
regulatory collaborative process for financial stability, this FSR carries significant contributions from the Securities
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the Insurance Development Regulatory Authority (IRDA) on systemic issues
pertaining to the respective segments.
Ensuring financial stability cannot be a formulaic rule-based task. The endeavour for the policy makers
should be to not get trapped in “commoditised ideas, reductive categories and prepackaged narratives” – trying to
fit everything to ‘The Bed of Procrustes’1.
Mumbai D. Subbarao
June 14, 2011 Governor
1 Talib, Nassim: “The Bed of Procrustes”, 2010, Random House
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Assessment and Outlook
The Indian financial system remains stable in the face of some fragilities being observed in the global
macro-financial environment. The growth is slackening in most parts of the world, even as the risks
from global imbalances and sovereign debt crisis in Europe continue to hover. The uncertainties in
global environment with persistently high energy and commodity prices have contributed to a slight
moderation in India’s growth momentum as well. The macroeconomic fundamentals for India, however,
continue to stay strong, notwithstanding the prevailing inflationary pressures and concerns on fiscal
front.
During the period since the previous Financial Stability Report (FSR) was published in December
2010, Indian financial markets have remained stress free even as the reliance of domestic firms on
international sources of finance denominated in foreign currency has been growing. The regulatory
arrangements are being strengthened, emphasising a coordinated approach, in line with the current
international developments and best practices.
The banking sector continues to be stable, though the structure of the sector - characterised by
significantly ‘connected’ and ‘clustered’ banks, carries certain inherent risks, as shown by the Network
Analysis- one of the newly introduced analytical techniques in this FSR. The Banking Stability
Indicator endorses the overall improvement in the stability of banking sector, even though the robust
growth in bank credit during 2010-11, is hinting at some early concerns on profitability and asset
quality. The various macro-financial stress tests, including the newly introduced ones based on more
rigorous computation methodologies; also show that the banking sector remains adequately capitalised
and resilient to asset quality shocks and other plausible adverse changes in macroeconomic scenario.
Global Macroeconomic Developments
Slowdown in growth even as the risk scenario
improves…but global imbalances remain
1. The global risk scenario has improved during the
last six months, though there are signs of a slowdown
in growth during 2011 in most countries, including some
of the developing economies in Asia. The main factors
affecting the global growth are: high food, commodity
and energy prices, steps towards fiscal consolidation,
sovereign debt problems in the Euro area and high level
of government debt in some advanced economies. Also,
the main underlying factors behind global imbalances
remain largely unaddressed, increasing the uncertainty
around the path of global recovery.
Sovereign debt crisis threatening to spill over to other
areas
2. The sovereign debt crisis in countries like Greece,
Portugal, and Ireland is posing serious challenges for
the stability in the entire Euro area. The increasingly
high levels of government debt in other advanced
countries are also adding to the uncertainty around the
fiscal consolidation and its impact on international
financial markets. Although the Emerging Market
Economies (EMEs) have more comfortable fiscal space
and better growth prospects, there are still significant
risks on the fiscal front, given the complex inter-play
between growth and inflation.
Domestic Macroeconomic Developments
Slight fall in growth rate as management of fiscal
position and inflation takes precedence
3. The slackening of global recovery, high oil and
commodity prices, deceleration in domestic industrial
growth, uncertainty about continuation of strong growth
in agricultural sector and impact of monetary policy
actions pose downside risks to India’s Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) growth during 2011-12. The slowdown
in growth momentum may affect the quality of the
assets of financial sector.
Inflation remains a big challenge, as asset prices stay
high
4. The international prices of food, energy and
commodities are expected to remain high during 2011-
12. Although there has been some decline recently in
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international oil prices, this may not help in inflation
management as complete pass- through of previous
escalations is still to be affected. Inflation is likely to
face upward pressure from higher subsidy expenditure
of the government and rise in wages and raw material
prices. Housing prices have undergone some correction
but continue to stay firm. Gold prices continue to
increase on the back of strong demand.
Current Account Deficit (CAD) may remain under
pressure
5. Recent growth in India’s exports may off-set, at
least partially, the expected increase in the import bill
due to elevated oil and commodity prices. There does
not seem to be an impending pressure on the financing
of CAD. However, going ahead, as the advanced
economies exit from the accommodative monetary
policy, there could be some slow down in capital inflows.
Quality and pace of fiscal consolidation remains a
concern
6. In the wake of high international commodity and
oil prices, the budgetary projections of deficits for 2011-
12 are expected to come under pressure. Management
of government expenditure, especially subsidies bill, will
pose challenges to the process of fiscal consolidation.
This could be further accentuated by a tempered growth
adversely impacting the revenue collections.
Financial Markets
Improvement in stability of financial markets at global
and domestic levels
7. During the last six months, global financial
markets have been resilient, overcoming a short phase
of heightened volatility caused by the earthquake in
Japan and political tensions in Libya and other parts of
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The forecasted
value for Financial Stress Indicator (FSI) for India, a
measure to capture the severity of contemporaneous
developments as they occur in different market
segments and the banking sector, suggests benign
conditions in the near term.
Sovereign debt crisis could affect institutions and
markets
8. The sovereign debt crisis is threatening to affect
some of the bigger economies even as the high deficit
and debt levels in Advanced Economies (AEs) like US,
UK and Japan could exert further pressure on their
sovereign rating outlook. The low economic growth
combined with the high levels of debt in these countries
is adversely impacting market sentiments.  Continued
concerns regarding sovereign risk could raise the funding
costs of the financial sector and have a negative impact
on its balance sheet. Evolving regulatory changes will
require financial institutions to raise fresh capital
even as they face a wall of refinancing at a time
when sovereigns in AEs also have high borrowing
programs.
Increasing financialisation of commodity markets
adding to asset correlation
9. The sustained demand and growth in EMEs are
providing strong impetus to commodity prices but the
increasing financialisation of commodity markets might
be adding to the volatility in commodity prices. It could
also result in an increased correlation between financial
and commodity markets, thereby facilitating faster
transmission of shocks across markets.
Domestic markets functioned without any stress, with
liquidity conditions remaining tight for the banking
system
10. Inspite of a sharp turnaround in Government cash
balances with the Reserve Bank during the current
financial year, liquidity in the system remained in a
deficit mode reflecting an increase in liquidity
requirements of the economy. The increase is mainly
attributable to strong credit demand and high level of
currency in circulation. However, the overnight call rates
have remained range-bound. The collateralized markets
continued to remain the predominant money market
segment of the money market. The government bond
yields hardened across all maturities. The increase was
more pronounced in the short end resulting in a
flattening of the yield curve. Rupee has remained range-
bound, reflecting a relatively balanced external account
and  the general weakness experienced by the US dollar
during the period.
Increased reliance by Indian firms on foreign funding
causing currency mismatches…
11. Availability of alternative channels of funding has
reduced the dependence of firms on domestic bank
credit over the years. Rising domestic yields are widening
the interest rate differentials vis-à-vis AEs, resulting in
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a greater access to External Commercial Borrowings (ECB)
by Indian firms. This trend is causing a build-up of
currency mismatches in their balance sheets. India’s
International Investment Position (IIP) statistics show
that the currency risk exposure of India’s non-official
sector has increased in the last few years, with an
increasing net liability position. This means that the
translation risk for the non-official sector arises from a
depreciation of the Indian rupee.
…even as refunding risks of corporates escalate due
to maturing FCCBs
12. During the period from 2005 to 2008, large
amounts were raised through Foreign Currency
Convertible Bonds (FCCBs) by many Indian companies
with elevated conversion premia. Most of them
are nearing maturity by March 2013. Estimates
show that a very large proportion of these FCCBs may
not get converted into equity thus requiring their
refinancing at the much higher interest rates prevalent
today.
Portfolio capital flows – evidence of herd behaviour
13. During 2010, Indian capital markets received a
significant amount of net portfolio capital flows. These
flows tend to be more volatile, though their impact on
the domestic macroeconomic situation so far has been
limited. While equity markets in India have undergone
some downward correction with Foreign Institutional
Investors (FIIs) pulling money out, the bond markets
have seen incremental flows on account of attractive
yields and the recent enhancement of limits for FII
investment in corporate and government bonds. An
internal study points to tendency of the portfolio capital
flows to be ‘auto-correlated’ thus implying ‘herd
behaviour’, both in good times as well as during times
of stress.
Program trading systems in Indian stock markets
14. Encouraging the use of Algorithmic trading and
High Frequency Trading (HFT) adds to the efficiency and
liquidity of markets but carries some risks too. Indian
securities markets have withstood systemic events in
the past, without any major disruption. Even as facilities
like Smart Order Routing (SOR) are introduced in Indian
stock exchanges, events like ‘flash crashes’ witnessed
in US equity markets in May 2010, need to be guarded
against.
Financial Institutions
Banking sector maintains good health with robust
credit growth hinting towards subtle vulnerabilities
15. The recovery in economic growth during 2010-11
has been accompanied by a strong credit growth and
slight decline in Non Performing Assets (NPAs). The
banking sector balance sheet increased by 19 per cent
during the year ended March 31, 2011, spurred by a
robust growth of 22.6 per cent in credit off take. The
growth in deposit mobilisation, at around 18 per cent
did not keep pace with the growth in credit, the gap
being funded through an increasing share of market
borrowings. This increased reliance on borrowed funds
raised concerns about the liquidity position of banks
arising from growing maturity mismatches, in
conjunction with a reduction in the share of liquid assets
in total assets.
Asset quality, though improved, is a concern due to
skewed growth in credit to certain sectors
16. Asset quality improved mainly on the back of the
credit growth which outpaced the growth in NPAs. The
write-offs of NPAs by banks to cleanse their balance
sheets also helped in achieving a lower gross NPA ratio.
Even with a broadly diversified credit portfolio, the
contribution to the credit growth was disproportionately
high for three sectors – retail, commercial real estate
and infrastructure. As each of these sectors have a
peculiar set of asset quality propositions, the brisk
growth in exposure seen during 2010-11 poses some
concerns. The asset quality under the priority sector
lending, especially agriculture, deteriorated at a faster
rate as compared to the overall asset quality, which was
a concern.
Banks remain well capitalised, despite a marginal
decline in the Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets Ratio
(CRAR)
17. The system level CRAR under Basel-II norms
stood at 14.3 per cent as at end March 2011 which was
well above the regulatory minimum of 9 per cent. There
was, however, a slight decline over the CRAR of 14.5
per cent as at end March 2010, largely due to
robust credit off take. All the bank groups had CRAR
above 12 per cent as at end March 2011 under Basel-II
norms.
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Profitability helped by robust Net Interest Income (NII)
18. An increase in NII facilitated growth of around
20 per cent in aggregate net profit of the banking system,
even with an almost stagnant non-interest income and
increase in risk provisions. The public sector banks
registered a lower growth in profits – mainly due to
reduction in trading profits, increase in provisions
towards staff expenses (including those for pension
liabilities) and towards impaired assets. Going ahead,
with hardening interest rates and the imminent increase
in cost of funds, the credit growth is expected to slow
down, which could adversely affect the profitability. The
hike in savings account interest rate, amortizations of
pension liabilities and potentially enhanced provisioning
requirements for NPAs may also impact profitability.
Further escalations in Off- Balance Sheet exposures of
foreign banks
19. The previous FSR pointed to high levels of activity/
involvement of foreign banks in the use of derivatives.
This trend continued during the year. Credit equivalent
of the derivative exposures remained low and showed a
declining trend even as the notional amounts of such
exposures rose as a proportion of balance sheet size.
The derivative deals, mainly the (Over the Counter) OTC
trades, include deals of the foreign banks with other
commercial banks which have systemic implications and
therefore need strict vigilance to ensure conformation
to regulatory stipulations.
Systemic importance of the insurance sector
20. The fast growth in the insurance sector in the
decade since liberalization has further increased the
importance of the sector mainly because of the growing
inter-linkages of the sector with other financial
institutions. The sector, by virtue of the intrinsic nature
of the activities, faces risks related to: solvency,
investment returns, economic down turns and issues
related to ‘persistency’ though the sector is generally
considered to be contributing less to systemic risk than
banks.
Regulatory environment
Strengthening the regulatory architecture - coordinated
oversight for financial stability
21. The Financial Stability and Development Council
(FSDC), chaired by the Finance Minister, has been
established to strengthen the institutional framework
for coordination among all regulators and the
Government. The FSDC is assisted by a Sub-Committee
under the Governor of the Reserve Bank, which is
expected to evolve as the operative, hands-on body for
financial stability in peace times with the FSDC having
broad oversight and a central role in crisis times.
Proposed amendments to banking legislations will
fortify the regulatory structure
22. Amendments to the banking sector legislations
have been proposed with a view to fortifying and making
more effective, the regulatory architecture while easing
the access of the nationalised banks to capital market.
Simultaneously, the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms
Commission (FSLRC) has been set up with a mandate to
revamp the financial sector laws. There is a case for
reviewing the various legislations and recasting them
in tune with current policy framework.
Implementation issues remain with migration to the
advanced approaches under Basel II
23. Indian banks, at the aggregate level, remain
adequately capitalised at present. The progress towards
the advanced approaches under Basel II remains on a
firm footing, amidst some challenges. The main
implementation issues for the migration relate to
constraints of data, tools, methodologies and necessary
skills for quantification and modelling of risks.
Data and analytical requirements for Basel III will be
challenging….
24. As the phase-in period for Basel III measures
commences in 2013, the banks will need to gear
themselves for the demanding data and analytical
requirements for the revised liquidity framework. The
position in respect of capital remains comfortable though
some individual banks may need capital infusions which
could pose some difficulties if the sluggish performance
of the equity markets persists. The capital needs of banks
will also be impacted due to the unamortised portion of
pension liabilities to be absorbed by April 01, 2013 on
migration to International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS).
…as will the calibration of the countercyclical buffers
25. The calibration of the countercyclical buffers
proposed under Basel III will require accurate assessment
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as to whether the credit growth is excessive and/or is
leading to the build-up of systemic risks. The commonly
used indicators, including the ratio of credit to GDP, may
not be suitable for India and a combination of qualitative
judgment and quantitative indicators may be the way
forward for assessing the requirement for, extent of and
timing of imposition and removal of the buffer.
The supervisory framework for Financial
Conglomerates (FCs) is being enhanced…
26. Efforts to improve the supervisory processes for
the large and complex financial entities in the country
are underway. The criteria for identification of FCs have
been strengthened and a revised offsite reporting format
has been introduced to improve capturing of the group
risk profile. Guidelines on the corporate governance
framework and management / monitoring of risks arising
of intra-group transactions and exposures are also being
finalised.
… even as discussion on a Financial Holding Company
model for India is set in motion…
27. A Reserve Bank Working Group has recommended
that the Financial Holding Company model should be
pursued as the preferred model for the financial sector
in India. However, necessary legislative and other
changes will be required through discussions with the
stakeholders for evolving an optimal structure for such
companies under Reserve Bank’s regulation.
Gaps in the regulatory framework for NBFCs remain
even as the entities in the sector remain closely
interconnected
28. Many NBFCs, which are borrowing both from the
markets and the banks, have the capability of being over-
leveraged and, being deeply interconnected, can pose
systemic risks. Differences in regulatory requirements
for such entities vis-à-vis the banking sector and between
NBFCs under the purview of different regulators add to
the scope for regulatory arbitrage. There remain gaps
and weaknesses in the regulatory perimeter – wealth
management activities, structured products, alternative
investment funds like hedge funds, PE funds etc., -
which need to be addressed. The systemic importance
of Government owned NBFCs has grown over the years
and the regulatory framework for such entities is being
re-examined.
Gaps in regulation permitting cooperative societies to
raise funds outside any regulatory ambit need to be
addressed
29. Loopholes in the regulatory arrangements in the
country permit co-operative societies to raise deposits
from members and funds from external sources without
being subject to any prudential framework. The entire
gamut of issues related to raising of funds, especially
from external sources, by these entities needs to be
examined.
An analytical prognosis of the network of the Indian
banking system suggests significant degree of
interconnectedness
30. An analytical framework to assess the network of
the Indian banking system reveals that the system is
substantially connected and clustered. This intertwined
nature of the banking system in any system could leave
it vulnerable to domino effects in case of idiosyncratic
failure of one or more banks. While the contagion impact
is relatively contained due to regulatory limits on
interbank exposures, there remains need for continuous
monitoring of the interconnectivities in the financial
system to identify build up of risks /excesses in the
system and to guide policy action to address the same.
Financial Market Infrastructure
Payment and Settlement Systems - Robust
functioning…but vulnerabilities from
interdependence needs to be monitored …
31. The operational performance of the payment and
settlement infrastructure in India continued to be robust
though vulnerabilities could emerge from the high
degree of integration and inter-relationships among
systems, processes and institutions involved in various
segments of the payment and settlement systems. The
benefits from synergies arising out of such
interdependencies comes bundled with risks as stress
on credit / liquidity aspects in one segment / institution
/ process may affect the other parts of the settlement
system due to the cross-linkages.
Vulnerabilities in the management of liquidity risks
of Central Counterparties (CCPs) need to be addressed
32. The management of liquidity risks faced by the
CCPs entails addressing vulnerabilities arising from the
quality and range of collateral, quantum of margins and
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model risks. There are vulnerabilities in the Indian
context arising from dependence on committed backup
liquidity for funds and securities from financial
institutions for completion of the settlement process
(in the case of Clearing Corporation of India Limited,
i.e. CCIL) and exposures to the banking sector as
collateral is accepted the form of bank deposits, bank
guarantees, etc. (in the case of other CCPs).  The risks of
the failure of a CCP, however unlikely, need to be
addressed given the potential collateral damage from
such an event. There are, however, no easy solutions
given the moral hazard concerns which the provision of
central bank liquidity for CCPs entails.
Existing reporting arrangements for OTC derivative
markets in India need to be leveraged
33. The OTC markets in India with their skewed
participation structures need greater attention
towards standardization and introduction of central
clearing even as some segments face low volumes
making it difficult to mandate guaranteed clearing
for these markets.  The existing reporting
arrangements for OTC markets encompass foreign
exchange, interest rate, government securities,
corporate bonds and money market instruments.
Going forward, there is a need for consolidation and
building on the existing reporting arrangements of
CCIL while ensuring that the governance issues
emanating from CCIL acting as both, a trade
repository as well as a CCP, are addressed.
Macro issues facing deposit insurance system in India
remain relevant
34. Ensuring the adequacy of the deposit insurance
fund, reducing the time taken to reimburse depositors,
improving the coverage of the deposit insurance system
and broadening the mandate of Deposit Insurance and
Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC) remain critical
issues for strengthening the deposit insurance
system in the country. A Working Group is reviewing
the issues.
Stress testing
Capital adequacy shows resilience…though
profitability gets affected
35. Two new stress testing tools were added to the
set of techniques used in the previous FSR. The first of
these: Banking Stability Measures in the form of Banking
System’s Portfolio Multivariate Density (BSMD) approach
for analysing financial stability from different
combinations of distress dependencies, infers that
during the periods of crisis, the systemic risks rise faster
than individual risks. The second tool, based on Vector
Autoregression (VAR) approach for judging the resilience
of banking sector on various macroeconomic shocks by
capturing the interaction among macroeconomic
variables and banks’ stability variables, shows that
interest rate had the most significant (negative) impact
on slippage ratio of the banks.
36. The resilience of the projected balance sheets of
the commercial banks was studied through stress testing,
in respect of credit risk, interest rate risk and liquidity
risk. Under stress conditions based on NPA shocks, the
profitability of the banks was seen to be affected
significantly though the capital adequacy position
appeared to be reasonably resilient. The study indicates
that some banks may face extreme liquidity constraints,
under severe stress scenario. Overall, the results of the
macro-stress tests using different scenarios, suggested
that the banking sector would be able to withstand
macroeconomic shocks though the prevailing inflation
and interest rate situation is expected to have an adverse
effect on the asset quality of banks.
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Chapter I
Macroeconomic Outlook
Improvement in macroeconomic conditions at the global level has contributed to some moderation
in risks to global financial stability. However, considerable uncertainty remains. Fiscal weakness and
sovereign debt problems in the euro area, high leveraging in many advanced economies, banking
sector default risks prevailing in some regions, the consequences of the Japanese earthquake, persistence
of MENA turmoil and continuance of high energy and commodity prices may negatively impact
investors’ confidence and spending decisions of corporations and households.
On the domestic front, growth is likely to moderate while inflation is likely to remain firm due to
rising commodity prices. This is expected to have an adverse impact on the fiscal consolidation process.
The current account deficit is likely to remain elevated due to rise in imports resulting from higher
oil and commodity prices, along with challenges of financing, as global conditions increase volatility
in capital flows. High input prices and interest costs may result in downward pressure on margins of
corporates. The aggregate impact of moderately paced global recovery, domestic growth moderation,
upside risks to inflation and higher interest rates on the financial sector is likely to remain somewhat
adverse during the year.
Global risks decline but risks from inflation and capital
flows remain high
1.1. Since the publication of the second Financial
Stability Report (FSR) of the Reserve Bank in December
2010, the signs of recovery in several advanced
economies have strengthened.  Some concerns regarding
sovereign debt risks in the Euro Area, however, have re-
emerged. On balance, the global risks have improved
but remain elevated. On the domestic front, decline in
risks due to moderation in capital flows has been offset
by the increased volatility in portfolio flows.  Risks from
inflation have increased since December 2010. Corporate
and household risks have remained at the same levels
(Chart 1.1).
Global Developments
Deceleration of global growth a concern…
1.2. The Global Financial Stability Report (April 2011)
has pointed out a decline in global risks since their
previous assessment in October 2010 due to
improvement in macroeconomic conditions. The growth
in GDP during 2011, however, is expected to be lower
in most countries, except Middle East and North African
(MENA) and Sub-Saharan economies. The decline is most
Global
Capital Flows
Inflation
Fiscal
Corporate
Household
FSR Dec 2010 FSR June 2011
Chart 1.1: Macroeconomic Risk Map
Source: Staff Estimates.
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pronounced in the case of newly industrialised as well
as developing economies in Asia (Chart 1.2).
1.3. Latest data on OECD Composite Leading
Indicators (CLIs) point towards considerable variations
in the pace of recovery in various economies during
March 2011. While CLIs for North America, China and
Russia point towards continued expansion, those for
Brazil and India are pointing towards a slowdown relative
to trend.
1.4. The manufacturing Purchasing Manager Indices
(PMIs) for the U.S. and Europe, though in expansionary
mode, have recorded a decline (Chart1.3). The
unemployment rate in the U.S. has also increased recently.
1.5. Downside risks to global growth include:
• High food, commodity and energy prices
• Withdrawal of fiscal stimulus measures and fiscal
consolidation
• Reemergence of sovereign debt problems in the
Euro area periphery and high level of fiscal debt
in some advanced economies
• Continuance of structural global imbalances
• Slowdown in the U.S.
• Weakness in real estate and household incomes
in some advanced economies
• Decline in GDP of Japan
• Prolonged political disturbance in MENA nations.
…but decline in unemployment rate provides a silver
lining
1.6. Unemployment which peaked in 2009 and 2010
is trending downwards and is expected to improve the
aggregate demand (Chart 1.4).
Persistence of global imbalances is getting longer than
what was expected…
1.7. The structural causes of global imbalances
have not been fully addressed and are reflected in the
persistence of global imbalances. Though the trade
balance of China has been fluctuating widely, it
has largely remained in the surplus zone. The negative
trade balance of the U.S., notwithstanding some
moderation in the aftermath of the crisis, continues
to be very large (Chart 1.5). As pointed out in the
previous FSR, the process of rebalancing of external
and internal imbalances is progressing albeit at a slower
pace.
Chart 1.2: Deceleration of Growth in 2011
Source: IMF.
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… and same has been the experience with sovereign
debt
1.8. The sovereign debt crisis in Europe has returned
full circle to the problem that started over a year ago.
Notwithstanding the bail-out package, Greece has been
slipping further behind its targets for cutting its budget
deficit. The creditworthiness and the ability of accessing
the market by the sovereign debt crisis economies
remains impaired. The possibility of debt crisis spreading
from the periphery to the core Euro zone countries and
East European economies cannot be ruled out at this
stage. The government debt is generally high and
increasing in other advanced economies also (Chart 1.6).
1.9. Some empirical studies1 have pointed towards
continuance of elevated fiscal stress risks above the pre-
crisis years in advanced economies due to elevated
solvency risks and high budget financing needs. Though
fiscal stress is lower for emerging economies due to
better fiscal space and higher growth prospects, fiscal
risks remain high due to rising tension in growth and
inflation dynamics.
World trade recovering but may record moderate
growth… Indian exports remain steady
1.10. Global trade is recovering with the value of world
merchandise trade, led by Asia, accelerating perceptibly
in the fourth quarter of 2010 compared to the same
period of 2009. In volume terms, world trade expanded
by 12 per cent in 2010. World imports of Emerging
Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs) are back
to pre-crisis trends, but those of advanced economies
continue to lag. Japan’s natural disaster may have some
impact on East Asian economies, which have strong trade
and financial links with Japan, before a reconstruction-
led recovery starts.
1.11. The robust growth in India’s exports reflects
diversification of products from labour intensive
manufactures to higher value-added products in
engineering and petroleum sectors and to destinations
across emerging markets and developing economies.
Geopolitical uncertainties in the MENA countries and
the natural disaster in Japan are not expected to directly
affect India’s trade position given a moderate share of
these regions in India’s international trade; significant
Source: Bloomberg.
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indirect effects may, however, arise from the possible
rise in oil prices and other commodity prices. As
indicated in Chapter V, the impact of exports on the
quality of banking assets has been found to be significant
and hence the exposures to the export sector need to be
monitored carefully.
Domestic Economy
Real activity remains strong, though signs of
moderation are visible
1.12. The increase in the growth rate of real GDP during
2010-11 was mainly due to the sharp improvement in
the growth of ‘agriculture & allied activities’, even as
the contribution of industry and services were
somewhat lower (Chart 1.7).
Industrial growth decelerates, partly reflecting
moderation in investment demand
1.13. As highlighted in the previous FSR, the volatility
in industrial production remains high. The volatility is
largely due to fluctuations in capital goods production
(Chart 1.8). Though the growth in capital goods sector
has been rapid, the volatility reflects the uncertainties
in the economy.
1.14.  On the demand side, the acceleration in growth
in 2010-11 largely reflects faster growth of exports vis-à-
vis imports and acceleration in private final consumption
expenditure and gross fixed capital formation. The
growth rate of government final consumption
expenditure moderated sharply in 2010-11 reflecting
fiscal consolidation efforts; its share in GDP growth also
declined sharply (Chart 1.9).
1.15. Downside risks to growth during 2011-12 include:
• Slackening of global recovery and external
demand conditions
• Moderation in investment
• High oil and commodity prices
• Impact of monetary policy actions of the past and
future.
The impact of Basel III proposal for higher capital
charge likely to be minimal
1.16. The Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG) of
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has
estimated that annual GDP growth would fall by 0.03
percentage points for each percentage points increase
Source: CSO, Staff Calculations.
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in capital requirements. The Long-term Economic Impact
(LEI) Working Group has estimated that one percentage
point increase in the capital ratio would cause 0.09 per
cent permanent decline in output. In a similar kind of
study for Italy, the output decline over eight year horizon
has been estimated to be 0.00 -0.33 per cent depending
upon the estimation methods.2 The Institute of
International Finance (IIF), however, has assessed that
the adoption of Basel III would cost about 3 per cent of
GDP in Europe and U.S. The French Banking Association
estimates double of this figure for the national economy.
Some studies on global experience have shown that
macroeconomic costs of increase in capital and liquidity
requirements are sensitive to the length of the
implementation period, adjustment strategy used by
banks and the monetary policy response.
1.17. A preliminary assessment of the impact of
increased capital requirements on GDP made by the
Reserve Bank3 showed that under ceteris paribus
assumption, one percentage point increase in capital to
risk weighted assets ratio (CRAR) could be associated
with a marginal moderation in the average real GDP
growth rate over a medium term horizon deriving from
the impact of CRAR on bank credit growth and lending
interest rate.
Inflation stays elevated while the underlying drivers
change
1.18. Global food, energy and other commodity prices
are likely to remain high during 2011 (Chart 1.10).
Inflation at the global level is a concern as persistence
of high global commodity prices would result in lower
growth and higher inflation dispersed all over.
1.19. At home, inflation is likely to face upward
pressure from fuller pass-through of oil and coal prices,
higher subsidy expenditure of the government and
rise in wages and raw material prices. Downward
stickiness of inflation would also arise from structural
component of food inflation along with higher global
food prices.
Commodity Crude Oil Coal Food
Agricultural Raw Materials Aluminum
Chart 1.10 : Global Commodity Price Indices
Note:
Source:
Figures for 2011 are forecasts.
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2 Locarno, Alberto (2011): The Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III on the Italian Economy, Bank of Italy, May
3 The assessment is based on a small analytical static macro model with inputs from annual balance sheets and profit and loss accounts data of the
banking sector and macroeconomic aggregates. The study looked at one time impact, unlike the convergence pattern that some international studies
including the BIS study simulated. The results are indicative and tentative, and subject to various assumptions including the key assumption that
banks will continue to hold capital buffer in line with the baseline scenario. In the absence of these assumptions, the Basel III may not have any
impact on real GDP growth.
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Gold prices continue to rise, while corrections are
visible in housing prices in some centres…
1.20. The quarterly House Price Index (HPI) for various
centres, based on the official data on registration of
property sale/purchase deed collected from the
Department of Registration and Stamps  (DRS) of
various State Governments indicate continued firmness
in housing prices in some centres and modest
corrections in some others (Chart 1.11). Reports of
unsold inventory in some centres may lead to further
correction. Credit is growing at its trend rate and
the servicing of these assets as reflected in housing
NPAs ratio has continued to record improvement
(Chart 1.19).
1.21. Since the crisis, the price of gold has recorded a
secular rise (Chart 1.12). This may not pose much
concern as its role as collateral, from anecdotal evidence,
appears to be low.
CAD to remain stretched due to combined impact of
high global oil prices and moderation of growth in
exports
1.22. If oil and commodity prices remain elevated,
the CAD will remain significant (Chart 1.13), although
higher growth in software exports and remittances may
provide some cushion. Financing of CAD is going to be
a challenge as advanced countries begin exiting from
their accommodative monetary policy stance. This could
slow down capital inflows to EMEs, including India, as
investors rebalance their portfolios.
CAD continued to be financed by volatile portfolio
flows while FDI remained subdued
1.23. Capital flows have been found to be more volatile
in emerging economies than in advanced economies.
Further, in the post-crisis period, it has been observed
that the share of debt creating flows have increased
while that of FDI has declined, in general, among the
emerging economies. IMF has observed that monetary
tightening by U.S., especially if unanticipated, leads to
decline in capital flows to economies having exposure
to the U.S.
1.24. In case of India, the portfolio flows were stable
during 2009-10 but turned volatile during 2010-11
reflecting the uncertainties at both global and domestic
Source: RBI.
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levels (Chart 1.14). Thus, financing of CAD may face
considerable risk as FDI, though stable, has not
been exhibiting momentum. The composition and
volatility of capital flows could have implications
for external vulnerabilities, warranting close
monitoring.
1.25. Some of the measures to ameliorate risks arising
from capital flows are development of deep and liquid
domestic financial markets, stronger macroeconomic and
prudential policies and supervision, fiscal restraint and
strong institutions.
Fiscal consolidation process to continue in 2011-12 but
the quality and pace may matter
1.26. The Union Budget 2011-12 has restarted the
process of fiscal consolidation, which was temporarily
put in abeyance in response to the crisis. There are,
however, risks to the deficit projections of 2011-12 as
subsidies are likely to exceed the budgetary provisions,
given sharply higher international commodity prices
(Chart 1.15). The Budget’s lower projection of subsidies
for 2011-12 is subject to the underlying assumption of
no major variation in international fertilizer and
petroleum prices during the entire span of 2011-12,
which may not hold. The process of fiscal consolidation
needs to be carried forward on both revenue and
expenditures sides, with a sharper focus on the latter.
Containment of subsidies by raising domestic prices of
petroleum products and fertilizers should be a building
block of this strategy.
1.27. The rising international oil prices may generate
pressures on the fiscal situation in case there is a delay
in the corresponding adjustment in domestic prices,
leading to larger subsidy expenditure towards under-
recoveries of downstream oil public sector units.
Furthermore, the introduction of the National Food
Security Bill may also have additional expenditure
implications. Moreover, the quality of fiscal
consolidation remains a concern.
Higher interest costs and commodity prices may put
pressure on corporate margins
1.28. Reflecting monetary tightening, interest payment
by the corporate sector has been rising and is likely to
continue in the near future (Chart 1.16). This is likely to
adversely impact the margins. Further, high and rising
Portfolio Investment 2011
FDI 2011FDI 2010
Portfolio Investment 2010
Chart 1.14: Net FDI and Portfolio Flows
Source: RBI.
N
o
v.
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
U
S$
b
n
.
A
p
r.
M
ay
Ju
n
.
Ju
l.
A
u
g.
Se
p
.
O
ct
.
D
ec
.
Ja
n
.
Fe
b
.
M
ar
.
Source: RBI.
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2
0
0
0
-0
1
2
0
0
1
-0
2
2
0
0
2
-0
3
2
0
0
3
-0
4
2
0
0
4
-0
5
2
0
0
5
-0
6
2
0
0
6
-0
7
2
0
0
7
-0
8
2
0
0
8
-0
9
2
0
0
9
-1
0
(R
E
)
2
0
1
0
-1
1
(B
E
)
Pe
r
ce
n
t
to
G
D
P
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Pe
r
ce
n
t
to
G
D
P
Chart 1.15: Deficit and Debt (Centre and States)
Gross fiscal deficit Gross primary deficit Revenue deficit
Combined total liabilities of Centre & States (Right Scale)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Pe
r
ce
n
t
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4(P)
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11
Chart 1.16: Corporate Sector Performance
Growth in Interest payment (Right Scale)
Gross profits to sales Interest to gross profits
Interest coverage(Times)
Source: RBI.
14
Chapter I Macroeconomic Outlook
commodity prices create cost pressures to firms and also
reduce the real personal disposable income in the hands
of households.
Share of household sector credit records a decline but
asset impairment in household sector remains high
compared to the systemic average
1.29. The share of private consumption is expected to
decline marginally during 2010-11. In tandem, the share
of retail credit in total advances also declined marginally
thereby indicating that the risk from indebtedness of
households to the banking sector has not increased
during this period (Chart 1.17). Impairment of assets in
the retail portfolio of banks remains higher than the
systemic average but is witnessing some correction
(Chart 1.18). Unlike the experience of some advanced
economies, the asset impairment is relatively lower in
housing sector and witnessing correction (Chart 1.19).
Concluding Remarks
1.30. Notwithstanding some improvement in the global
macroeconomic environment and associated global risks,
considerable uncertainties contribute to the continuance
of global risks at elevated levels. Growth is expected to
decline among most advanced as well as emerging and
developing economies during the current year.
Concomitantly, world trade is also likely to witness
deceleration. Despite some moderation, global
imbalances continue to persist implying that the process
of rebalancing may take long and may require stronger
policy measures. Reemergence and persistence of
sovereign debt problems has posed additional challenges
and is expected to prolong global recovery.
1.31. Slackening of global recovery, high oil and
commodity prices, sovereign debt problem in the Euro
area periphery intensifying and some slowdown in
domestic investment demand may pose downside risks
to the growth of the domestic economy. High prices of
commodities, including oil, are also expected to
adversely impact the current account balance, fiscal
balance, households spending, and margins of corporates
which may collectively pose some downside risks to the
performance of the financial sector.  Elevated inflation
rate and rising interest rate may also impact on the
balance sheet of financial entities.
Chart 1.19: Impairment of Housing Assets
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Chart 1.17: Household Consumption and Borrowing
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Chapter II
Financial Markets
Several advanced economies (AEs) are trying to break the mutually reinforcing cycle of low growth
and high indebtedness. Very few have made progress that is promising, on this count. Heightened
sovereign risk concerns may increase funding costs for not just sovereigns but financial institutions
also which still face a substantial wall of financing needs. Competition among sovereigns and financial
institutions for funding comes at a time when there is near-consensus among investors about stronger
prospects in emerging market economies (EMEs). Given this backdrop, a small shock could have
potential negative feedback effects that threaten markets beyond AEs. EMEs in turn are looking to
shield themselves from capital flows in excess of their absorption capacity to prevent imbalances from
developing in their own economies. In India, there are early signs of a greater reliance on foreign
sources of funding. The flow and stock effects of greater internationalisation of the Indian markets,
institutions and funding need to be prudently monitored and managed.
International Markets
2.1 Global financial markets remained orderly during
the period since the release of the previous Financial
Stability Report (FSR). Two events of systemic
significance, the Japanese earthquake and conflict in
Libya, caused sharp corrections in financial markets but
their immediate impact appears to be waning slowly.
Rate hike expectations for the year in US have fallen
2.2 Monetary policy in AEs continues to remain
accommodative. The Federal Reserve’s policy rate, the
Federal Funds Target Rate stands at 0 - 0.25 per cent,
the second Quantitative Easing (QE II) programme of
US$ 600 billion is likely to conclude in June 2011 but
the Federal Reserve would continue to reinvest the
principal payments from its securities holdings. 10-year
US treasury bond yields were trading below 3 per cent
after the release of lower than expected rise in US
payrolls data in early-June (Chart 2.1). Federal Reserve
Chairman Bernanke has linked “sustained period of job
creation” with a “truly established” recovery. The most
notable development of this period has been the secular
decline in the US dollar against most currencies (Chart
2.2), of both advanced and emerging markets. The US
economic data has been soft enough to keep
expectations of interest rate hike in check, but not weak
enough to not sustain a strong growth. Expectations of
rate hike by the Federal Reserve by December 2011 which
Chart 2.1: 10-year Bond Yields (in per cent)
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Chart 2.2: US dollar Against Advanced (DXY ) and
Emerging Asian Currencies (ADXY )
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were growing earlier in the year have since receded
(Chart 2.3). This has allowed risk appetite to remain strong,
and the US dollar to be used as a funding currency for risk
asset trades. US equity indices traded with a positive bias
during the period (Chart 2.4) with investors favouring stocks
with greater exposure to emerging markets.
Withdrawal of monetary accommodation in Euroarea
has begun at an uncertain pace
2.3 Meanwhile, in Europe, anticipation of policy
normalisation in Euro-area has led to a steady rise in
the Euro against major currencies, particularly, the US
dollar, where policy would remain accommodative for a
longer period. The European Central Bank (ECB) raised
its policy rate, the refinance rate, by 25 bps to 1.25 per
cent in its meeting on April 7, 2011. The currency,
however, fell after ECB kept its policy rate unchanged
in its meeting in May 2011 and President Trichet did
not meet expectations about further rate hikes in the
market3. The Euro fell heavily against major currencies
after the May 2011 meeting, and has remained soft with
the emergence of greater uncertainties in regard to
Greece. European equity has remained range bound.
Prospects for UK and Japan have muddled
2.4 In the UK, inflation remained above the target of
the Bank of England (BoE) while growth remained weak.
BoE expects inflation to rise further this year and remain
above its target of 2 per cent in 2012. UK equity and
bond markets remained orderly but directionless. The
Pound sterling gained from general US dollar weakness.
In Japan, the earthquake in March 2011, which caused
large scale destruction to capital stock, rattled financial
markets. Japanese production and growth are expected
to remain subdued until later this year when the repair
work would give a boost to output in the economy. The
equity market is yet to recover its initial losses while
the bond market yields which initially rose on fears of
another round of fiscal expansion fell back as its impact
wore off. The Japanese yen rallied in the wake of the
earthquake on fears that there would be large scale
Source: Bloomberg.
Chart 2.3: Federal Funds Implied Probability of Target Rate in
Federal Open Markets Committee Meeting in
December 2011 Based on Federal Funds Futures Contracts
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Chart 2.4: Stock Indices (normalised, July 1, 2010 = 100)
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1 DXY or the Dollar index indicates the international value of the US dollar against a basket of 6 major world currencies. The Euro has the highest weight
in the index at 57.6 per cent followed by Japanese yen at 13.6 per cent, Pound sterling at 11.9 per cent, Canadian dollar at 9.1 per cent, Swedish krona at
4.2 per cent and Swiss franc at 3.6 per cent. An increase in its value suggests appreciation of the US dollar.
2 ADXY is the Bloomberg - JP Morgan Asia Dollar index that is a trade and liquidity weighted index of ten Asian currencies against the US dollar. Chinese
yuan has the highest weightage at 35.9 per cent and that of Indian rupee is at 7.8 per cent. An increase in its value suggests depreciation of the US dollar.
3 President Trichet’s press conference after the rate setting meeting is a key event for financial markets that pick on the use of the phrase “strong
vigilance” in relation to price stability objective as a signal for further rate hikes. Reluctance of President Trichet to use the phrase led to disappointment
in the market about the pace of rate hikes.
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repatriation by Japanese financial firms of their
investments abroad. These fears, however, proved
unfounded. The currency remained very volatile for a
period following the earthquake in March 2011
(Chart 2.5). The sharp rise in the currency was
successfully reversed with joint intervention by Japan
and other advanced country central banks.
An earthquake transmits shocks to the financial system
2.5 Initial assessments by the Japanese Cabinet Office
put the damage to the economy’s capital stock at around
$240 billion, which is more than double the damage
following the Kobe earthquake in 1995. GDP growth for
Japan in 2011 is expected to be lowered with Q1 growth
at (-) 3.7 per cent despite the massive rebuilding effort
sought to be launched by Japan in the second half of the
year. In the first two business days after the earthquake,
the Nikkei stock index fell almost 20 per cent, and
Japanese sovereign 5 year CDS spreads jumped almost
50 basis points from around 100 basis points and 10-
year government bond yields rose 10 basis points from
around 1.2 per cent. The Japanese yen became very
volatile in the aftermath of the disaster.
2.6 The Bank of Japan (BoJ) responded swiftly to the
challenge. In the first week after the earthquake, it
injected ¥37 trillion (US$ 439 billion) into financial
markets to ensure ample liquidity. It also increased the
amount of its Asset Purchase Program by ¥5 trillion, with
the aim of keeping premia on risk assets low. In response
to the yen’s sharp appreciation, the BoJ, together with
other G7 countries, embarked on a coordinated
intervention in the foreign exchange market.
Questions over sustainability of European sovereign
debt remain
2.7 The concerns with regard to sustainability of
sovereign debt in the Euro-area do not appear as be
localised to Greece, Ireland and Portugal (Chart 2.6)
which have sought bailout packages from European
Union and IMF. The adverse and mutually reinforcing
facets of the problem, namely, low economic growth and
high indebtedness in many advanced economies (AEs)
has led to an unstable equilibrium.
Fiscal concerns could spread to bigger economies
2.8 The European debt concerns pertain to relatively
smaller economies of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. There
are early signs of it spilling over into bigger European
Source: Bloomberg.
Chart 2.5: US$/JPY Spot Rate and 1 Month Volatilities
(in per cent)
Realised Volatility Implied Volatility US$/JPY (RHS)
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economies. S&P and Fitch placed Italy and Belgium on
negative outlook in May 2011. Both countries have high
debt, difficult fiscal prospects, and political challenges
ahead. The moves added pressure to a battered euro area.
Rising debt and deficit levels of bigger AEs, like US, UK
and Japan are also inviting the attention of rating
agencies. The concerns expressed by them have so far
not rubbed off on risk or term premia on the long term
debt of these sovereigns. The need to raise larger sums
from the financial markets by AEs is coinciding with
significant refunding requirements of international
banks, mainly European ones. The wall of refinancing
by such banks has to be carried in competition with not
only domestic sovereigns but with emerging market
assets which are perceived to have more favourable risk-
reward attributes.
Geopolitical tensions and stagflation risks
2.9 Continuing tensions in the Arab world and the
military conflict in Libya have had a direct impact on
energy markets. Financial markets typically have low
appetite for political risks. Equity, bond, credit and
foreign exchange markets have corrected in view of the
violence in Libya. A lengthy conflict in Libya, possibly
combined with uncertainties about the viability of
nuclear energy post-Fukushima, puts sustained upward
pressure on global energy prices (Chart 2.7). This could
add to existing concerns about inflationary pressures –
not just in EMEs but in AEs where growth is still not on
sound footing.
2.10 The oil industry’s supply dynamics have always
been prone to disruption owing to low excess capacity
and inventory levels (Chart 2.8). Precautionary
stockpiling during such periods of political tension can
aggravate the price moves in the energy markets causing
distress to importing countries. At the same time, the
higher revenues earned by the producers do not
translate into any significant rise in export potential
for others when the price moves are sharp. These
developments have come at a time of high food and
energy led inflation the world over. A resurfacing of
stagflation risks of decades ago owing to oil supply
shocks cannot be ruled out if the unrest were to spread
to bigger oil exporters.
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Chart 2.7: Near Month Energy Futures Prices (in US$)
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Financialisation of commodity markets increases asset
correlation
2.11 Commodity prices (Chart 2.9) have traded with a
positive bias since the global recovery and continued
their advent during the period under review. The
gyrations in commodity prices are often interpreted as
early indicators of the changing prospects of the global
economy, particularly that of EMEs. Increased
financialisation of the energy and commodities market
i.e. securitised commodity - linked instruments that are
considered an investment rather than a risk
management tool through Exchange Traded Funds,
structured products and other vehicles has caused fears
that genuine hedgers might get ‘crowded out’. There is,
however, little evidence of financial investors as being
responsible for high commodity prices today. However
their actions could be adding to price volatility and
correlation of financial and commodity markets
(Chart 2.10). This phenomenon facilitates faster
emission of stress from commodities to financial
markets.
Domestic Markets
2.12 Domestic markets remained orderly without
stress. This is evidenced by the Financial Stress Indicator
(FSI)5 (Chart 2.19).
Autonomous factors cause banking system liquidity
to remain in deficit
2.13 The banking system liquidity has remained in
deficit mode for almost a year as reflected in the
Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) operations of the
Reserve Bank (Chart 2.11). The factors affecting it have
been the increase in required reserve resulting from
the growth in bank credit and Net Demand and Time
Liabilities (NDTL) and currency in circulation. Inspite
of a sharp turnaround in Government cash balances with
the Reserve Bank during the current financial year,
liquidity in the system remained in a deficit mode
reflecting an increase in liquidity requirements of the
economy. Volatility in the liquidity situation needs to
be actively managed by the Reserve Bank.
4 Each component in various segments of commodities in the chart is as per the composition of the Reuters - Jeffries CRB Index.
5 The FSI is designed to capture the contemporaneous severity of the developments as they transpire in equity markets, bond markets, foreign exchange
markets and the banking sector. Financial stress is defined as the force exerted on economic agents by uncertainty and changing expectations of loss in
financial markets and institutions. Stress increases as uncertainty or expectation of increase in financial loss increase. The variables are selected for their
timeliness, forward looking information and systemic relevance and availability of data.
Chart 2.9: Commodity Price Movements
(normalised, 2 July 2010 = 100)
4
Ju
l-
10
Se
p
-1
0
N
o
v-
10
Ja
n
-1
1
M
ar
-1
1
M
ay
-1
1
70
100
130
160
190
Grains Soft Commodities Energy
Industrial Metals Precious Metals
Source: Bloomberg.
Source: Bloomberg.
Chart 2.10: 30 – Day Rolling Correlation of Reuters –
Jeffries CRB Index with various Assets
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2.14 The tightness in liquidity conditions on account
of autonomous and frictional factors got reflected in
money market rates (Chart 2.12). The call money rates
generally hovered around the upper bound of the LAF
corridor. Similarly, the interest rates in the CD market
moved in tandem with the call rates, except during a
brief period leading to March 31, 2011, when banks
raised funds prior to the annual closing of accounts.
Commercial Paper (CP) and Certificate of Deposit (CD)
rates touched double digits and treasury bill rates too
rose above 8 per cent on occasions. The rates in the
collateralised segments generally continued to move in
tandem with the call rate, and stayed below it.
Transaction volumes in the collateralised borrowing and
lending obligation (CBLO) and market repo segments
showed marginal improvement in Q4 compared to Q3
of 2010-11. Banks and primary dealers continued to
remain the major group of borrowers in the collateralised
segments whereas mutual funds (MFs) remained the
major group of lenders of funds in these segments. The
collateralised segment of the money market continued
to remain the predominant money market segment,
accounting for more than 80 per cent of the total volume
during this period.
2.15 The government bond yields rose across the yield
curve during the period under review with shorter
maturities rising slightly faster (Chart 2.13). As a result,
the yield curve flattened. Initially, there was a downward
bias to yields on account of announcement by SEBI on
auction of unutilised investment limits for FIIs for
government securities and corporate bonds and a lower
than expected April-September borrowing amount
announced by the Central Government. Yields have,
however, hardened with inflation rising beyond
expectations on each occasion since September 2010
(May, April, March and February 2011 Wholesale Price
Index (WPI) stood at 9.1, 8.7, 8.9 and 8.3 per cent
respectively) raising expectations of further monetary
tightening (Charts 2.14 & 2.15). In early-June, 2 - year
bond yields exceeded those of 10 - year bonds causing a
minor inversion in the yield curve.
2.16 The Indian rupee remained in a range against the
US dollar during the period under review despite several
6 Bloomberg survey of professional forecasters, bank economists and investment analysts before the release of the WPI inflation figures is used.
Source: Bloomberg.
Chart 2.12: Money Market Rates in India (in per cent)
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Chart 2.14: WPI Inflation Forecasts and Actuals, and RBI Repo Rate
(in per cent)
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adverse factors, namely, high crude oil prices and slump
in FDI. It was initially aided by a recovery in portfolio
flows, including equity and debt capital (debt capital
flows have remained strong since last year) (Chart 2.16)
and narrowing of current account deficit. Banking capital
which witnessed net outflows in Q3 2010-11 turned
positive in Q4 2010-11. The general US dollar weakness
globally has helped the Rupee further its gains.
The correction in equity markets as a result of high
inflation numbers and the attendant rate hikes during
the period weakened the Rupee which gave up most of
its gains.
Financialisation versus internationalisation of
Rupee
2.17 The offshore trading activity in the Indian rupee
has been increasing at a rate much higher than that
estimated by market participants (2010 Triennial Central
Bank Survey of BIS). Some recent work on the share of
offshore markets by Robert McCauley and Michela
Scatigna (BIS Quarterly review – March 2011 and earlier
by Ho et al (2005) and McCauley (2010)) has attempted
to provide simple benchmarks for ‘turnover’ and
‘location’ of currency trading, and highlight some
important cases of deviations from those benchmarks.
Their report shows that as the GDP rises, a currency
trades in greater multiples of the home economy’s
underlying international trade (“financialisation”) and
trades to a greater extent outside its home market
(“internationalisation”).
2.18 On the basis of the relationship between turnover
and income, Indian rupee stands out, as it trades more
in proportion to India’s trade (exports and imports) and
income. This may partly be explained by the relatively
large outright foreign investments in India’s equity
market and also by the rapid growth in onshore rupee
futures market. Also, the turnover in Indian rupee, which
is high-yielding, benefits from ‘carry trade’ strategies in
forward markets (both deliverable and non-deliverable)
and futures (Galati et al (2007)). The relatively higher
financialisation of the Indian rupee compared to the
Chinese renminbi reflects the more liberal foreign
exchange regime put in place in India. India has already
achieved current account convertibility and has a more
open capital account.
Source: Bloomberg.
Chart 2.15: Bond Market Yields in 10-year Maturity (in per cent)
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Chart 2.16: FII Equity and Debt Daily Net Flows (US$ million)
and Exchange Rate of Rupee
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Increasing reliance by corporates on foreign currency
borrowing
2.19 The two track growth and divergent course of
monetary policy followed in EMEs vis-à-vis AEs has led
to an ever-widening interest rate differential. This has
natural implications for interest rate-sensitive capital
flows into the EMEs (Chart 2.17). Over the past few
months, there has been a discernible increase in External
Commercial Borrowings (ECBs) registered with the
Reserve Bank, both under the Automatic as well as the
Approval Routes (Table 2.1) and the aggregate ECB flows
for 2010-11 were almost at the pre-crisis levels. Increased
reliance by corporate on foreign currency funding also
increases the currency mismatches in their balance
sheets.
Substitution of domestic bank credit
2.20 Bank credit has historically been the dominant
funding source for corporate in India. However, with
the easy access to foreign currency credit and availability
of alternate domestic funding channels, particularly
the corporate debt market, some amount of
disintemediation in the financial system is already
evident. An internal study was conducted to empirically
show the relationship between ECB and corporate bond
outstandings and the outstanding bank credit Granger
Causality test under VAR(1)7 framework has been used
for this study. The first difference of log of all the three
variables was taken for the modeling exercise. The result
for Granger Causality of changes in outstandings of
corporate bond and ECB to bank credit outstandings is
presented in Table 2.2, whereas, estimated parameters
for bank credit equation is shown in Table 2.3.
2.21 It may be observed that the null hypothesis that
corporate bonds and ECB jointly do not granger-cause
bank credit to change cannot be accepted. In other words,
the two variables, ECB and corporate bonds jointly
influence bank credit. Further, both, coefficients of ECB
and corporate bonds are negative, which implies that a
rise in the two variables causes a fall in Rupe
denominated domestic bank credit. As access to foreign
currency borrowing is regulated in price as well as
quantum terms, given the capital account management
Table 2.1: ECBs Registered with the Reserve Bank (in US$ million)
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11
ECB 22,224 15,462 17,363 24,481
FCCBs 6,103 463 3,362 1,270
Total 28,327 15,925 20,725 25,751
Table 2.2: VAR Granger Causality
Excluded Variable
DLCorporate_Bonds DLECB All
Chi-sq 5.94 2.36 7.50
p-value 0.01 0.12 0.02
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
7 Vector Autoregression (1)
Table 2.3: Parameter Estimates
Equation Variables Parameter p-Value
estimate
DLBank_Credit Constant 0.10 0.00
DLBank_Credit (-1) -0.28 0.11
DLECB(-1) -0.13 0.14
DLCorporate_Bonds (-1) -0.45 0.02
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Source: RBI and Bloomberg.
Chart 2.17: Trend in ECBs and FCCBs and Interest Rate
Differentials in 10-years
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framework, true disintermediation away from the
banking system would be critically contingent on the
development of a deep corporate bond market.
Growing currency mismatches  of the national balance
sheet
2.22 The trend of greater reliance on external
borrowings by firms in India over the years is showing
up on the country’s International Investment Position
(IIP). The non-official sector’s exposure to currency risk
has increased in the last few years, with an increasing
net liability position vis-à-vis non-residents (Chart 2.18).
Foreign claims on Indian assets denominated in Indian
rupee is far greater than that of residents in foreign
currency denominated overseas assets. India’s net
external liabilities have increased from US$ 47 billion
as on March 31, 2004 to US$ 158 billion as on March 31,
2010. It may be mentioned that these external liabilities
include the foreign currency loans given by overseas
branches of Indian banks to domestic corporates. There
has been a consistent increase in such borrowings over
the past few years (Table 2.4).
2.23  The net liability of the non-official sector
(referred to as the Adjusted net IIP in the chart), has
risen even more from US$ 160 billion to US$ 437 billion.
This means that the aggregate translation risk for the
non-official sector arises from a depreciation of the local
currency, i.e. the Indian rupee. China has a net asset
position on its IIP. Its net IIP improved from US$ 1.2
trillion in 2007 to US$ 1.8 trillion in 2009 and its
exposure is to an appreciation of its local currency, the
Renminbi. The contrasting risk exposures of the national
balance sheets can be observed in the prices for 25 delta
risk reversals8 on the exchange rates. For Indian rupee,
the figure is always positive whereas for the Chinese
renminbi, which is aided by a surplus on the current
account, it rose above zero only during extreme risk
aversion of 2008-09 (Chart 2.19).
Rising refunding risks of corporates
2.24 During the three financial years in 2005-06 to
2007-08, Indian firms raised foreign capital through
8 The risk reversal is a skew in the demand for out-of-the-money options at high strikes compared to low strikes and can be interpreted as the option
market’s view of the most likely direction of the spot movement over the next maturity date. It is defined as the implied volatility for call options minus
the implied volatility of put options on the base currency. In the case of both Indian rupee and Chinese yuan, the base currency is US dollar. A positive
number means that market participants are willing to pay a slightly higher price to buy call options on US dollars when compared to put options on US
dollars and vice versa.
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Chart 2.19: 25 Delta Risk Reversals in the 6 Month Maturity for
US$/INR and US$/CNY (in per cent)
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Table 2.4: Lenders’ Profile of ECBs (in US$ million)
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11
Total ECB 28,327 15,925 20,725 25,751
Of which lent by :
Overseas branches of 2,880 1,495 2,303 5,127
Indian banks (10.2) (9.4)  (11.1)  (19.9)
Foreign Bank 17,272 8,864 8,438 13,692
(61.0) (55.7) (40.7) (53.2)
International Financial 1,180 2,643 3,133 2,849
Institutions  (4.2)  (16.6)  (15.1) (11.1)
International Investors 6,373 463 3,334 1,455
(22.5) (2.9)  (16.1)  (5.7)
Foreign Collaborator/ 621 2,458 3,514 2,597
Equity Holder (2.2) (15.4) (17.0) (10.1)
Note: figures in brackets represent the percentage for each category of lenders.
Source: RBI.
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Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs) which were
very popular at the time. The conversion price on such
bonds was 25 - 150 per cent higher than the prevailing
stock price at the time of issuance and they carried zero
or very low coupons. This is reflected by the consistent
growth in FCCB issuance during 2005-08. FCCB proceeds
were meant for overseas acquisition (19 per cent) and
import of capital goods (16 per cent) as per returns filed
by firms.
2.25 FCCBs, which are normally issued for a maturity
period of more than five years, worth more than US$ 7
billion are maturing by March 2013 (Chart 2.20). Of
these, CRISIL estimates that “FCCBs worth ` 220 - 240
billion may not get converted into equity shares, as the
current stock prices of issuing companies are
significantly below their conversion prices… The Nifty
is now only about 10 per cent below its highs in January
2008. But many of these companies, accounting for more
than half of the outstanding FCCBs, are trading at a
discount of more than 50 per cent to their January 2008
prices”. More than a few firms potentially face severe
funding problems in the next two years which may not
remain confined to their industries.
Herd behaviour of portfolio capital
2.26 During 2010, Indian capital markets received a
very significant amount of net portfolio capital flows
(US$ 29 billion in equities and US$ 10 billion in debt)
apart from a large sum under the heads of ECB and trade
credit. In particular, between August and October 2010,
as much as US$ 18 billion was received under portfolio
equity capital. IMF has stated9 that “Econometric results
suggest portfolio flows to emerging markets tend to be
persistent and have high degrees of autocorrelation…
High persistence in flows is often attributed to herding
behaviour”.
2.27 To test for persistence of flows, autocorrelation
exercise for capital flows into India was done for various
time periods beginning 2007 (Table 2.5). It shows that
portfolio equity flows are autocorrelated (in a statistically
significant manner) while that of debt flows are not in
the first and second order (Lags of 1 and 2 in daily
observations). Net overall portfolio flows too are
9 Global Financial Stability Report, October 2010
Table 2.5: Autocorrelation Coefficients at the First and Second Lag
Level for Daily Net FII Flows in Equity and Debt into India
Period Lag FII Debt FII Equity Total FII
Jan 2007 until May 2011 1 -0.03(0.39) 0.41(0.00) 0.29(0.00)
2 0.04(0.33) 0.29(0.00) 0.24(0.00)
Jan 2010 until May 2011 1 0.23(0.00) 0.43(0.00) 0.36(0.00)
2 0.05(0.00) 0.33(0.00) 0.25(0.00)
Note: The number given in the bracket is the p-value for the test statistic. It is the
lowest level of significance at which the null hypothesis that the test statistic does
not have any autocorrelation (upto the specified lag level).
Source: RBI Staff Calculations, Bloomberg
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autocorrelated (statistically significantly) for all periods,
presumably being dominated by equity flows. Debt FII
flows into government and corporate bond markets in
India face overall caps.
2.28 The study shows that capital flows tend to be
influenced by past behaviour. The inflow of funds into
EM countries, like India, is often self reinforcing with
success in initial investments by a fund leading to further
allocation by the same fund as well as emulation by
others. Likewise, withdrawal at times of stress by a few
becomes more widespread owing to herd behaviour even
when fundamentals do not warrant action by all. The
strains arising out of Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) discussed above have unsettled global markets
and a return to higher volatility and risk aversion cannot
be ruled out.
Debt inflows have offset equity outflows
2.29 While equity market in India has corrected lower
with FII investors pulling money out of it, the bond
markets have been relatively stable. FII net outflows from
equity market in January and February 2011, has been
more than offset by the bond market net inflows
(Charts 2.21 and 2.22). The inflows into bond market
can be attributed to the recent expansion of limits
for FII investment in corporate bonds and the fact
that tight liquidity conditions in the interbank
markets have propelled bond yields to attractive multi-
year highs.
2.30 The pursuit of easy monetary policy by the US
Fed and the other central banks and the resultant global
liquidity has had little impact on the domestic
macroeconomic situation so far. The Reserve Bank is
committed to use a prudential mix of policy
instruments to contain any adverse impact of such
policies. At the same time, it is recognised that the
global recovery will not be firmly established unless
and until the US economy is surely and irreversibly
restored to its potential growth and low unemployment
levels prevalent pre-crisis. Any US domestic policy
framework which makes this possible is in interest of
the EMEs and the adverse fallouts of policies
undertaken to achieve that have to be addressed with
appropriate policy instruments available at the latter’s
disposal.
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Chart 2.21: FII Gross Monthly Purchases and Sales
in Equity Markets (in crore)`
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Chart 2.22: FII Gross Monthly Purchases and
Sales in Debt Markets (in crore)`
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Smart Order Routing (SOR) in Indian equity facilitates
algotrading
2.31 Based on the proposal received from stock
exchanges and market participants, Securities and
Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has introduced the facility
of SOR which allows the brokers’ trading engines to
systematically choose the execution destination based
on factors viz. price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution
and settlement, size, nature or any other consideration
relevant to the execution of the order10. This facility
would help brokers execute client orders efficiently by
providing the best price available across multiple trading
venues (Stock Exchanges) through the use of High
Frequency Trading (HFT) or Algotrading (Box 2.1). Indian
securities market has shown remarkable resilience to
systemic events previously. It would need to guard
against ‘flash crashes’ of the kind that rattled US equity
markets on May 6, 2010.
Forecast of FSI suggests benign conditions until August
2011
2.32 The Financial Stress Indicator is a measure that is
designed to capture the contemporaneous severity of the
Box 2.1 Algorithm trading / High Frequency Trading
Trading in financial markets has changed substantially with the
growth of new information processing and communications
technologies over the last two decades. Algorithmic trading, in
the context of trading on modern (electronic platform based)
financial markets, refers to an automated trading process using
computer programs (algorithms) for making certain trading
decisions (timing, price, order - type and quantity), submitting
and managing trading orders. In Algorithmic (‘Algo’) trading,
traders connect their computers directly with trading systems
of exchanges known as electronic communication networks
(ECNs) or Smart Order Routing (SOR). A computer algorithm
then monitors streaming price quotes and other relevant
information on different ECNs and places orders without human
intervention. High Frequency Trades are conducted in all asset
classes - equities, derivatives, currency and fixed-income.
According to some estimates, at present, HFT accounts for 70-
80 per cent of trading volume in US and 40 per cent of trading
volumes in Europe for equities.
The “flash crash” of May 6, 2010 is widely reported as a case
that illustrates markets’ vulnerabilities linked to HFT related
practices. The May 6, 2010 ‘flash crash’, a stock market crash
event, in which the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) fell
about 900 points, is the second largest intraday point swing in
its history. Though the Index recovered those losses within
minutes, a joint report of the Securities Exchange Commission
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission detailed how
the HFT systems started selling the E - Mini S&P 500 contracts
aggressively, accelerating the effect of an unusually large sale
by a mutual fund and contributing to the sharp price declines
that day.
As compared to the developed markets (US and Europe), HFT is
at an early stage in India but Algorithmic trading is picking up
fast since the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)
approved the use of Algotrading in April 2008. The National
Stock Exchange (NSE) and the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE)
have invested in necessary technological platforms to facilitate
HFT and have offered the ‘co-location’ facility (whereby the
members can house their servers at / near the exchange’s
system-engine to save precious microseconds in execution of
an order) to interested members.
developments as they transpire in equity markets, bond
markets, foreign exchange markets and the banking sector.
In order to forecast FSI, univariate time series models
(ARIMA, ARCH, and GARCH) has been used to forecast
each of the component indicators of the FSI. The projected
FSI for the period until August 2011 is well below the
constructed threshold value11 of 0.9 (Chart 2.23).
10 Source : Securities and Exchange Board of India
11 An indicator is said to issue a signal of stress whenever it exceeds a given threshold level. Threshold levels are chosen so as to strike a balance between
the risk of missing many crises and the risks of having many false signals. These risk situations would happen, respectively, if the signal is issued only
when the evidence is overwhelming, and if a signal is issued at the slightest possibility of a crisis. If the threshold is too “tight” to reduce the number of
false signals, the type I error (rejecting the null hypothesis of crisis when in fact there is a crisis) is large. In contrast, if the threshold is too “slack,” i.e.
too close to normal behaviour, it is likely to catch all the crises but it is also likely to announce many crises that never happened. In this case, the type II
error (accepting the null hypothesis of a crisis when in fact there is none) will be large.
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Chart 2.23: Financial Stress Indicator (with Projections upto
August 2011 in Green)
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Concluding Remarks
2.33 The macrofinancial environment for stability has
improved in the last few months since the release of
the previous FSR. There are, however, lingering concerns,
some of which have aggravated since then. The sovereign
debt situation in Europe appears to be spreading to the
rest of the AEs which are bigger and have much greater
systemic significance. Robust demand and growth in
EMEs have strong structural and cyclical impetus to
commodity prices but the increasing financialisation of
commodity markets together with higher speculative
interest might be distorting the tradeoffs between
inflation and growth for many AEs and EMEs and
escalating volatility. This in turn causes shocks from
commodity markets to spread to other markets. If bond
market sentiments were to turn, particularly, on fears
of inflation, banking and financial institutions in AEs
which are still recovering from the financial crisis could
be hit hard. The impact of the two major systemic events
of the period under review, viz. conflict in Libya
(and unrest in MENA) and the Japanese earthquake has
been limited so far. If tensions in MENA continue or
spill over into bigger economies in the region, the impact
on Indian financial markets would be difficult to contain,
particularly because India’s fiscal improvement is
expected to slow this year.
2.34 In India, the higher inflation and the attendant
rate hikes have increased the attractiveness of overseas
borrowing in terms of interest rate differential and
availability of credit. Firms are exploring overseas
markets to raise money even without offsets for the
foreign currency liabilities that follow. Moreover, many
of them face bunched up maturities on FCCBs in the
next two years. The high and growing net external
liability position of residents exposes the country to the
risk of a sharp fall in the currency. Any potential adverse
fallout of accommodative monetary policies pursued
elsewhere need to be addressed with appropriate policy
action.
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Chapter III
Financial Institutions
Banks in advanced economies continued to face sluggish credit growth apart from their insufficient capitalisation
and weak funding positions that still seemed dependent on public support. The confidence in the banking
system was also adversely impacted due to renewed sovereign risks, particularly in the Euro area. As against
this, in India, banks remain well capitalised, with their asset quality and profitability showing considerable
improvement over the previous year. There was robust revival in credit off take during 2010-11 compared to the
subdued growth witnessed in 2009-10. Amid these developments, the upturn in credit growth called for caution
as this is a phenomenon often synonymous with less stringent credit risk assessments and potential to contribute
to asset impairments during the downturn of credit cycle. The fears of impending slowdown in the economy also
raised the concern of sustainability of the credit growth even as monetary tightening and macroprudential
measures to prevent overheating were underway. The liquidity position of the banks was adversely affected on
account of growing mismatches in the growth rates of deposit and credit, apart from the other structural factors
like gaps in the maturity profile of their assets and liabilities becoming bigger due to growing exposure to long
term infrastructure projects. The Banking Stability Map, introduced in the previous FSR to indicate relative
movements of select risk parameters of the banking system during a given period, indicated marginal increase
in the risks pertaining to liquidity compared to the previous year. However, the Banking Stability Indicator, also
introduced in the previous FSR, showed overall improved stability. In the co-operative sector, while the measures
to consolidate and strengthen the urban co-operative banks continued, the number of unlicensed rural co-
operatives entities came down as a result of steps initiated in this regard. The financial soundness indicators of
rural cooperative credit institutions, however, remained a matter of concern. The non-banking finance companies
showed improvement in their performance as a result of which their soundness indicators also improved. The
regulatory architecture of these companies continued to be tightened with a view to plug regulatory gaps and
prevent possible opportunities of regulatory arbitrage. Insurance sector has been covered for the first time in the
FSR. Although, the insurance sector does not contribute to the systemic risk in the manner the banking sector
does, it is a critical component of the financial system, being one of the key players in the financial markets. In
India, the insurance sector has grown deep and wide over the years, particularly after opening up of the sector
to the private players, and remains robust and well regulated.
Post-crisis Global Scene
Sovereign and bank funding risks remain key sources
of financial instability even as global system
witnessed ‘two speed recovery’
3.1 The world economy is expected to grow at about
4.5 per cent during 2011 and 2012. As against this, the
growth of advanced economies is expected to be only
2.5 per cent compared to the 6.5 per cent growth
expected in case of emerging and developing economies
(World Economic Outlook, IMF, April 2011). This ‘two
speed recovery’ has thrown unique policy challenges
for countries.
3.2 Sovereign balance sheets remained a key source
of financial instability, especially because of their
interconnectedness with banks. On the one hand, the
concerns over the sustainability of public debt have been
affecting the banks’ balance sheet creating adverse
feedback loops through real economy. On the other
hand, the volatility in the Euro area markets emanating
essentially from sovereign debt risks, has resulted in
erosion of investors’ demand making the task of
sovereign funding quite uncertain apart from driving
up sovereign yields and CDS spreads. Going forward,
the most pressing challenge for the advanced economies
is the funding of banks and sovereigns, particularly in
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some vulnerable Euro area countries (Charts 3.1 and
3.2).
3.3 Segments of the global banking system remain
vulnerable to further shocks. Despite improvements to
balance sheets and significant policy initiatives, some
banks remain insufficiently capitalised and vulnerable
to rising funding costs, which was evident in the rising
and elevated bank CDS spreads. Credit growth remained
very subdued in the advanced economies despite the
lending conditions having eased in the major advanced
economies. As against this, credit growth reached high
levels in many emerging market economies (EMEs),
particularly in Asia and Latin America.
Domestic Developments - Scheduled Commercial
Banks (SCBs)
Balance Sheet
Amid strong growth, some concerns owing to growing
reliance on market funds to fund robust credit growth
were discernible
3.4 The balance sheet structure1 of the SCBs
remained robust. Deposits continued to dominate the
liability side of the balance sheet while the profile of
bank assets, essentially held as part of the banking book,
also remained largely unchanged. However, certain
concerns were discernible in the balance sheet structure,
viz., increased reliance on market borrowings to fund
assets, increasing imbalances in the maturity profile of
assets and liabilities and potential addition to asset
impairments which could follow the rebound in credit
off take.
3.5 As at end March 2011, the balance sheet size of
SCBs increased by about 19 per cent primarily on
account of improved credit off take. The outstanding
credit had grown by 22.6 per cent during the year (17
per cent in the previous year) (Chart 3.3). As against
this, deposits lagged behind with growth of 18 per cent.
The gap was funded by increase in funds accessed from
market (CD issuances and borrowings) which increased
by 34.5 per cent over its position as at end March 2010.
The share of borrowings and CDs in banks’ liabilities
1 Deposits comprise about 79 per cent of total liabilities and the credit portfolio (advances and investments) constituted about 87 per cent of the assets,
the investments being about 30 per cent of the total assets.
Chart 3.1: Sovereign Funding Requirements
Source: GFSR, April 2011
(P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
2
0
1
1
G
D
P
)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
G
er
m
an
y
C
an
ad
a
U
n
it
ed
K
in
gd
o
m
Ir
el
an
d
Fr
an
ce
B
el
gi
u
m
Po
rt
u
ga
l
Sp
ai
n
It
al
y
U
n
it
ed
St
at
es
G
re
ec
e
Ja
p
an
Fiscal Deficit Maturing Debt
Source:
Note:
GFSR, April 2011
The data are for a sample of banks in each country.
(In percent of total debt)
Chart 3.2: Banking Funding Needs
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rose to about 10 per cent in 2011 from about 7.5 per
cent in 2006 (Chart 3.4).
3.6 The increased reliance of banks on borrowed
funds raised concerns about their liquidity position,
especially if such reliance were to increase further.
These concerns were further accentuated by a reduction
in the share of liquid assets in the total assets of the
banks (Chart 3.5). In particular, the period from October
2010 to February 2011, during which the systemic
liquidity conditions were strained, witnessed increased
CD issuances with interest rates rising to 9-10 per cent.
Increase in borrowings from market was particularly
evident in the case of public sector banks (PSBs) and
new private sector banks.
3.7 Concerns about increasing reliance on borrowed
funds were further exacerbated by growing mismatches
in the maturity profile of deposits and advances. While
more deposits than advances were getting re-priced in
the near term (less than a year) bucket, more advances
than deposits were maturing in 1-3 year and 3-5 years
buckets (Chart 3.6). These mismatches entailed
considerable rollover risks for banks.
3.8 At the current juncture, however, the reliance on
market borrowings was not very significant in absolute
terms. Also, concerns were alleviated by the accessibility
of banks to stable low cost deposits (current account
and savings account - CASA deposits) which stood at
about 35 per cent of total deposits (Chart 3.7).
Chart 3.4: Share of CDs and Borrowings in Liabilities
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
M
ar
-2
0
0
6
Ju
n
-2
0
0
6
Se
p
-2
0
0
6
D
ec
-2
0
0
6
M
ar
-2
0
0
7
Ju
n
-2
0
0
7
Se
p
-2
0
0
7
D
ec
-2
0
0
7
M
ar
-2
0
0
8
Ju
n
-2
0
0
8
Se
p
-2
0
0
8
D
ec
-2
0
0
8
M
ar
-2
0
0
9
Ju
n
-2
0
0
9
Se
p
-2
0
0
9
D
ec
-2
0
0
9
M
ar
-2
0
1
0
Ju
n
-2
0
1
0
Se
p
-2
0
1
0
D
ec
-2
0
1
0
M
ar
-2
0
1
1
p
er
ce
n
t
Source: RBI supervisory returns
Chart 3.5: Level of Liquid Assets
Source: RBI supervisory returns
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Chart 3.6: Maturity Profile of the Deposits and Advances
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Credit Growth
Credit growth revived; nonetheless caution was called
for to ensure quality of assets
3.9 Credit growth rebounded in 2010-11 with 22.6
per cent growth in outstanding credit after a subdued
performance in the previous year. The robust growth
in credit was a necessity in a developing economy
like India for sustaining high GDP growth and
improving the level of financialisation of the country
(credit to GDP ratio stood at about 73 per cent as at
end December 2010). Simultaneously, however
underwriting standards would need to be tightened in
order to ensure that the quality of credit does not
deteriorate, going forward.
3.10 To assess the impact of credit growth in India on
banks’ asset quality, an empirical study was conducted
to analyse the related trends in the periods identifiable
with pre-global financial crisis, its aftermath and the
post crisis phase. The study revealed that strong credit
growth was synonymous with lowering of the risk
perceptions leading to perceptible improvement in asset
quality, whereas slow down in credit growth was
followed by increase in impaired assets (Chart 3.8).
During March 2007 - September 2008, while the
outstanding credit growth remained relatively high at
about 24 per cent, NPAs had either decelerated or grew
Chart 3.8: Growth of Credit and NPAs during Phases of Upturn and Downturn (in per cent)
Source: RBI supervisory returns and RBI staff calculations
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by less than 10 per cent (left pane), as against which
during the slow down phase (middle pane) when the
credit off-take started declining and fell to 12-13 per
cent in December 2009, the growth in NPAs rose from
about 13 per cent in December 2008 to 30 per cent in
December 2009. The credit growth during 2010-11,
seemed comparable to the growth witnessed in pre-crisis
period. It was also being seen that there was substantial
deceleration in growth of NPAs (right pane). Apart from
reflecting cyclicality, the pattern was also indicative of
impairment in assets being actually initiated during
phases of rapid credit growth. Increased caution in credit
selection and stringent monitoring standards would
thus be necessary to ensure that the credit growth
remained immune to potential impairments, should a
slow down were to take place.
3.11  An analysis of growth in outstanding credit, gross
NPAs and Tier-I capital funds over the past one decade
also revealed similar trends. The analysis additionally
revealed that growth in capital funds was above (below)
its long term trend when credit growth exceeded (fell
short of) its long term trend. Thus, the phases of robust
credit off take warranted close monitoring as these could
be precursors to future asset impairments and
reductions in capital levels during the downturn of the
credit cycle (Chart 3.9).
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3.12  The periods of high credit growth have
the potential to give rise to credit boom like scenarios
(Box 3.1), which have often been identified to be
precursors to credit busts and financial crises. However,
devising methods to get a reliable estimate of
overheating in the system due to high credit growth is
Box 3.1: Are We Witnessing a Credit Boom?
It is widely believed that phases of credit booms preceded
majority of financial or banking crises. In an analysis of the
financial crises in the past, and episodes of credit booms as
defined by Mendoza and Terrones, it was observed in a BIS paper
(BIS Quarterly review, September 2010) that there were 17
episodes of financial crises which were preceded by credit booms
in a sample of 27 such crises.
Such phases of excessive credit booms have been defined to be
happening when the cyclical component of credit exceeds the
average historical cyclical component by 1.75 times the standard
deviations of the credit variable. Based on this definition, lower
limit for credit boom has been estimated and presented in the
Chart 3.10. It may be observed from the chart that in India,
during the period under analysis, cyclical component of credit
growth has never crossed the lower limit, nonetheless, during
the period between March 2006 and March 2007, it may have
come quite close to the limit. Hence, based on this definition, it
appeared that the country might have witnessed a near credit
boom during the stated period. This period indeed preceded
the period of slower growth in credit and higher growth of NPAs
in the banking system. The chart also showed that such a credit
growth may have taken place during 2010-11 as the cyclical
component reached close to the aforesaid limit.
The above study is of considerably greater relevance for
developed economies. For developing economies like India,
however, it has limitations where robust credit growth is a
necessity for financing higher economic growth. Nevertheless,
measuring credit booms in developing economies like India,
may be helpful in identifying such periods which witnessed
strong credit growth and, as discussed in para 3.10 and 3.11 of
this Chapter, were followed by greater growth in impaired assets.
It may also signal the need for cautious credit selection, strategic
limit to concentration risks in the specific sectors driving the
growth, more strict monitoring of accounts to ensure that credit
quality did not suffer in the wake of improved credit growth,
apart from holding adequate capital and providing more towards
potential accretions to NPAs.
Gap(RHS) Adjusted Credit Growth
Adjusted Credit Growth(Trend) Credit Boom Limit (RHS)
* Credit (private) pertains to advances outstanding with SCBs, UCBs, NBFCs and
excludes credit to Govts. and PSUs.
RBI supervisory returns and RBI staff calculationsSource:
Chart 3.10: Credit* Growth vis-à-vis its Long term Trend
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difficult as different economies, based on their stages
of development, pose critical limitations to usefulness
of these methods. As discussed in Chapter IV, one such
method which attempts using the trend of credit to GDP
ratio to determine overheating, could not give any
reliable estimate.
Chart 3.9: Growth in Credit, NPAs and Tier-I Capital Funds vis-a-vis their Growth Trend
Bank Credit Bank Credit(Trend) Tier I Capital Tier I Capital(Trend) NPA NPA(Trend)
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Exposure to specific sectors have driven the credit
growth
3.13 The credit portfolio of SCBs was well diversified
across industries, geography and sectors. However,
during the last few years, incremental credit growth was
observed to be mainly propelled by credit growth in a
few sectors viz., retail, commercial real estate and
infrastructure. In March 2011, these sectors accounted
for 19 per cent, 4 per cent and 13 per cent respectively
of the gross advances of the SCBs (Chart 3.11). The
combined contribution of the three sectors to the
incremental gross outstanding credit was to the extent
of 40 per cent. Their combined exposure registered an
increase of 27.5 per cent during 2010-2011 as against
20.4 per cent in 2009-2010 (Chart.3.12). The PSBs and
new private sector banks showed the maximum increase
(27.9 per cent and 30.6 per cent respectively).
3.14 Each of these sectors were characterised by
unique asset quality features and, given their large share
in credit portfolio of banks, required careful monitoring.
Sectoral Credit and their Asset Quality
Real Estate
Incremental share in both credit and impaired assets
remained large
3.15 Real estate loans constituted 17.7 per cent of gross
advances in March 2011, the share being nearly 30 per
cent in case of new private sector and foreign banks.
The credit to the sector registered a growth of 24.6 per
cent in 2010-11, i.e. at a rate higher than the overall
credit growth of 22.6 per cent. In the preceding two
years, the rate of growth of loans to this sector was
17 per cent and 11 per cent respectively (Charts 3.13
and 3.14).
3.16 Residential mortgages and the commercial real
estate - the two major segments of the real estate sector
- both registered a growth rate of about 24 per cent. The
new private sector and foreign banks increased their
commercial real estate exposure by 59 and 69 per cent
respectively, a rate much higher than the single digit
growth rate witnessed by the other two bank groups.
The rate of growth of NPAs in this segment at 19.8 per
cent was also higher than the overall NPA growth rate
Chart 3.11: Share of Loans to Commercial Real Estate,
Retail and Infrastructure in Gross Credit
Source: RBI supervisory returns
Commercial Real Estate loans Retail Loans Infrastructure loans
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Chart 3.12: Growth of Combined Exposure
(Retail, Commercial Real Estate and Infrastructure Loans)
Source: RBI supervisory returns
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Chart 3.13: Growth in Real Estate Loans
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of 14.8 per cent. In particular, the NPAs in the
commercial real estate segment grew at 70.3 per cent
as at end March 2011, most of the impairment taking
place in PSBs.
3.17 The share of real estate NPAs in the gross NPAs
of the banking sector stood at 15 per cent - lower than
the share of sector’s credit in total credit at 17.7 per
cent. The gross NPA ratio at 1.8 per cent was also lower
than the overall NPA ratio of 2.3 per cent for SCBs. The
NPA ratio improved for residential mortgage loans
(2.5 to 2.2 per cent), though it deteriorated in the case
of commercial real estate loans (1.6 to 2.3 per cent)
(Chart 3.15).
3.18 Despite the positive developments mentioned
above, the real estate sector posed some concerns given
the large and growing share of these loans in the credit
portfolio of banks, its NPAs witnessing higher than
system level NPAs growth, and potential of greater
slippages into NPAs.
3.19 Going forward, the asset quality in this segment
may come under further pressure given the increasing
interest rate environment2. There is also some anecdotal
evidence of increasing inventory levels in the sector
even as prices continued to remain elevated. In view of
these developments, the Reserve Bank announced a
series of macroprudential measures, inter alia, to curb
excessive leveraging in the sector and strengthen
resilience of the banking system3.
Retail credit staged a comeback having declined in the
previous year
3.20 Credit to the retail sector accounted for 18.5 per
cent of the gross loans and advances of SCBs as at end
March 2011, marginally lower than 19 per cent in March
2010 (Chart 3.16). Retail loans grew by 19 per cent during
2010-11, rebounding strongly after a 3 per cent growth
in 2009-10. The bulk of the increase was attributable to
the personal loan segment which primarily comprised
2 Monetary tightening to address inflationary conditions has resulted in raising reference rates nine times, from 4.75 to 7.25 per cent (repo rate) between
March 2010 – May 2011. Increase in the base rates of select banks was in the range of 1.25 to 2.0 per cent during the same period.
3 Reserve Bank announced a series of measures in the Second Quarter Review of Monetary Policy in November 2010 which included, inter alia, restriction
on Loan to Value ratio of housing loans to 80 per cent (90 per cent for loans up to `20.00 lakh) to prevent excessive leveraging and increase in the risk
weights on large housing loans (` 75 lakh and above) to 125 per cent, increase in standard asset provisioning on the outstanding amount of loans with
‘teaser’ interest rates from 0.40 per cent to 2.00 per cent etc.
Source: RBI supervisory returns
Chart 3.14: Share of Real Estate Loans in Gross Credit
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Chart 3.15: Real Estate NPA Ratios
Real estate NPAs as % of real estate advances
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Chart 3.16: Share of Retail Loans and its NPAs in Gross
Advances and Gross NPAs
Retail loans as percentage of gross advances Retail NPA as % of gross NPAs
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riskier, unsecured loans (Chart 3.17). As on March 2011,
31 per cent retail loans were unsecured, with this
segment registering an increase of 24.9 per cent during
the year.
3.21 The gross NPA ratio of retail loans at 3.2 per cent
remained higher than the overall NPA ratio of 2.3 per
cent for SCBs. However, the quantum of retail NPAs
showed decline of 2.2 per cent during 2010-11 as against
decline of about 7 per cent in 2009-10 (Charts 3.18 and
3.19). The quantum of housing loan NPAs also declined
though there was a marginal increase in case of personal
loan NPAs.
3.22 The robust rebound in retail loans witnessed
during recent quarters warrants close monitoring as the
asset quality of such loans could come under pressure
given the increasing interest rate environment. The
performance of these loans are closely linked to the
individual income and wealth levels, which could be
affected if the risks to economic growth, as discussed
in Chapter I of this Report, were to materialise.
Infrastructure credit grew robustly, so did the sector’s
impaired assets; gross NPA ratio in the sector, however,
remained low
3.23 Advances to infrastructure continued to exhibit
strong growth of above 40 per cent in 2010-11 (Chart
3.20). The share of infrastructure lending in total
advances consequently increased to 12.9 per cent in
March 2011 as against 11 per cent in March 2010. Among
the bank groups, the exposure was concentrated in PSBs
Source: RBI supervisory returns
Chart 3.17: Growth in Housing and Personal Loans
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Chart 3.18: Growth in Retail Loan NPAs
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Chart 3.19: Ratio of Retail Loan NPAs
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which accounted for 84.8 per cent of the total banking
sector’s exposure to the segment.
3.24 There was an increase of 42.5 per cent in impaired
infrastructure loans during 2010-11. Nevertheless, the
gross NPA ratio for such loans continued to be low at
around 0.5 per cent.
3.25 Banks’ exposure to power, telecommunications
and roads and ports formed the important segments of
infrastructure credit. Credit to the power sector
accounted for about 42 per cent of aggregate
infrastructure credit while the other two segments
accounted for 18 per cent each (Chart 3.21). During the
last five years, SCBs’ exposure to the power sector grew
at an average of 50 per cent whereas large fluctuations
were witnessed in the growth rate of credit to other
two sectors (Chart 3.22). Gross NPA ratios in the
different segments of infrastructure credit fluctuated
over the years but remained well below the overall NPA
ratio for the SCBs (Chart 3.23).
3.26 The previous FSR stated that increased exposure
to the infrastructure segment could heighten asset
liability management (ALM) risks for banks. These risks
have been accentuated with the increased share of
infrastructure credit in the total advances of SCBs. The
asset liability management issues associated with
infrastructure lending could also potentially get
exacerbated given the not insignificant probability of
projects getting delayed, as pointed out in the previous
FSR. All of this underscores the urgent need for evolving
a long term funding market for infrastructure projects.
Concentration in high risk industries was low
3.27 A study of deployment of bank credit in thirty
eight major industries was done to assess the
concentration in high risk industries and the underlying
trends4. Over the period spanning the last six years, the
share of credit to high risk industries has remained low
though there was some increase noticed in the
aftermath of the crisis. As on March 2011, the share of
such credit stood at around 16 per cent. There were,
however, some outlier banks whose share in high risk
4 Risk categorization of various industries is based on CRISIL industry risk scores for the periods while data for banking sector as on March 2011 has been
used from Reserve Bank sources.
Source: RBI supervisory returns
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industries exceeded the industry average (Charts 3.24
to 3.25).
Exposure to Priority Sector5
Exposure to the priority sectors increased but high
level of NPAs were a cause for concern
3.28 Priority sector credit grew by 21 per cent during
2010-11 as against which its impaired assets increased
by 28 per cent. Thus, asset quality of exposures to the
priority sector, especially agriculture, continued to
compare unfavourably with the overall NPA ratio of the
banking sector. Consequently, the gross NPA ratio for
the sector deteriorated from 3.3 per cent to 3.5 per cent
(Chart 3.26).
3.29 The gross NPA ratio in respect of credit to the
agriculture segment rose to 3.3 per cent in March 2011
as against 2.4 per cent in March 2010. The deterioration
in the ratio was attributable to a rise of 60 per cent in
agriculture NPAs as against a growth of 19 per cent in
agriculture credit. The gross NPA ratio of the micro and
small enterprises (MSE) was also high at 3.5 per cent
with gross NPAs increasing by 18.4 per cent over high
accretions of the previous year. In order to address entire
gamut of issues involved with lending to the priority
sector, a Committee is being constituted by the Reserve
Bank to relook at the definition of the priority sector,
especially in cases where bank finance was being routed
through other institutions.
Off-balance Sheet (OBS) Exposure
Significant increase was noticed in foreign banks’ OBS
exposure
3.30 Aggregate notional amount of OBS exposures of
the SCBs as a percentage of their total balance sheet
size increased from 178 per cent as at end March 2010
to 198 per cent as at end March 2011. In the case of
foreign banks, OBS exposure as proportion of their on-
balance sheet exposure increased from 1554 per cent
to 1860 per cent during the year.
5 Priority sector credit is an arrangement of directed bank credit to such needy sectors which are worse off in absence of mandated channelisation of
bank credit. Besides ensuring the growth of the financial sector, banks have been assigned a special role in the economic development of the country,
with certain proportion of credit being directed to priority sectors like agriculture, MSE, education, housing, micro credit, weaker sections of
population, etc.
Source: RBI
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Chart 3.26: Growth in the outstanding exposure and
NPAs in Priority Sectors
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3.31 The notional principal of these exposures
increased by 32.3 per cent during the year as against
decline of 5.8 per cent in the previous year (Chart
3.27). The distribution of the aggregate notional
amount of OBS exposures among the bank groups
showed concentration of about 68 per cent in foreign
banks and just about 15 per cent each in case of PSBs
and new private sector banks (Chart 3.28).
3.32 Credit equivalent of the derivative exposures,
as a ratio of balance sheet size remained low and, in
fact, exhibited a declining trend (from 8.8 per cent
in March 2009 to 5.3 per cent in March 2010 and
further to 4.5 per cent as at end March 2011). The
ratio in case of foreign banks was higher at 51 per
cent in March 2010 but declined to 47 per cent as at
end March 2011. The aggregate mark-to-market
(MTM) positions of the SCBs remained positive.
3.33 Among the OBS constituents, credit contingent
deals as proportion of OBS exposure declined as at
end March 2011 while the share of derivative deals,
especially the foreign exchange contracts increased,
warranting increased vigilance on this front (Chart
3.29).
3.34 OBS exposures in India generally comprise
simple products/deals. Forward contracts form the
bulk of foreign exchange contracts and are generally
hedged back-to-back by the banks. There are, however,
associated credit risks in forward contracts and in
OTC interest rate deals which warrant vigilant risk
management.
Financial Soundness Indicators
Capital to risk weighted assets ratio (CRAR)
Banks remain well capitalised, though improved credit
off take resulted in marginal decline in the capital
adequacy ratio
3.35 SCBs remained well capitalised as at end March
2011.The system level CRAR under Basel-II norms stood
at 14.3 per cent which was well above the regulatory
minimum of 9 per cent. There was, however, a minor
decline compared to the CRAR of 14.5 per cent as at
Source: RBI supervisory returns
Chart 3.27: Growth in OBS Exposures among Bank Groups
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end March 2010, largely due to robust credit off take
during 2010-11. All the bank groups had CRAR above
12 per cent as at end March 2011 under Basel-II norms.
Under Basel-I norms, however, the CRAR for PSBs at 11.9
per cent was marginally lower than 12 per cent (Chart
3.30).
3.36 The regulatory tightening of the capital
requirements in India, especially with regard to core
capital, preceded the Basel-III stipulations as the banks
were required to maintain Tier I capital ratio of 6 per
cent on a continuous basis with effect from April 01,
2010. Resultantly, as at end March 2011, core CRAR was
comfortably above 6 per cent, for the banking system,
each bank group as well as for individual banks (Table
3.1). Going forward, as the Basel III norms are
introduced, some banks may need to raise additional
capital especially if credit off take remains robust, as
discussed in Chapter IV of this Report.
Leverage Ratio
Leverage ratio of banks in India remained comfortable
3.37 In an attempt to increase the systemic resilience
by strengthening capital standards at individual bank
level, Basel III regulatory capital framework has
introduced a non-risk-based leverage ratio as a backstop
to the risk-based capital requirement. It is proposed to
test a minimum Tier I leverage ratio of 3 per cent
beginning 2013 capturing both on and off balance sheet
exposures. Leverage ratio of SCBs in India remained
comfortable at about 6 per cent as at end March 2011
(Chart 3.31). Most banks individually operated with
Tier I leverage ratio of greater than 4 per cent (only
one bank had leverage ratio not greater than 3 per cent).
Overall Asset Quality
Asset quality impairments decelerated, though risks
of further slippages remain
3.38 Gross NPAs for SCBs increased by 14.8 per cent
in 2010-11 as against 19.9 per cent in 2009-10. Given
the higher growth rate of advances at 22.6 per cent, the
gross NPA ratio improved from 2.5 per cent to 2.3 per
cent. Net NPAs for SCBs improved to 0.9 per cent from
Table 3.1 Distribution of SCBs’ CRAR and Core CRAR
2010 2011
 CRAR
> 3 per cent <=6 per cent - -
>6 per cent <= 9 per cent 1 -
>9 per cent <=12 per cent 2 6
>12 per cent 79 75
core CRAR
upto 3 per cent - -
>3 and <=6 per cent 1 -
> 6 per cent <=8 per cent 9 2
> 8 per cent 72 79
Source: RBI supervisory returns
Chart 3.30: Capital Adequacy Ratios of the Bank Groups
Source: RBI supervisory returns
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1.1 per cent (Chart 3.32). The increase in gross NPAs
was higher in the case of PSBs (at 23 per cent) against
an increase of less than 5 per cent for the private sector
banks and a decline of 30 per cent in case of foreign
banks (Chart 3.33). Going forward, however, banks may
possibly face some further deterioration in asset quality
if credit growth slows down, as discussed in paragraph
3.10 of this Chapter.
3.39 The reduction in the growth rate of NPAs was, to
some extent, due to write-offs of NPAs in addition to
recoveries, though both had declined marginally as at
end March 2011. The amount involved in the write-
offs stood at 87 per cent of recoveries (97 per cent in
2009-10) and 20 per cent of outstanding credit (28 per
cent in 2010). Clearly, in the absence of such write-offs,
the position of gross NPAs would be much higher than
is reported currently.
Additions to restructured accounts have fallen
3.40 The previous FSR discussed the one-time special
dispensation in restructuring norms permitted by the
Reserve Bank in 2008-09 for entities temporarily affected
by the financial crisis. Standard assets to the extent of
about 3 per cent of outstanding amount were
restructured under the special dispensation during
2008-09 and 2009-10. The increase in the amount of
restructured assets was 192 per cent and 60.2 per cent
respectively during the two years. After the expiry of
the currency of the special dispensation, instances of
such restructuring declined sharply and an increase of
only 10.7 per cent in restructured accounts was
observed.
While slippages improved, in case of PSBs it remained
above the system average
3.41 The slippage ratio, which is a measure of fresh
accretion to the stock of NPAs as a percentage of
standard advances at the beginning of the year,
improved from 2.2 per cent as at end March 2010 to 1.6
per cent as at end March 2011 as the rate of growth of
NPAs decelerated to 14.8 per cent (Chart 3.34). The ratio
in case of PSBs, at 1.7 per cent, was marginally higher
than the industry average.
Source: RBI supervisory returns
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Chart 3.33: Growth of Advances and NPAs
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Chart 3.34: Slippage Ratio over the Years
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Increase in stickier NPAs was observed
3.42 The change in category-wise distribution of NPAs
during the year revealed an increase in doubtful assets
vis-à-vis sub-standard assets, indicating that NPAs were
becoming increasingly stickier. The trend was even more
pronounced in case of new private sector banks which
warranted monitoring (Chart 3.35).
Provisioning Coverage Ratio
Macro-prudential measure to act as cushion against
slippages
3.43 In December 2009, banks were advised to achieve
a provisioning coverage ratio (PCR) of 70 per cent of
their non-performing advances by end September 2010.
As on March 31, 2011, the private sector and foreign
banks had maintained the required ratio though the PCR
was just below 70 per cent in case of the nationalised
banks. In case of the SBI group, the gap6 was relatively
higher (Chart 3.36).
3.44 Keeping in view the sharp uptrend of credit
growth in 2010-11, the Reserve Bank announced further
macro-prudential measures in April and May 2011.
Banks were advised to segregate the surplus of
provisions under the PCR vis-à-vis the provisions
required as per prudential norms as on September 30,
2010, into an account styled as ‘counter-cyclical buffer’.
The buffer would be available to banks for making
specific provisions during economic downturns.
Accordingly, banks were no longer required to maintain
70 per cent PCR on the incremental advances after
September 2010. Simultaneously, the provisioning
requirements on impaired assets were also enhanced
on certain categories of non-performing and
restructured advances7.
Profitability
Robust growth in profitability was sign of improved
performance. Little growth in non-interest income and
rise in staff expenses, however, posed some challenge
3.45 The SCBs’ profitability showed robust
improvement during 2010-11 compared to 2009-10
(Chart 3.37). Interest income increased by 18.6 per cent
6 Some of the banks that had been granted extension of time beyond the stipulated date i.e. September 30, 2010 for achieving the PCR of 70 percent on their
request, have been advised to calculate the required provisions for 70 percent PCR as on September 30, 2010 and compute the shortfall there from. These banks
have also been advised to build up the shortfall at the earliest.
7 http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=6415&Mode=0
Source: RBI supervisory returns
Chart 3.35: Category wise NPAs
Loss Advances Doubtful Advances Sub-Standard Advances
p
er
ce
n
t
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
PSBs Old Pvt
Sector
Banks
New Pvt
Sector
Banks
Foreign
Banks
All Banks
As at end-March
# PCR = Provisions Held (Specific + Floating) plus stock of technical write-offs
Gross NPAs plus stock of technical write-offs*100.
RBI supervisory returns
divided by
Source:
Chart 3.36: Provisioning Coverage Ratio (PCR) of Bank Groups
#
Coverage without reckoning past write-offs
Coverage ratio inclusive of past write-offs
p
er
ce
n
t
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
SBI Group Nationalised
Banks
Old Pvt
Sector Banks
New Pvt
Sector Banks
Foreign
Banks
Chart 3.37: Income and Expense Components as Proportion
of Total Income and Expense*
*Total expense includes provisions but not taxes.
RBI Supervisory ReturnsSource:
March 2008 March 2009 March 2010 March 2011
p
er
ce
n
t
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Interest
Income as
% of total
income
Other
Income as
% of total
income
Interest
Expenses as
% of total
expense
Operating
Expenses as
% of total
expenses
Risk
Provisions as
% of total
expense
42
Chapter III Financial Institutions
over 7.5 per cent last year and interest expense increased
by 10.1 per cent as against 4.0 per cent last year.
Resultantly, there was improvement of 34.9 per cent in
the Net Interest Income (NII) of the banks during 2010-
11. The effect of increase in NII was seen in the 19.5
per cent growth in net profits despite little change in
non-interest income, increase of 49 per cent in risk
provisions and 24 per cent increase in operating
expenses (Chart 3.38).
3.46 The growth in interest income by 18.6 per cent
was, however, not in tandem with the growth in loans
and advances which grew by 22.6 per cent during 2010-
11. There did not also seem to be any decisive impact
of the prescription of base rate as minimum lending
rate on the interest income. Interest expense increased
by only a little over 10 per cent despite increased
quantum and cost of deposits, increased borrowings at
higher interest rates and the requirement to compute
interest on savings account balances on a daily basis.
3.47 The non-interest income of SCBs remained
unchanged from the previous year due to increase in
fee income and profits from forex operations getting
nearly off-set by a 77 per cent decline in profits from
trading in investment portfolio. The decline was
possibly due to increasing interest rates and systemic
liquidity strains in the second half of the year. The
foreign banks continued to suffer major losses in their
securities trading activities. There was also continuous
decline in the share of the securities’ trading profits
in the banks’ non-interest income after 2008-09
(Chart 3.39).
3.48 The non-interest expense of the banks showed a
substantial rise of 24 per cent over the previous year
mainly on account of staff expenses. Staff expenses
increased by 30.6 per cent due to wage revisions effected
by the PSBs. Share of staff expenses in non-interest
expense stood at 58 per cent at system level (65 per
cent in case of PSBs and 60 per cent in case of old private
banks).
3.49 The wage revisions in case of PSBs and old private
sector banks , amongst other things, included the impact
of enhanced gratuity limits and opening of pension
option for those who had not opted for it earlier. As
stipulated by the Reserve Bank, banks were required to
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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provide for the pension liabilities and enhanced gratuity
limits of serving employees (amortisable in five years)
and retired employees (without amortisation). While
pension and gratuity related provisions formed a major
portion of the staff expenses in 2011 particularly on
account of bullet provisioning in case of retired
employees, the impact of amortisation of pension
liabilities for serving employees will be affecting the
profitability in coming years as well. Going forward, it
will be necessary for banks to build adequate provisions
on consistent basis for such liabilities so that special
regulatory dispensation is not sought (Box 3.2).
3.50 Aggregate risk provisions increased by 49 per cent
during the year, the rise being mainly on account of the
increased requirements for NPA provisions (regulatory
stipulation of 70 per cent provisioning coverage ratio
for NPAs as at end September 2010).
Profitability ratios had improved at system level,
however marginal deterioration was noticed in case
of PSBs
3.51 The profitability ratios of the SCBs indicated
improvement over the previous year in as much as the
return on assets (RoA) and the return on equity (RoE)
Box.3.2: Provision for Pension and Gratuity Liabilities arising out of Wage Revision in Public Sector Banks and
Old Private Sector Banks: Systemic Concerns
Banks are required to provide prudently, on an ongoing basis
for various types of Employee Benefits including Defined Benefit
Plans such as Pension, Gratuity etc., in accordance with the
extant accounting standard AS 15 which is based on the
International Accounting Standard IAS 19. This aspect becomes
more critical subsequent to any wage revision.
The last wage revision of the PSBs and 10 old private sector
banks which came under the 9th bipartite settlement under
the aegis of Indian Banks’ Association (IBA) was signed in April
2010. This wage revision introduced certain new elements,
viz. (a) wage hike at a higher level of 17.5%; (b) offer of second
option for pension to existing and retired employees; and
(c) enhancement in gratuity limits from ` 3.5 lakh to `  10 lakh,
following the amendment to Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.
The expected additional liability of ` 30,366 crore, comprising
second pension option (`  22,488 crore) and gratuity
enhancement (` 7,878 crore) furnished by IBA, relating to 25
Public Sector Banks, was significant and constituted 81.9 per
cent of their net profit for the year 2009-10. As per the
accounting standards, these liabilities were required to be
absorbed in the Profit & Loss Account. Since the banks could
not absorb the impact of the additional burden on account of
above, the IBA approached the Reserve Bank, on behalf of its
member banks, seeking approval to amortise the additional
liability. IBA contended that both these events were
unanticipated and not recurring. In view of the above as well
as the significant impact of these liabilities, it was decided to
consider regulatory dispensation of amortisation to PSBs for
a period of five years subject to certain conditions in
consultation with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India (ICAI). This dispensation was not available to liabilities
in respect of retired/separated employees. The above
dispensation was extended mutatis mutandis, to the ten old
private sector banks who were signatories to the bipartite
settlement.
In terms of the above dispensation, PSBs have absorbed an
amount of ` 4971 crore towards pension and ` 1677 crore
towards gratuity in the profit and loss account for the year ended
March 31, 2011 while carrying the unamortized expenditure of
` 16,897 crore for pension and ` 2903 crore for gratuity in the
balance sheet as on March 31, 2011.
SBI employees enjoy pension as a third benefit unlike other
PSBs. Consequent to the revision of the wages in accordance
with the 9th Bipartite Settlement the pension fund liability of
the bank for FY 2011 was determined at ` 11,707 crore. SBI had
requested that the additional costs of pension liability arising
on account of revision of pension consequent upon the 9th
bipartite settlement should be evenly spread over the future
working lifetime of the employees which was not agreed to by
the Reserve Bank since the increase in the liability was linked
to the wage revision and could have been reasonably anticipated.
However from a purely systemic stability point of view, the
impact on SBI's profitability being very significant, regulatory
dispensation allowing adjustment against reserves to meet the
additional pension liability, net of current year's liability was
allowed. In the event, the bank provided ` 2473 crore to the
Profit and Loss Account and the balance of ` 7927 crore was
charged to the reserves.
Going forward it is necessary that banks build adequate
provisions for such liabilities in a phased manner in order that
regulatory dispensation is not sought and the burden is not
concentrated in the year that the settlement is signed. This also
has systemic stability issues arising from under-provisioning
and non compliance with Accounting Standards in vogue,
especially since the Indian Accounting Standards are on the verge
of convergence with the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS).The matter has been taken up with the IBA.
Banks are also being advised to make a proper assessment of
their superannuation liabilities and provide for the same from
the year in which the periodical wage settlements fall due and
not from the year in which such settlements are signed.
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of the banks increased from 1.0 per cent and 13.3 per
cent in 2009-10 to 1.1 per cent and 13.7 per cent in
2010-11 (Chart 3.40). However, in case of PSBs, these
ratios deteriorated (from 1.0 per cent and 16.2 per cent
to 0.9 and 15.4 per cent respectively). Interest spread
improved from 2.7 to 3.1 per cent.
3.52 Going forward, increasing interest rates, hike in
the savings account interest rate and potentially
enhanced provisioning requirements for NPAs as well
as provisions for pension liabilities may impact the
profitability of banks.
Banking Stability Map
Liquidity indicators exhibited increased risk
3.53 The Banking Stability Map and Indicator were
introduced in the previous FSR to present an overall
assessment of changes in underlying conditions and risk
factors having bearing on stability of the banking sector.
The assessment was based on five dimensions during a
given period. The methodology has been further
enhanced by including certain other indicators for each
of the five dimensions8 (Table 3.2).
3.54 The Banking Stability Map indicates that
relatively, risks to soundness and liquidity increased in
March 2011 as compared to March 2009 and March
2010, whereas risks due to efficiency, asset quality and
Table 3.2: Indicators used for Construction of Banking Stability Map and Banking Stability Indicator
Dimension Ratios
Soundness CRAR Tier-I Capital to Tier-II Capital Leverage ratio as Total-Assets to Capital and Reserves
Asset-Quality Net NPAs to Total-Advances Gross NPAs to Total-Advances Sub-Standard-advances Restructured-Standard-Advances
to gross NPAs to Standard-Advances
Profitability Return on Assets Net Interest Margin Growth in Profit
Liquidity Liquid-Assets to Total-Assets Customer-Deposits to Non-Bank-Advances to Deposits maturing within-1-year
Total-Assets Customer-Deposits to Total Deposits
Efficiency Cost to Income Business (Credit + Deposits) to total employees
8 The five composite indices represent the five dimensions of Soundness, Asset quality, Profitability, Liquidity and Efficiency. Each index, representing
a dimension of bank functioning, takes a value between zero (minimum) and 1 (maximum). Each index is a relative measure during the sample period
used for its construction, where a high value means the risk in that dimension is high. Therefore, an increase in the value of the index in any particular
dimension indicates an increase in risk in that dimension for that period as compared to other periods. For each ratio a weighted average for the banking
sector is derived, where the weights are the ratio of individual bank’s asset to total banking system assets. Each index is normalised for the sample
period as ‘ratio-on-a-given-date minus minimum-value-in-sample-period divided by maximum-value-in-sample-period minus minimum-value-in-sample-
period. A composite measure of each dimension is calculated as a weighted average of normalised ratios used for that dimension, where the weights are
based on the marks assigned for supervisory assessment of CAMELS rating of the banks.
Chart 3.40: Profitability Ratios
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profitability declined (Chart 3.41). The dimensional
increase in liquidity risk of the banking sector was, at
least partially, attributable to the decline in the level of
liquid assets. Though the soundness indicators showed
a relative deterioration vis-à-vis the position in previous
year, the ratios continue to remain well above the
regulatory requirements.
Banking Stability Indicator
Banking Stability Indicator has, barring few
fluctuations, strengthened over the years
3.55 Based on the individual composite indices for
each dimension, the Banking Stability Indicator is
constructed as a simple average of the five composite
sub-indices mentioned in Table 3.2. A quarterly series
of the Indicator shows an overall improved stability in
the banking sector, barring a slight dip in September
2010 (Chart 3.42).
Regional Rural Banks (RRBs)
Performance of RRBs in Category II and III needs to
be monitored
3.56 RRBs have a large branch network in the rural
area (11861), accounting for nearly 37 per cent of the
total rural branch network of all commercial banks
including RRBs. RRBs are categorised into three
categories - Sustainable viable (Category I - 55 RRBs),
Current viable (Category II - 24 RRBs) and Loss making
(Category III - 3 RRBs) - based on select parameters like
profit and profit earning capacity, etc. An analysis of
the performance of the three loss making RRBs and 24
other RRBs in Category II revealed some concerns. In
order to align the RRBs with the operational efficiency
gained by other banks through IT enabled products, a
Road Map for adoption of CBS in RRBs has been finalised
and is targeted to be completed by September 2011.
Cooperative Banking Sector
Rural Co-operative Credit
Financial soundness remained an area of concern
3.57 At the aggregate level, the gross NPA ratios as at
end March 20109 improved for the short term
9 Latest data available. Data for 2010 is provisional. Data in case of certain States pertains to 2007-08 and 2008-09.
Chart 3.41: Banking Stability Map
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co-operative credit institutions (StCB & DCCB). For the
long term institutions (SCARDB & PCARDB), the ratios
deteriorated further (Chart 3.43). 52 per cent of StCBs
and 40 per cent of DCCBs had achieved a CRAR of 9 per
cent and above. Regulatory measures, such as, requiring
a minimum CRAR of 4 per cent as a pre-requisite for
licensing have been introduced. Though norms in
respect of minimum capital adequacy ratios have not
yet been prescribed for the rural co-operative credit
institutions, its disclosure has however been put in
place since March 2008.
3.58 During 2009-10, there was marginal improvement
in the profitability of StCBs and DCCBs (8 per cent and
2 per cent respectively) though the profits came from
banks in few regions. There was a significant increase
in the number of loss making branches of long term co-
operative credit institutions.
3.59 The number of StCBs that remained to be licensed
remained unchanged at 7 since the publication of the
previous FSR. Some improvement was, however,
discernible in case of DCCBs as the number of
unlicensed institutions came down from 164 to 150.
Urban Co-operative Banks (UCBs)
Consolidation exercise continued amid improving
financials
3.60 Consolidation of UCBs continued with the
issuance of 11 NOCs (in addition to 103 NOCs as at
September 2010) for mergers and notification of 18
mergers (in addition to 71 notifications as at end
September 2010). These consolidation measures have
led to a reduction in the number of weak and unlicensed
banks in the sector. Consequently, the financial
soundness indicators of scheduled UCBs have improved
(Chart 3.44).
Non-banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)
Increase in the business was concomitant with
improvement in the financial soundness indicators
Non Deposit taking Systemically Important NBFCs
(NBFC-ND-SIs)
3.61 The balance sheet size of NBFC-ND-SIs increased
by 21.1 per cent in 2010-11, mainly on account of
borrowings which increased by 25.3 per cent.
Source: RBI supervisory returns
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Borrowings from banks/FIs formed a major proportion
(30.3 per cent) of their total borrowings. On the asset
side, loans and advances increased by 27.6 per cent.
Asset quality and profitability improved over
the previous year, though capital adequacy ratios
showed marginal decline, nonetheless remaining well
above the regulatory minimum stipulated (Charts 3.45
and 3.46).
NBFCs Deposit taking (NBFC-Ds)
3.62 In case of NBFC-Ds, loans and advances increased
by three per cent as at end September 201010 over
previous half year. Asset quality and capital adequacy
ratios showed improvement (Chart 3.47).
Regulatory architecture - revisions in light of systemic
interconnectedness
3.63 Keeping in view the economic role and
heterogeneity of the NBFC sector and its systemic
interconnectedness, the regulation of this sector has
been progressively tightened. As a part of the important
regulatory initiatives taken recently in this regard, the
CRAR of both NBFC-ND-SIs and NBFC-Ds have been
aligned to 15 per cent from the earlier stipulation of 12
per cent (stipulation in case of NBFC-Ds becoming
effective as at end-March 2012). Provisioning of 0.25
per cent for standard assets and a prudential cap on
banks’ exposures to debt oriented mutual funds have
also been stipulated. There were concerns arising due
to concentration risk in NBFCs engaged primarily in
making loans against gold jewellery, high interest rate
charged by these companies, difficulties in ensuring end
use of funds, collateral risks in such exposures., etc. As
a measure to address these issues, the Reserve Bank
directed that the bank loans to NBFCs for on-lending
against gold jewellery, would be no more eligible for
classification under agriculture sector. Further in a
separate move, it was announced that bank loans to
NBFCs, other than to such MFIs which fulfilled certain
recently introduced eligibility conditions (as mentioned
in next paragraph), would not be eligible to be classified
as priority sector loans. As discussed in Chapter IV, a
Working Group has been formed to address the entire
gamut of issues relating to the regulation of NBFCs.
10 Latest off-site data available
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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Addressing issues in the MFI sector
3.64 Pursuant to the Malegam Committee
recommendations on microfinance sector, bank loans
to all Micro-finance Institutions (MFIs), including NBFCs
working as MFIs, will be eligible for classification as
priority sector loans only if the prescribed percentage
of their total assets are in the nature of ‘qualifying
assets’ and they adhere to the ‘pricing of interest’
guidelines to be issued in this regard. Bank loans to
other NBFCs would not be reckoned as priority sector
loans with effect from April 1, 2011. Further, following
the sharp drop in collections by MFIs in Andhra Pradesh
and some incipient signs of contagion spreading to other
States, a special regulatory asset classification benefit
was extended to the restructured MFI accounts, which
were standard at the time of restructuring, even if they
were not fully secured.
Insurance Sector - Critical Component of Financial
Sector
3.65 Insurance companies are a critical component of
the financial sector and their smooth functioning is a
necessary pre-condition to maintain financial stability,
both domestically and globally. The sector faces several
risks - risks related to solvency, investment returns,
economic downturns, issues related to persistency11, etc.
- though they are generally considered to be contributing
less to systemic risk than the banks (Box 3.3).
Opening of the sector to private sector has led to
higher growth and penetration of insurance in the
country
3.66 With the opening up of the insurance sector in
India in the year 2000, the industry has been witness
to the entry of 22 players in the life segment and 15 in
the non-life segment in addition to three insurers with
license to operate on a standalone basis in the health
insurance sector. The foreign participation in the
industry is permitted through joint venture with an
Indian promoter with FDI cap fixed at 26 per cent. The
total number of insurers registered with the Insurance
Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA), the
insurance sector’s regulator, as on March 31, 2011 stood
at 48 viz., 23 life insurers, 19 general insurers, 3
standalone health insurance companies and 2
specialised companies - one dealing with credit
insurance and crop insurance and the other being a
reinsurer. Partially, as a result of these measures, the
insurance penetration (as measured by the ratio of
premium underwritten in a given year to the Gross
Box 3.3 Systemic Risks posed by the Insurance Sector
Insurance sector does not contribute to systemic risk in the
manner banking sector does. In contrast to banking activity,
which is about maturity transformation, insurance sector
collects its premia in advance rather than in arrears to fund its
obligations. Such upfront funding reduces liquidity risks and
reliance on leverage if the premia are priced correctly. Another
differentiating feature of insurance sector is that policies are
not like checking accounts, i.e. balances are not withdrawable
on demand. Policy-holders are not allowed to withdraw money
from their policy balances at will and such requests entail heavy
penal charges. Therefore, the equivalent of a ‘bank run’ is
uncommon in the insurance sector. Unlike banking, where a
fall in value of assets significantly below that of liabilities causes
failures immediately through bank runs, insolvency in insurance
sector plays out in 'slow motion' over several years. This is due
to the longer term claims and the much more dispersed payout
dates on insurance products. Insurers typically have more
flexibility and time to deal with a crisis than do banks which
have to meet deposit withdrawals in the short term.
However, in case of insurance companies being a part of financial
conglomerate, their bankruptcy can trigger systemic risk by
casting doubt on the creditworthiness of the conglomerate's
commercial bank, particularly if the bank is of sufficiently large
size. Nonetheless, prohibition of multiple use of capital within
a financial conglomerate effectively reduces this source of
systemic risk. Inter-linkages of insurance activities with other
financial institutions also could be a source of disruption in
the financial system (the banking sector in particular). For
instance, insurers are typically the major investors in many
financial markets - equities and government securities and
considerably affect stock market movements. In case of non-
life insurance business, where the premium ceded to foreign
re-insurers is significant, the domestic exchange rate movements
may be significant.
11 Percentage of life insurance or other insurance policies remaining in force; percentage of policies that have not lapsed. The higher the percentage, the
greater the persistency. Since it is an important measure of a company ’s retention of its life insurance business, most companies extend every effort to
increase persistency.
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Domestic Product (GDP) of the year) has increased from
2.3 in 2000 to 5.4 in 2009.
3.67 The linked12 and non linked business of the Life
Insurance Industry accounted for 42.1 and 57.9 per cent
of the first year premium underwritten in 2010-11 as
against 8.5 and 91.5 per cent respectively in the year
2003-0413.
3.68 In the Indian context, insurance companies are
required to adhere to a range of prudential norms viz.
minimum capital, solvency ratio, exposure norms,
investment exposure patterns, etc. for life and general
insurers. Also, the insurance companies are not
permitted to take positions in commodity market, to
avail loans from banks and to invest policy holders’
funds abroad. As a first step towards ‘Risk Based Capital’
and hence ‘Risk Based Supervision’ system, life
insurance companies are now required to submit
‘Economic Capital’ report to the IRDA as part of their
annual actuarial and other reports. The ‘Economic
Capital’ computation involves quantification of specific
risks and assesses the insurer’s capital requirements
with reference to various risks faced by the insurer. This
regulatory framework facilitates management of
systemic risks of the insurance sector. Nevertheless, in
order to ensure that core insurance activities do not
cause a systemic shock or trigger a systemic event, inter-
linkages of the sector with the rest of the financial
system needs to be carefully monitored.
Concluding Remarks
3.69 In India, increase in credit off take during 2010-
11 was above its long term trend. Credit growth
appeared to be concentrated in certain sectors, which
called for vigilance on this front to contain build up of
risks/excesses. Recovery in credit growth has led to the
expansion of the balance sheets of SCBs by about 19
per cent. However, slack growth in deposits have also
resulted in continued dependence on borrowing and
other short term means to fund the expansion. The
12 These products (Unit Linked Insurance Plans-ULIPs) provide insurance cover to the policyholder and higher returns over the long-term, due to
diversified investments in equity and debt instruments, ULIPs are different from traditional products in that the risks and rewards underlying the
investment component of the premium underwritten by the insurance company are borne entirely by the policyholder. The policyholder determines the
investment pattern from out of the various options, as to the proportion of debt, equity and money market instruments indicated by the insurer, based
on his risk aptitude.
13 Source : IRDA
rising structural mismatch in the maturity profile of
the deposits and advances further contributed to the
liquidity concerns.
3.70 Credit growth, despite being well diversified in
many sectors, appeared to be weighed more by growth
in retail, commercial real estate and infrastructure
credit. A study of deployment of bank credit in thirty
eight major industries showed a declining trend in
exposure towards high risk industries. Off balance sheet
exposures of banks continued to rise, with the foreign
banks showing the largest increase with their notional
exposure being more than 18 times their on-balance
sheet exposures.
3.71 Capital adequacy of the SCBs continued to be
strong, though there was a minor decline due to robust
credit off take. Leverage ratio of banks in India remained
comfortably above 3 per cent, as required under the
Basel III norms.
3.72 Asset quality improved on the back of rebound
in credit off take as credit growth outpaced the growth
in NPAs. Going forward, the rapid credit growth also
raised the possibility of large scale slippages, requiring
continued vigilance. In this regard, the Reserve Bank’s
countercyclical measures stipulating minimum NPA
provisioning coverage ratio of 70 per cent on the level
of NPAs as on September 30, 2010 may act as a cushion
against possible rise in the NPAs.
3.73 The SCBs’ profitability showed improvement
during 2010-11. However, on account of increase in
provisioning towards pension liabilities, the staff
expenses of PSBs increased sharply. Going forward,
increasing interest rates, hike in the savings account
interest rate amortisation of pension and gratuity
liabilities and potentially enhanced provisioning
requirements for NPAs may impact the profitability of
banks.
3.74 The Banking Stability Map indicated that risks to
liquidity had increased as at end March 2011 over March
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2010. The Banking Stability Indicator however showed
strengthening of the banking sector on the stability
front.
3.75 The financial soundness of the co-operative sector
remained a matter of concern though consolidation
measures continued to progress. The regulation of non
banking finance companies has been progressively
tightened in order to plug regulatory gaps and dissuade
regulatory arbitrage.
3.76 The penetration of the insurance sector has
increased after it was opened up to private players and
FDI through joint ventures was permitted. The
regulatory framework for insurance in India has ensured
a robust and well regulated sector. While the essential
structure of the insurance business entails relatively
lower systemic risk, the interconnectedness of the sector
with the banking and the rest of the financial system
could be a source of disruption which may need careful
monitoring.
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Chapter IV
Financial Sector Policies and Infrastructure
Sound regulatory policies, robust arrangements for regulation of the financial system and smoothly
functioning financial market infrastructure are critical building blocks for financial stability. In
2013, the phase-in period for Basel III measures commences. Efforts are already underway to migrate
to advanced approaches under Basel II. Regulators and banks across the world, and especially in
emerging markets like India, will face immense challenges in the days ahead. A few individual
banks may need to raise additional capital. All banks will have to gear themselves for the demanding
data and analytical requirements for the revised liquidity framework and for the advanced approaches
under Basel II. Even as the supervisory framework for financial conglomerates is being strengthened,
the financial holding company model is being proposed as the preferred model for large financial
entities in the country. Arrangements for cross border supervisory cooperation are being strengthened
in a bid to reduce the probability of a crisis. Regulatory gaps, especially in the NBFC sector, leave
scope for arbitrage even as financial sector laws are being revamped and banking sector legislations
amended to fortify the regulatory structure. Gaps in the regulatory arrangements for the cooperative
sector enabling cooperative societies to raise deposits, including from external sources, without being
subject to prudential norms needs to be addressed. While the Sub-committee of the Financial Stability
and Development Council (FSDC) is expected to evolve as the more active, hands-on body for financial
stability in normal times, the FSDC would have a broad oversight and assume a central role in times
of crisis. The network of bilateral exposures of Indian banks is highly intertwined increasing risks of
a contagion from the failure of any bank(s). Caps on interbank exposures limit the domino effect,
but the network of connectivities needs to be continuously monitored. Payment and settlement systems
in the country are robust, but are characterised by a significant degree of interdependencies which
leave them vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks. Safety net arrangements need to address critical issues
in respect of adequacy and management of funds, coverage, recovery performance and time taken for
settlement.
4.1 The financial crisis that began in 2007 has revealed
the need for a new supervisory and regulatory approach
designed to strengthen the system and contain the risk
of future financial and economic disruptions. The
approach needs to be of a macroprudential nature, since
recent events have shown that even rational choices at
the individual level can lead to negative systemic
consequences. In fact, better regulation, an effective
regulatory architecture, efficient financial market
infrastructure and robust analysis of data and
information to identify burgeoning risks are key critical
ingredients for ensuring financial stability.
4.2 The first part of the Chapter presents the current
challenges as the Indian banking system attempts to
migrate to the advanced approaches under Basel II and
readies itself for the requirements of Basel III.  It also
highlights the regulatory efforts underway to strengthen
and improve financial sector policies. The second part
of the Chapter presents the emerging issues in the
arrangements for the regulation of the financial sector
in the country, highlights gaps in the regulatory
perimeter and flags avenues for regulatory arbitrage. The
third part presents the results of an extensive modeling
exercise undertaken to analyse the network of interbank
exposures in the Indian banking system. Risks and
vulnerabilities in the payment and settlement systems
and the safety net arrangements are presented in the
last part of the Chapter.
FINANCIAL SECTOR POLICIES
4.3 Significant progress has been made in crystallising
the global regulatory reforms agenda which was set in
motion with a view to strengthen the resilience of the
banking sector and to removing the fault lines which
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permitted the cyclical build up of risks. These were
outlined in the previous FSR. The Reserve Bank remains
committed to adoption of internationally agreed
standards and reforms and efforts are ongoing to this
end. Domestic initiatives to strengthen the regulatory
framework of the financial sector continued in parallel
with several measures - increasing specific provision
requirements for non-performing assets, imposition of
a prudential cap on banks’ investments in debt oriented
mutual funds, amongst others, being announced. Going
forward, several challenges remain viz., migration to
advanced approaches under Basel II, adoption of Basel
III proposals for capital, liquidity and leverage,
calibration of the countercyclical buffer, convergence
with the revised accounting standards, etc., which are
likely to test both the regulators and the regulated
entities in the days to come.
Higher capital requirements under Basel III
4.4 Collectively, the new global standards to address
both firm-specific and broader, systemic risks have been
referred to as “Basel III”, the building blocks of which
were highlighted in the previous FSR. It had postulated
that, given the comfortable capital adequacy position of
banks in India, the Indian banking system is unlikely to
be unduly stretched in meeting the more stringent
requirements of the Basel III proposals. It was also
highlighted that for emerging economies like India, the
implementation comes at a time when credit demand
is expected to pick up given, inter alia, the compulsions
of robust growth, the investment needs of infrastructure
and the demand ushered in by increasing financial
inclusion. Thus, notwithstanding the current position
at the aggregate level, a few individual banks may need
to augment their capital.
4.5 An internal study shows that this is, indeed, the
case. A series of regression analyses were conducted to
project risk weighted assets and capital adequacy of
banks under different growth scenarios and assuming a
conservative growth rate of capital funds through
internal accruals at 15 per cent per annum. The analysis
revealed that the capital adequacy ratios of several banks
fall below the minimum regulatory requirements, even
under a Basel II scenario, indicating that capital will need
to be augmented in the coming years (Charts 4.1 and
4.2)1. This could prove to be a challenge for the banking
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Chart 4.1: CRAR Projections (2012)
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Chart 4.2: CRAR Projections (2013)
Source: Supervisory returns and RBI staff calculations.
1 The additional capital arrived at in the internal study represents the capital which banks will need to raise in order to maintain their capital adequacy
ratios  in a situation of robust credit growth which can be expected given the growth rates assumed in the study.
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system, given the sluggish performance of the equity
markets and could also put pressure on Government
finances. The capital needs of banks will also be
impacted due to the unamortised portion of pension
liabilities to be absorbed by April 01, 2013 on migration
to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
Calibration of a countercyclical buffer presents
challenges
4.6 The Basel III proposals contemplate two capital
buffers for the banking system – a capital conservation
and a countercyclical buffer (Box 4.1). The calibration of
the countercyclical buffers proposed under Basel III
poses a number of challenges. The primary aim of the
buffer is to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of
protecting the banking sector from periods of excess
aggregate credit growth which are often associated with
the build-up of systemic risks. The regulatory authorities
in each jurisdiction will, therefore, be required to
monitor credit growth and make assessments of whether
Box 4.1: Capital Buffers Proposals Under Basel III
Capital Conservation Buffer: The purpose of the conservation
buffer is to ensure that banks maintain a buffer of capital that
can be used to absorb losses during periods of financial and
economic stress. While banks are allowed to draw on the buffer
during such periods of stress, the closer their regulatory capital
ratios approach the minimum requirement, the greater the
constraints on earnings distributions. This framework will
reinforce the objective of sound supervision and bank
governance and address the collective action problem that has
prevented some banks from curtailing distributions such as
discretionary bonuses and high dividends, even in the face of
deteriorating capital positions. The capital conservation buffer
aims to establish a fixed range above the Common Equity Tier
1 minimum capital requirement of 4.5 per cent of Risk Weighted
Assets (RWA). This buffer above the regulatory minimum
requirement will be calibrated to a maximum of 2.5 per cent
and has to be met with common equity, after the application of
deductions. Hence, the total common equity requirements reach
a level of 7 per cent. The capital conservation buffer will be
phased in between 1 January 2016 and year end of 2018,
becoming fully effective on 1 January 2019. It will begin at 0.625
per cent of RWAs in January 2016 and increase each subsequent
year by an additional 0.625 percentage points, to reach its final
level of 2.5 per cent of RWAs on 1 January 2019. However,
individual countries have the discretion to impose shorter
transition periods.
Countercyclical Buffer: The countercyclical capital buffer works
on the principle of extending the size of capital conservation
buffer during periods of excess credit growth. The purpose of
the countercyclical buffer is to achieve the broader
macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from a
system wide build up of risk due to excess aggregate credit growth
and to ensure that the banking sector in aggregate has the capital
on hand to help maintain the flow of credit in the economy
without its solvency being questioned, when the broader financial
system experiences stress after a period of excess credit growth.
Countercyclical buffers will be calibrated in the range of 0 to 2.5
per cent of RWAs. Deviations from the trend of the ratio of private
credit to GDP is the indicator preferred by the Basel Committee
for gauging excessive credit growth, but countries will also need
to consider other variables like asset prices, funding spreads and
CDS spreads, credit condition surveys, real GDP growth, etc. while
also exercising a considerable degree of judgment in deciding on
the application or release of the countercyclical buffer. A lead
time of up to 12 months will be given to banks when the buffer
is imposed. The release of the buffer can be allowed gradually in
situations where credit growth slows and system-wide risks recede
in a benign fashion.
References : Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more
resilient banks and banking systems, Dec 2010
: BCBS Guidance note for national authorities
operating the countercyclical capital buffer, Dec 2010
such growth is excessive and/or is leading to the build-
up of systemic risks. Based on this assessment, they will
need to use their judgment to determine whether a
countercyclical buffer requirement should be imposed,
to what extent it should be imposed and when the
requirement should be removed.
Credit-to-GDP gap may not be a reliable indicator for
calibrating the buffer
4.7 The common reference guide suggested by the
Basel Committee is based on the aggregate private sector
credit-to-GDP gap. This indicator does not work well in
all jurisdictions at all times. This is especially so in
emerging economies like India, where it tends to rise
for structural reasons – higher credit off take due to
higher growth and greater financial inclusion. Also, some
economic sectors are relatively new in India and banks
have only recently begun financing them in a big way.
The risk build-up, if any, in such sectors cannot
accurately be captured by this ratio.
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4.8 An assessment of the indicator in the Indian
context (using both annualised and non-annualised GDP
data) shows that reliable and timely signals in respect
of imposing and removing the buffers are not thrown
up in a consistent manner (Charts 4.3 and 4.4). In
the first case, the deviations from trend are not
significant enough to guide such decisions while in the
second case, the gap is volatile making it difficult to draw
conclusions.
A mix of quantitative and qualitative indicators will
have to guide the calibration of the buffer
4.9 An examination, in the Indian context, of some of
the other possible indicators suggested by the Basel
Committee reveal that none of these indicators can be,
on a standalone basis, considered reliable indicators for
the calibration of the countercyclical buffer (Charts 4.5
to 4.8). The calibration of the buffer in the Indian context
will, therefore, have to rely on a mix of qualitative and
quantitative indicators and will require a considerable
degree of judgment. Further, in India, sectoral
approaches to countercyclical policies have stood the test
in the past. The tools used in India to contain pro-
cyclicality are essentially time-varying provisioning for
standard assets and differentiated risk weights for
sensitive sectors.
4.10 An internal Working Group in the Reserve Bank
is currently examining the modalities of a
framework to operationalise the countercyclical capital
regime.
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Chart 4.3: Ratio of Credit to GDP
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Chart 4.4: Ratio of Credit to GDP
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Source: CSO, Supervisory returns and RBI staff calculations.
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2 Credit includes bank credit, external commercial borrowings, corporate bonds, NBFCs-D and UCBs. GDP is taken at current market price, which is
annualised based on four quarters moving sum. The trend component of credit and GDP has been extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
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Chart 4.6: Interest Income to Total Assets
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
2.5
2.7
Pe
r
ce
n
t
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Po
in
t
Se
p
/0
2
A
p
r/
0
3
N
o
v/
0
3
Ju
n
/0
4
Ja
n
/0
5
A
u
g/
0
5
M
ar
/0
6
O
ct
/0
6
M
ay
/0
7
D
ec
/0
7
Ju
l/
0
8
Fe
b
/0
9
Se
p
/0
9
A
p
r/
1
0
N
o
v/
1
0
Gap (RHS) Interest Income to Total Assets
Interest Income to Total Assets (Trend)
55
Financial Stability Report June 2011
Chart 4.7: Profit Before Tax to Assets
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Chart 4.8: Price to Earnings (PE) ratio
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4 The study is based on the rating wise distribution of the portfolio of scheduled commercial banks as reported to the Reserve Bank. The study considers
risk weights based on the rating distribution of the portfolio which would result if ratings migrated based on the average one year transition matrix
(Transition matrix of CRISIL Ltd. has been used). For example, if 3 per cent of the AAA rated corporates are expected to migrate to  AA rating, 3 per cent
of the bank’s AAA rated portfolio has been risk weighted at 30 per cent (as applicable to AA rated accounts) instead of 20 per cent (as applicable to AAA
rated accounts).
Migrating to higher approaches under Basel II presents
many challenges
4.11 The time schedule for implementation of advanced
approaches under Basel II was notified by the Reserve
Bank. The guidelines for the implementation of the
Internal Models Approach for market risk were released
in April 2010. Guidelines on the Standardised Approach
/Alternate Standardised Approach for operational risk
were issued in March 2010 while those for Advanced
Measurement Approach for operational risk were issued
in April 2011. The guidelines on Internal Ratings Based
Approach for credit risk are being formulated. Migration
of banks to advanced approaches would be contingent
on an internal assessment of their preparedness for the
purpose and the prior approval of the Reserve Bank.
Banks in India have the option of adopting the
advanced approaches for one or more of the risk
categories and it would not be necessary to adopt the
advanced approaches for all the risk categories
simultaneously.
4.12 Migration to advanced approaches under Basel II
norms will facilitate a closer alignment of capital
requirement with the risk profile of banks, improved
quantification of Pillar II risks and enhanced monitoring
and reporting processes. The process of migration,
however, comes with inherent challenges. The foremost
constraint is the availability of skilled personnel and
robust data, especially in case of credit and operational
risks. Internal rating systems to support the
quantification of default and loss estimates, calibration
of the exposure at default (EAD) and loss estimates to
downturns and validation of risk models are integral to
the advanced approach for credit risk. These systems
require a large time series data, understanding of credit
cycles and quantitative modeling of macro and micro
level risk factors. On the other hand, operational risk
modeling is a relatively new discipline and the
methodologies are still evolving.
Credit risk capital under the standardised approaches:
Reliance on credit rating agencies will continue
4.13 The previous FSR pointed out that the reliance of
banks on external ratings for arriving at their capital
requirements using the Standardised Approach under
Basel II is likely to continue in many jurisdictions,
including India, for some time. An empirical study to
assess the adequacy of credit risk capital for the rated
portfolio of banks was undertaken4. Risk weights were
assigned based on a rating transition matrix including
stressed transitions (stress scenarios envisaged a 50 per
cent (Scenario 1) and 100 per cent (Scenario II) increase
in downgradations). The analysis revealed that the risk
weighted assets  increased by up to nearly 15 per cent
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5 http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=24444
when calculated based on forward looking ratings
(including stressed ratings) (Chart 4.9).
Supervisory framework for Financial Conglomerates
(FCs) being strengthened – issues relating to resolution
and interconnectedness remain germane
4.14 The previous FSR outlined the initiatives being
undertaken internationally to reform policies for
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs)
with a view to reducing the probability and impact of
failure, improving resolution capacity and strengthening
core financial infrastructures and markets. It also
outlined the existing arrangements for the supervision
of large FCs in India while highlighting the areas where
improvements in the regulation and supervision of these
large financial firms may be warranted. Issues related
to the difficulties in orderly resolution of FCs and
interconnectedness with the NBFC sector remain
germane. While differential prudential norms may be
required for FCs going forward, efforts to improve the
arrangements for the supervision of these entities are
already underway. The supervisory processes for the
major banking groups are being strengthened: a revised
offsite reporting format has been introduced to improve
capturing of the group risk profile; the criteria for the
identification of FCs has been revised to include off
balance sheet position of banks and NBFCs; and
guidelines on the corporate governance framework and
management / monitoring of risks arising of intra-group
transactions and exposures are being issued.
The financial holding company model - the preferred
model in India
4.15 The previous FSR suggested that a holding company
structure for FCs may better ring fence risks in the
banking sector than the bank subsidiary model currently
prevalent in the country. A Working Group on the
Introduction of Financial Holding Company Structure
in India5 constituted by the Reserve Bank has since
recommended that the financial holding company model
should be pursued as the preferred model for the
financial sector in India. It has recommended that a
separate legislation should be enacted for the regulation
of financial holding companies and that the Reserve
At average transition rates Stress scenario I Stress scenario II
Chart 4.9: Increase in Risk Weighted Assets Based on
Transitional and Stressed Ratings
Source: Supervisory returns and RBI staff calculations.
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Bank should be designated as the regulator for such
companies (Box 4.2).
MoUs with overseas supervisors to enhance cross-
border supervisory cooperation
4.16 International initiatives underlining the
importance of cross border supervisory co-operation and
information sharing gain importance in view of
increasing cross border operations of Indian banks and
growing presence of foreign banks in India. Till recently,
there was a system of informal exchange of information
and supervisory cooperation with various overseas
regulators / supervisors on a bilateral “need to know”
basis. However, as the need to enhance and structure
this system was being increasingly felt, the Reserve Bank,
in consultation with the Government, decided to enter
into MoUs with overseas regulators for exchange of
supervisory information within the available legal
framework.  The first such MoU has been signed between
the Reserve Bank and the China Banking Regulatory
Box 4.2: The Bank Subsidiary Model and the Financial Holding Company Model
Over the years, banks have set up subsidiaries in various non-
banking financial areas such as Mutual Funds, Housing Finance,
Insurance, NBFCs, etc. This, in turn, led to the development of
some large and complex financial institutions in the country,
which are commonly referred to as Financial Conglomerates
(FC). The emergence of FCs in India brought to the fore questions
about the organisational structure of such entities, i.e. which
should be the preferred corporate model for these entities. The
issue acquired relevance from two distinct, though inter-related,
perspectives – one, efficient corporate management within the
groups addressing the growth and capital requirements of
different entities; and two, the degree of regulatory comfort
with different models, particularly in regard to the concerns
relating to contagion risks. FCs in India, at present, are generally
organised under the Bank Subsidiary Model (BSM) in which the
bank is the parent of all the subsidiaries in the group. In contrast
to this, a Holding Company Model (HCM), is one where
commercial banking, insurance, investment banking, mutual
fund, stock broking and other financial activities are conducted
under the same corporate umbrella. The Working Group on the
Introduction of Financial Holding Company Structure in India
was mandated to examine the need and feasibility of introducing
a financial holding company model in the Indian context,
including by drawing lessons from the global financial crisis. The
Working Group found that though the HCM is not conclusively
superior to the BSM, it offers some distinct advantages, viz.,
a. A HCM is better in removing capital constraints and
facilitating expansion in other financial services. Since
under the HCM, the subsidiaries will not be directly held
by the bank, the responsibility to infuse capital in the
subsidiaries would rest with the holding company;
b. The model would also fare better in terms of direct impact
of the losses of the subsidiaries, which would be borne
by the holding company unlike in the case of BSM where
it would be escalated to the consolidated balance sheet
of the bank;
c. Unlike in the case of BSM, under the HCM, the bank’s
board will not be burdened with the responsibility of
managing the group’s subsidiaries. Management of
individual entities in a disaggregated structure is also
expected to be easier and more effective;
d. The HCM may enable a better regulatory oversight of
financial groups from a systemic perspective. It would
also be in consonance with the emerging post-crisis
consensus of having an identified systemic regulator
responsible inter alia for oversight of systemically
important financial institutions (SIFI);
e. The HCM would provide the requisite differentiation in
regulatory approach for the holding company vis-à-vis the
individual entities; and
f. The HCM model is likely to allow for neater resolution of
different entities as compared with BSM where liquidation
of the parent bank may make the liquidation of
subsidiaries inevitable.
Commission (CBRC) in December 2010 and a few other
MoUs are in the pipeline.
REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE
FSDC and its Sub-Committee – coordinated oversight
for financial stability
4.17 The earlier FSRs have argued the case for central
banks having a substantive role for financial stability
while proposing that it cannot be an exclusive
responsibility. In the Indian context, even as the Reserve
Bank has implicitly been the systemic regulator in India,
other financial sector regulators too have important
responsibilities.  Beyond the regulators, the global crisis
has demonstrated the importance of the coordinating
role the Government has to play, especially in times of
stress. The post crisis focus on establishing an
institutional mechanism for coordination among
regulators and the Government has culminated in the
establishment, in December 2010, of the Financial
Stability and Development Council (FSDC) to be chaired
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by the Union Finance Minister. The FSDC is to be
assisted by a Sub-Committee to be chaired by the
Governor of the Reserve Bank. This structure attempts
to strike a balance between the sovereign’s objective of
ensuring financial stability to reduce the probability of
a crisis and the operative arrangements involving the
central bank and the other regulators. While the Sub-
Committee is expected to evolve as a more active, hands-
on body for financial stability in normal times, the FSDC
would have a broad oversight and will assume a central
role in crisis times.
Legislative reforms
FSLRC constituted – revision to legislations in tune
with the current policy framework
4.18 The Union Budget 2010 proposed the setting up of
a separate Financial Sector Legislative Reforms
Commission (FSLRC) to rewrite and clean up the
financial sector laws. The FSLRC has since been formed
under the chairmanship of Justice (Retd.) B. N. Srikrishna
and has constituted eight sub-committees that will look
into areas such as banking, pension, insurance, capital
markets, debt management office, forward markets and
legal processes. As the previous FSR argued, there is a
strong case for reviewing the various legislations and
recasting them in tune with the current policy
frameworks.
Proposed amendments to the legislative framework for
banks to make regulatory powers of the Reserve Bank
more effective
4.19 The Banking Laws (Amendment) Act, 2011 has
been introduced in the Parliament in March 2011 seeking
to amend the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the Banking
Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings)
Act, 1970 and the Banking Companies (Acquisition and
Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980 to, inter alia, make
the regulatory powers of the Reserve Bank more effective
and to increase the access of the nationalised banks to
capital market (Box 4.3).
Non Banking Financial Sector
The non-banking financial sector in India – within a
regulatory ambit
4.20 Strengthening regulation and supervision of
shadow banking has been identified by the G20 Leaders
as a critical issue for financial sector regulation. In the
Indian context, as reported in previous FSRs, the NBFC
sector is not typically a shadow banking sector as in the
case of advanced economies since the sector is largely
regulated by the Reserve Bank, SEBI, IRDA and NHB.
Money market instruments like commercial paper and
short term non-convertible debentures (NCDs) are
regulated by the Reserve Bank while SEBI regulates
mutual funds and longer tenure NCDs.
Gaps in regulation remain even as the entities continue
to be closely interconnected
4.21 The previous FSR highlighted the fact that while
NBFCs are subjected to prudential regulations, the
regulations vis-à-vis banks is asymmetrical, with banks
being subjected to more stringent regulations. It was also
highlighted that the presence of multiple regulators for
the NBFCs in the country and an entity based approach
to regulation give rise to possible regulatory gaps. Many
entities, which are borrowing both from the markets and
the banks, have the capability of being over-leveraged
and, being deeply interconnected, can pose systemic
risks. Both banks and mutual funds also invest in
corporate paper of NBFCs thereby enhancing the
financial integration of these entities.  Some restrictions
exist on the NBFC exposures that banks can take and
the Reserve Bank has recently announced a prudential
cap on banks’ exposures to debt oriented mutual funds6.
Several measures to tighten the regulatory framework
for NBFCs have also been announced, as discussed in
Chapter III of this Report. Nevertheless, these entities
remain closely interconnected.
4.22 There are also differences in regulatory
requirements of different NBFCs carrying on similar
activities and gaps in regulation of certain entities give
rise to potential for regulatory arbitrage. The previous
FSR highlighted some such instances. Further, there are
important differences in the regulatory requirements
applicable to brokers for margin trading and those
applicable to NBFCs undertaking similar activities
especially with respect to requirements of minimum net
owned funds, restrictions on borrowings, availability of
margin trading facility for initial public offerings and
other risk management prescriptions. There is also a
need to bring in Alternative Investment funds including
6 The Monetary Policy  Statement for 2011-12 announced that investment of banks in liquid schemes of debt oriented mutual funds will be subject to a
prudential cap of 10 per cent of their net worth as on March 31 of the previous year (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Mode=0&Id=6376).
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Box 4.3: Main Features of the Proposed Amendments to Banking Legislations
(A) The main features of the proposed amendments to the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949:
(i) To exempt mergers and acquisitions of the banking
companies from the applicability of the provisions
of the Competition Act , 2002;
(ii) To confer power upon the Reserve Bank to specify
approved securities;
(iii) To enable banking companies to issue preference
shares subject to regulatory guidelines issued by
Reserve Bank;
(iv) To remove the existing restrictions on voting rights
limited to ten per cent of the total voting rights of
all the shareholders of the banking company;
(v) To provide for prior approval of Reserve Bank for
acquisition of 5 per cent or more shares or voting
rights in a banking company;
(vi) To align the restriction on commission, etc., on sale
of shares to issue price rather than to the paid-up
value of shares;
(vii) To confer power upon the Reserve Bank to specify
the cash reserve ratio for select banks;
(viii) To establish a “Depositor Education and Awareness
Fund” to take over inoperative deposit accounts
(accounts not claimed /operated for a period of ten
years or more);
(ix) To confer power upon the Reserve Bank to call for
information and returns from the associate
enterprises of banking companies and to inspect
the same, if necessary;
(x) To confer power upon the Reserve Bank to
supersede the Board of Directors of a banking
company in certain cases in consultation with the
Central Government;(xi) Substantially increase
the penalties and fine for some violations of the
Banking Regulation Act; and
(xii) To confer power upon the Reserve Bank to order a
additional audit of cooperative banks in public
interest for a more effective supervision of co-
operative banks.
(B) The main features of amendments proposed in the
Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of
Undertakings) Act, 1970 and 1980:
(i) Enable the nationalised banks to increase or
decrease the authorised capital with the approval
from the Central Government and the Reserve Bank
without being limited by the ceiling of a maximum
of three thousand crore of rupees;
(ii) Permit the nationalised banks to issue
two additional instruments (“bonus shares” and
“rights issue”) for assessing the capital market to
raise capital required for expansion of banking
business;
(iii) Raise restriction on voting rights from the existing
1% to 10 % for shareholders other than the Central
Government.
private pools of capital such as hedge funds, private
equity funds, etc. within the regulatory perimeter.
Further, NBFCs set up by banks to carry on activites that
can be undertaken by banks presents a clear case of
regulatory arbitrage both on the assets and liabilites side.
4.23 A Working Group on NBFCs is, inter alia, examining
issues related to regulatory gaps and identifying arbitrage
opportunities that exist in the system, enhancing
disclosure requirements, improved supervisory
practices, etc.
Systemic importance of Government sponsored NBFCs
warrants their being subject to prudential regulation
4.24  There are at present 37 Government owned NBFCs
(five NBFCs owned by the Central Government and 32
by various State Governments). Nine of these entities
are deposit taking NBFCs, with deposits amounting to
nearly ` 2,000 crore as on March 31, 2010, while the
total advances of the 37 companies stood at nearly ` 2.9
lakh crore. Further, the assets of these companies have
been progressively increasing over the years with
funding largely through public markets.
4.25 These entities have so far been exempted from the
prudential regulatory framework for NBFCs as they are
under the administrative control of a ministry of the
Government and because they were deemed to pose less
supervisory concern with regard to protection of
depositors’ interest. Over time, the systemic importance
of the Government entities has increased with the
expanding size of their balances sheets and their growing
interaction with the financial system. At the same time,
the regulatory framework for NBFCs has also acquired
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an explicit focus on the systemic risks posed by the
sector and on regulatory arbitrage. It has, therefore, been
decided to revisit the exemptions granted to these
NBFCs in consultation with the Government.
The regulatory framework for wealth management
services warrants examination
4.26 A recent high profile fraud unearthed in the
wealth management services offered by a bank in the
country has thrown open a host of issues regarding
the regulation of such activities and the conflicts of
interest in the Indian financial sector. In the Indian
context, activities related to portfolio management
services (PMS) are governed by the SEBI (Portfolio
Managers) Regulations and Rules, 1993. Amongst
banks, one major public sector bank has been
permitted to offer PMS for a few pension/
superannuation funds. Other banks are only
permitted to undertake non-discretionary investment
advisory service with the prior approval of the Reserve
Bank. Over time, however, the distinction between
offering advisory and portfolio management services
has become increasingly blurred, as is evident from
the aforesaid fraud.
4.27 There is, therefore, a need to revisit the entire
set of regulatory prescriptions for wealth management
services including formulation of regulations for
investment advisers and for harmonising instructions
issued by different regulators. To this end, the Reserve
Bank is in the process of conducting a survey in
respect of wealth management activities being
provided by banks. SEBI is also considering putting
in place an appropriate regulatory framework for such
activities. Above all, the issue of banks selling third
party products and the conflicts of interest entails
greater examination.
Proliferation of structured products in an
unregulated space may pose systemic concerns
4.28 Structured products, in the Indian context, are
being issued mainly by NBFCs in the form of debt
securities with returns linked to equity, commodities
etc. These products, which are issued as debentures
and are typically privately placed, are currently not
subject to any specific regulatory regime. They are sold
mainly to High Net worth Investors through portfolio
managers or through wealth management services of
banks. They are complex securities where the
investors may not be able to understand the
underlying risks. There is also a risk involved in the
ability of the issuer to create a proper hedge. As these
are illiquid instruments, there are concerns relating
to valuation of such instruments. While the quantum
of outstanding structured products is not very
significant at the current juncture, the complexity and
lack of transparency of such products, their illiquidity
and concerns over valuation, and their potential
ability to influence asset prices through the
derivatives markets may give rise to systemic
concerns, especially if such products proliferate in an
unregulated space.
Regulatory gaps permitting deposit raising activities
of cooperative societies without being subject to
prudential norms need to be plugged
4.29 Banking activities of primary (urban) co-operative
banks  originally registered as co-operative credit
societies are regulated by the Reserve Bank under the
provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (As
applicable to Cooperative Societies). The provisions
of the Act are not applicable to a society if the paid
up share capital and reserves of a co-operative society
are less than one lakh rupees and /or if the deposits
accepted by the society are not repayable on demand.
Under the current legal environment, therefore, a co-
operative society may enroll any number of members,
receive deposits from the members, raise loans and
receive grants from external sources. The cap on funds
raised from the external sources in the case of a co-
operative society registered under the Multi-State Co-
operative Societies Act is ten times of the sum of its
subscribed share capital and accumulated reserves and
in the case of those registered under the State Acts,
the cap is prescribed in the byelaws of the society.
The aforesaid position represents a regulatory gap
which enables entities to raise public deposits without
being subject to any prudential norms. The entire
gamut of issues related to raising of funds, especially
from external sources, by these entities needs to be
examined.
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NETWORK ANALYSIS
4.30 The previous FSR underscored the importance of
developing strong analytical methods that help better
identify, monitor and address systemic linkages. To
further study the linkages amongst the scheduled
commercial banks, an Integrated Communication
Technology (ICT) based network model7 has been
developed to assess the degree of connectedness in the
system and to analyse the possible domino impacts of
bank failures.
Structural aspects of the Indian interbank market
4.31 For the entire analysis, bilateral data as on
December 20108 has been used. The total gross value
of these exposures amounts to around ` 6.9 lakh
crore. An analysis of the network of net bilateral
exposures reveals that, amongst the banking groups,
on the aggregate, the public sector and the old private
sector banks are the net lenders in the system while
the new private sector and foreign banks are the net
borrowers (Charts 4.10 to Chart 4.12).
The Indian banking sector– clustered and
connected
4.32 The Indian banking system is found to be
substantially connected and clustered. Also, as
evident from the central circular formation in chart
4.10, most banks have exposures to banks in all
banking groups. The system has a total of 1514 edges
(i.e., an aggregate of 1514 in degrees  and out
degrees), a cluster coefficient of 42 per cent and
connectivity of 27 per cent (Box 4.4).
Contagion Analysis – A stress test scenario
4.33 The above mentioned network model of
bilateral exposures can be used to model the impact
of bank failures. The contagion analysis (Box 4.4)
works on the basic principle that all net lenders to a
failing bank (trigger bank at the centre of the
contagion chart) will get affected in the first round
7 The Network model used in the analysis has been developed by Professor Sheri Markose (University of Essex) and Dr. Simone Giansante (Bath
University) in collaboration with the Financial Stability Unit, Reserve Bank of India.
8 Bilateral data in respect of interbank exposures (both fund based and non fund based) for a sample of 75 scheduled commercial banks.
9  The size of the node (bank) is rated by the number of in degrees, i.e., net lending.
10 Top 20 banks are selected based on dominant eigenvalues (Box 4.4).
Chart 4.11: Net Bilateral Exposures of All Banks
9
Chart 4.12: Net Bilateral Exposure of Top 20 Banks
10
Chart 4.10: Bipartite Representation of Bank Lending in Four Banking Groups
Colour coding: Green (Public Sector Banks); Purple (Old Private Sector Banks)
Cyan (New Private Sector Banks); and Brown (Foreign Banks)
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Chart 4.13: Impact of Failure of One Trigger Bank
12
Chart 4.14: Impact of Failure of Two Trigger Banks
11 For the purpose of the analysis, banks whose ratio of Tier I capital to Risk Weighted Assets falls below 6 per cent are considered to be distressed.
12 Colour code:
Trigger banks: Black
Distressed banks:
(i) Black: Banks whose core capital ratio falls below 6 per cent
(ii) Orange: Banks whose total capital adequacy ratio falls below 6 per cent
(iii) Red: Banks whose total capital adequacy ratio falls below 4.5 per cent
Banks which are affected but not distressed:
(i) Green: Banks which are affected by the failure of the trigger /distressed banks but whose capital adequacy remains above regulatory requirements
(ii) Yellow: Banks which are affected by the failure of the trigger /distressed banks and whose capital adequacy falls below 9 per cent but core capital
ratio remains above 6 per cent
of contagion. Banks which come under distress11
from an idiosyncratic event causing the failure of
the trigger bank(s) will always have the potential to
cause further damage in subsequent rounds of
contagion. The contagion eventually ends when the
system absorbs all  the losses generated
(Chart 4.13 and 4.14).
4.34  The impact as the result of failure of top 20
most connected banks, one at a time, and that of
the failure of 10 pairs of banks, one pair at a time,
are presented in Charts 4.15 to 4.16.
4.35 The above analysis clearly demonstrates the
intertwined nature of the banking system in the
country and leaves the system vulnerable to domino
effects in case of idiosyncratic failure of one or more
banks. The impact of such failures, in this model,
would depend on how connected the bank is to other
banks in the system as also its relationship with
other banks (e.g. lender or borrower). The above
analysis shows that the failure of the most connected
bank in the system shaves off nearly 14 per cent of
the banking system’s core capital. The contagion
impact is relatively contained due to regulatory
limits on interbank exposures (e.g. limits on cross
holding of capital amongst banks, limits on call
money market exposures and prudential limits on
interbank liabilities). The impact could be further
aggravated if other entities in the financial system
(other banks, NBFCs, Mutual Funds, etc.) are brought
within the ambit of analysis. In any case, there
remains need for continuous monitoring of the
interconnectivities in the financial system to
identify build up of risks/excesses in the system and
to guide policy action to address the same.
63
Financial Stability Report June 2011
total capital erosion in the system(RHS) no. of Banks affected
no. of banks in distress no. of banks with CRAR below 9 %
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Chart 4.16: Impact of the Failure of Ten Pairs of Trigger Banks
(One pair at a time)
Box 4.4: Network Analysis of the Indian Interbank Market – Analytics and Methodology
At the core of the analysis is matrix algebra, wherein the links
or the relationships in the form of lending and borrowing, which
exists between N banks are viewed in an N x N matrix. In a
system of linkages modelled by undirected graphs, these
relationships produce a symmetric matrix, as a link between
two banks will produce the same outcome whichever of the
two banks initiated it. In contrast, directed graphs are useful to
study relative asymmetries and imbalances in link formation
and their weights. For the network analysis, directed graphs
have been used, as we aim to model banks as having complete
discretion over the initiation of any link that they may choose
to form.
Key to the network topology is the bilateral relations between
banks which is represented by an adjacency matrix. The
adjacency matrix becomes the gross flow matrix X such that x
ij
represents the flow of gross financial obligations from the
borrower i to the lender j. A bilaterally netted matrix M with
entries (x
ij
- x
ji
) is then derived from the matrix X. The matrix M,
which is skew symmetric to the matrix X, gives the netted
position between banks i and j. For the contagion analysis, the
matrix M representing the net payables and receivables of all
the banks in the network topology, is the critical feature. The
number of links or directions representing net receivables for a
bank (node) from others is referred to as in degrees and the
number of links or directions representing net payable as out
degrees.
Connectivity statistics
Statistical analysis is subsequently carried out on the aforesaid
matrix to determine the level of interconnectedness and activity
that exists in the system. Some of these tools that are used are
as follows.
(a) Connectivity: This is a statistic that measures the extent
of links between the nodes relative to all possible links
in a complete graph. For a directed graph, denoting the
total number of out degrees to equal K = ∑
=
N
i
ik
1
 and N as
the total number of nodes, connectivity of a network is
given as )1( −NN
K
.
(b) Cluster Coefficient: Clustering in networks measures how
interconnected each node is. Specifically, there should
be an increased probability that two of a node’s
neighbours (banks’ counterparties in case of the financial
network) are also neighbours to each other. A high
clustering coefficient for the network corresponds with
high interconnectedness prevailing in the system.
(c) Average Path Length: This is used to measure the distance
that exists between any two nodes in the network.
(d) Shortest Path Length: This gives the average number of
directed links between a node and each of the other nodes
in the network.  Those nodes with the shortest path can
be identified as hubs in the system.
(e) In-betweeness centrality: This statistic reports how
shortest path lengths pass through a particular node.
(f) Eigenvector measure of centrality: Eigenvector centrality
is a measure of the importance of a node (bank) in a
network. It describes how connected a node’s  neighbours
are and attempts to capture more than just the number
of out degrees or direct ‘neighbours’ a node has.  Hence,
if two nodes have the same number of neighbours, then
the one that is likely to have a higher eigenvector centrality
is the node whose neighbours have the larger number of
neighbours. This measure of centrality assigns relative
scores to all nodes in the network based on the above
principle. In general, for an N x N matrix there will be N
different eigenvalues ë for which an eigenvector solution
exists. For the centrality measure, we take the dominant
eigenvalue and the associated eigenvector. The ith
component of this eigenvector then gives the centrality
score of the ith bank in the network.
Contagion analysis
The contagion analysis is basically a stress test where the gross
loss to the banking system owing to a domino effect of one or
more bank failing is ascertained. We follow the round by round
or sequential algorithm for simulating contagion that is now
well known from Furfine (2003). Starting with a trigger bank i
that fails at time 0, we denote the set of banks that go into
distress at each round or iteration by Dq , q= 1,2, …For this
analysis, a bank is considered to be in distress when its core
CRAR goes below 6 per cent.
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Chart 4.15: Impact of the Failure of Top 20 Banks
(One at a time)
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However, in terms of value, their share was only 10 per
cent. Recent initiatives such as the introduction of time
window for hourly settlement of NEFT transactions, the
introduction of a system of positive confirmation to the
beneficiary, extending NEFT to Regional Rural Banks
(RRBs) and reducing the settlement cycle of ECS
operations are aimed at expanding the reach of electronic
clearing systems and can be expected to facilitate further
migration of transactions to the electronic mode.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
O
ct
-0
9
N
ov
-0
9
D
ec
-0
9
Ja
n
-1
0
Fe
b-
10
M
ar
-1
0
A
p
r-
10
M
ay
-1
0
Ju
n
-1
0
Ju
l-
10
A
u
g-
10
Se
p
-1
0
O
ct
-1
0
N
ov
-1
0
D
ec
-1
0
Ja
n
-1
1
Fe
b-
11
M
ar
-1
1
n
o
in
la
k
h
RTGS CCIL Operated Systems Retail Electronic Plus Cards
MICR Non MICR
Charts 4.17: Trends in Volume
Source: RBI.
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PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS
Regulatory arrangements for payment and settlement
systems
4.36 In India, the Reserve Bank is tasked with the
regulatory oversight of the payment and settlement
systems in the country. The legal framework for the
oversight role of the Reserve Bank is provided by the
Payment and Settlement Systems (PSS) Act, 2007 and
the Payment and Settlement System Regulations, 2008
framed there under.
Commodity spot exchanges – a gap in the perimeter
of regulation
4.37 The previous FSR also outlined some of the gaps
in regulatory perimeter, in particular, the fact that some
payment systems viz., stock exchanges and clearing
corporations set up under stock exchanges, remain
outside the purview of the PSS Act. Also important in
this connection is the functioning of the spot commodity
exchanges. These exchanges facilitate purchase and sale
of specified commodities, including agricultural
commodities, metals and bullion by providing spot
delivery contracts in these commodities. This market
functions like the cash segment in equities and provides
facilities such as clearing and settlement of trades on
guaranteed multilateral netting basis. At present, there
are four such exchanges functioning in the country.
4.38 An issue arises in the context of the clearing and
settlement services offered by the spot exchanges which
are currently not regulated under the PSS Act, 2007 or
under any other regulatory arrangement.
Operational performance of the payment and
settlement systems
Operational Performance remains robust
4.39 The operational performance of the payment and
settlement infrastructure in India continues to be robust
with no major disruptions to the payment and
settlement process (Charts 4.17 and 4.18).
Progress in migration to electronic clearing modes
continued
4.40 Paper based payment instruments continued to be
widely used with their share in the Indian payment
system constituting 59 per cent in terms of volume.
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Operational risks closely managed and vulnerabilities
monitored
4.41 Management of operational risks in payment and
settlement systems has been a key priority for the
Reserve Bank. The Reserve Bank has three data centres
– two on-city (Mumbai) and one off-city - which ensure
that sufficient redundancies are available in case of any
disaster at any critical region/installation. Regular
disaster recovery drills test the resilience of the systems.
Live operations of the payment and settlement systems
were carried out from the off city centre on three
occasions during the half year ended March 31, 2011.
The member institutions participated in the drills from
their primary sites. Issues such as slow network response
/intermittent connectivity loss in some centres, revealed
by the drills, were taken as feedback for necessary follow
up/ corrective action.
4.42 Vendor concentration was observed in some of the
activities like hardware and software maintenance in
the core banking solutions being used by scheduled
commercial banks and in certain ATM services
outsourced by banks.
Settlement of large value transactions
4.43 For the management of settlement and other risks
in payment and settlement systems in the country, the
approach adopted by the Reserve Bank has been to
migrate the settlement of all large value transactions to
the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system or to
deferred net settlements. For most critical systems, the
settlement takes place on guaranteed basis through a
central counterparty (CCP). While Clearing Corporation
of India Limited (CCIL) acts as the CCP for money,
government securities and foreign exchange markets in
the country, there are other CCPs for equity and
commodity markets.  The previous FSR outlined several
issues of concern with respect to the functioning of the
CCIL including that of the design of CCIL as a
multiproduct CCP, absence of a net debit cap in the CBLO
segment, Herstatt risk in foreign exchange settlement,
etc. A number of steps have been initiated to further
strengthen the extant risk management practices in
various segments including operationalisation of a
default fund for the forex forward segment and
imposition of intra-day mark to market margin in the
securities segment.
Liquidity risks for CCPs in India remain – need to be
addressed
4.44 Liquidity risk is one of the major risks faced by
CCPs. This has also been highlighted in a recent report
on “Principles for financial market infrastructure”13
which recommends that a CCP should effectively
measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. In fact,
most well managed CCPs have developed various lines
of defence– in the form of member margins, guarantee
funds, non-member commitments and its own capital
– to manage liquidity risks.  There remains, however,
the potential risk of a CCP default especially as the lines
of defence may not be adequate in times of system wide
stress. In any case, there are vulnerabilities arising from,
inter alia, the quality of collateral being accepted by the
CCP; competitive pressures leading to CCPs being
incentivised to lower initial margins, accept a wider
range of collateral or allow lower haircuts; and the
inherent model risks arising from models which are
relied on to produce valuations on which the margining
system is based.
4.45 Some of these risks are evident in the Indian
system as well, though CCPs in India are subject to a
fair degree of regulatory oversight. In the case of CCIL,
which is subject to both on-site and off-site supervision,
there are dependencies for settlement on committed
backup liquidity for funds and securities from financial
institutions which are important market players and may
not be able to provide the backstop liquidity during times
of systemic stress. In the case of other CCPs operating
in the country (for example the CCPs in the equity
markets), there are vulnerabilities arising out of
exposures to the banking sector as collateral in the form
of bank deposits, bank guarantees, etc. are accepted in
lieu of margins and contribution to guarantee funds.  In
any case, the collateral damage from the failure of a CCP,
however unlikely, is too large for these risks to be left
unaddressed.
Access to central bank liquidity is one option; private
sector bail in mechanisms could be explored
4.46 The concerns in respect of liquidity risks of CCPs
raise the issue of access of the CCP to central bank
13 Joint CPSS-IOSCO consultative report on “Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure”, March 2011 (http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss94.htm)
66
Chapter IV Financial Sector Policies and Infrastructure
liquidity, which was flagged in the previous FSR. The
matter is far from straightforward as the very expectation
of a committed central bank support may, in fact, further
perpetuate the same risks on account of the classical
moral hazard problem. The provision of central bank
liquidity could work on a case by case basis but, even
then, central banks would require that the CCP is either
regulated by it or, at the very least, it has access to all
the relevant information about its risk management in
order to assess the case and has the authority to request
CCPs to implement changes to their risk management.
In the Indian case, there is a further complication that
not all CCPs are regulated by the central bank under the
PSS Act.
4.47 With CCPs emerging as the preferred mode for
settlement of transactions globally, the risks of creating
a new set of “too big to fail” institutions are greater than
mere tail risks, and arguably call for  efforts to enhance
the private sector bail-in mechanisms for CCPs, just as
is being considered for systemically important banks.
OTC markets
4.48 Several issues and challenges facing the OTC
markets in India, viz., skewed participation structure,
greater standardisation, introduction of central clearing,
etc., were highlighted in the previous FSR. These issues
remain relevant especially as continuing low volumes
in some derivative markets make it difficult to mandate
guaranteed clearing for these markets.
A central repository for all products offers several
advantages but raises governance issues
4.49 A key shared priority amongst international policy
makers is to ensure, inter alia, reporting of all OTC
derivative products to a trade repository. Internationally,
it is being argued that there should be a single repository
worldwide for any given instrument. Otherwise, the
aggregability of data will not be ensured and it may not
be possible to get a clear picture of positions and
exposures, particularly when two parties to a transaction
are located in different jurisdictions. However, there is
little discussion about whether there should be single
repository for all products as well. Further, such
repositories being public utilities, there is a strong case
for them to function as “not for profit” entities.
Existing reporting arrangements in the Indian context
could be leveraged
4.50 Unlike in most jurisdictions, where centralised
trade reporting has come into focus only post-crisis, India
has had arrangements for reporting of various OTC
derivative transactions ranging from summary
information to transaction level data. The Reserve Bank
has been working closely with CCIL to develop various
modules for transaction reporting. The existing reporting
arrangements for OTC markets encompass foreign
exchange, interest rate, government securities, corporate
bonds and money market instruments. What is now
needed is a consolidation of the reporting arrangements.
Since CCIL has already developed the requisite platforms,
it seems logical to leverage the advantages of economies
of scale and scope, going forward. However, as CCIL also
functions as a CCP, any such arrangement will need to
address the governance issues relating to separation of
trade repository function from the CCP function.
4.51 In this regard, a Working Group of the Reserve Bank
has made several recommendations towards expanding
the menu of products which are reported and requiring
such reporting through regulatory mandates.
Portfolio compression – managing systemic risks in
the OTC derivative markets
4.52 The financial crisis of 2007-09 exposed the
potential of OTC derivatives markets to contribute to
the build-up of systemic risk. In the Indian context, the
size of the derivative market remains limited and the
product profile continues to be largely plain vanilla.
Nevertheless, there remains potential for build-up of
systemic risks given that there are very few active
participants. With bilaterally negotiated early
terminations being the only way to exit a position
(besides entering into a trade with a opposite payoff),
gross notional outstanding amounts multiply manifold
leading to higher capital requirements and reduced
availability of counterparty limits. More importantly, the
gross notional values do not capture the economic
essence of the portfolios.
4.53 The preferred solution internationally – that of
migration to CCP settlement –  does not apply in
markets/products where, for different reasons, it is not
feasible to introduce such arrangements. A solution
being contemplated in some quarters for these markets/
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products is portfolio compression - a market-wide
exercise that reduces the overall notional size and
number of outstanding contracts in OTC derivative
portfolios without significantly altering the risk profiles
of the individual portfolios. The process involves
identification of trades which can be terminated early
by all the counterparties such that the constraints/
tolerance limits defined by each individual participant
are satisfied. In the Indian context, CCIL is currently in
the process of developing trade compression services
for the rupee derivatives market.
Interdependencies in the payment and settlements
Knock-on effects of interdependencies in payment
systems could cause disruptions
4.54 The risks of increasing interdependencies in
payment system infrastructures and potential knock-on
effects which could affect multiple systems due to their
inter-linkages were highlighted in a recent report14. In
the Indian context too, payment systems and related
settlement flows, operational processes and risk
management procedures are becoming increasingly
interdependent. This increases the possibility of
disruptions in any one system affecting the smooth
functioning of other related systems and elevates the
risk of disruptions to the entire payment and settlement
infrastructure of the country due to an idiosyncratic
event affecting any single system.
There is strong evidence of system and institution
based interdependencies in India
4.55 Interdependencies, in the Indian context, include
system based interdependencies arising from direct
cross–system relationships, i.e. relationships between
the Reserve Bank and CCIL operated systems, as well as
with SEBI regulated clearing corporations which settle
the funds leg of the corporate bond transactions in the
RTGS system (Chart 4.19).
4.56 Again, there are institution-based interdependencies
which result from indirect relationships between two
or more systems through a common financial institution.
In India, this is highly evident as all major financial
institutions are participants in all systems. In addition,
some major participants act as settlement banks for
funds settlement for some other participants in the
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14 CPSS report: ‘The interdependencies of payment and settlement systems’, June 2008 (http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss84.htm)
CBLO and government securities segments. Again, some
major banks in CCIL and Reserve Bank operated systems
are settlement banks for the equity markets, while some
provide funds and securities lines of credit to CCIL in
segments in which they are also major players
(Chart 4.20).
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4.57 Other forms of interdependencies also arise out of
operational factors such as a financial institution acting
as clearing bank for a system (as in the case of banks
acting as clearing banks for the equity market CCPs) or
because of providing common infrastructures (the
INFINET network operated by IDRBT).
A macro view of the risk management by
interdependent systems is warranted
4.58 Thus, the Indian payment system is a highly
integrated and interdependent web of interrelation-
ships, as is the case with most such systems across the
globe. While these interdependencies have generated
their own set of synergies leading to operational
efficiency and also reduced risks (for example reduced
credit risk due to DVP settlement in the RTGS system),
the high level of integration and interdependency affects
the settlement flows between various systems. It implies
that credit and liquidity risks can spread very fast
throughout the system. Disruptions in the payment and
settlement systems could also affect the underlying
financial markets. While arrangements such as
settlement of transactions in key payment systems in
central bank money, introduction of CCP settlement, etc.,
have mitigated these risks to a great extent, there
remains need for watchful management of the
interdependencies. The risk management systems of
each payment system have an important bearing on the
overall containment of systemic risk and a macro view
of these systems and their impact on systemic risk will
be critical to manage the risks arising out of
interdependencies in the payment systems.
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
4.59 The previous FSRs highlighted the importance of a
strong deposit insurance system as an integral part of
financial stability arrangements in any jurisdiction. The
effectiveness of safety net systems was severely tested
during the recent financial crisis and a large number of
countries adopted policies to enhance depositor
protection with a view to strengthen public confidence
in the banking system. Exit from such special
arrangements is one of the main challenges facing
deposit insurance systems internationally. Deposit
insurance agencies in different countries are also looking
into ways to enhance the effectiveness of cross-border
arrangements in order to reduce the adverse impact of
bank failures in the home country on the host country.
Another policy initiative is aimed at providing for the
proactive and early involvement of deposit insurance
agencies in the resolution of weak/failing banks.
Macro issues facing deposit insurance system in India
remain relevant
4.60 The previous FSR highlighted several issues and
challenges facing the deposit insurance system in India.
These, inter alia, include ensuring the adequacy of the
deposit insurance fund, reducing the time taken to
reimburse depositors, improving the coverage of the
deposit insurance system, broadening the mandate of
DICGC to include bank resolution, and ensuring
compliance with the Core Principles for Effective Deposit
Insurance Systems. These issues remain relevant.
Meanwhile, DICGC has initiated steps to settle long-
pending cases of settlement. The Corporation is also in
the process of implementing an integrated claims
management system aimed at improving data collection
system and reducing time taken to settlement. However,
one major reason for delay in reimbursing depositors -
inadequate powers with the Corporation to ensure
accountability of the liquidators – remains to be
addressed. The fund ratio of the Corporation continues
to remain low by international standards thus limiting
the Corporation’s ability to enhance coverage.
Addressing issues relating to broadening the mandate
of DICGC, though very important, will require sweeping
changes in the legislative framework.
4.61 A Working Group on Reforms in Deposit Insurance
is reviewing various issues, including adequacy of
deposit insurance fund, broadening the mandate of
DICGC, funds management and improving recovery
performance.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
4.62 Significant strides have been made to strengthen
the regulatory arrangements for the financial system,
both internationally and domestically. Going forward,
several issues and challenges are likely to emerge. Some
banks may need to raise additional capital for funding
credit growth and for meeting the requirements of Basel
III. This may present difficulties given the sluggish
performance of the equity markets. Amendments to
banking sector legislations easing the access of
nationalised banks to the capital market may alleviate
this. Prescribed indicators for calibrating the
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countercyclical buffers may not be appropriate in
emerging markets like India and a mix of qualitative and
quantitative indicators as well as a good dose of
regulatory discretion will need to be employed for
calibrating the buffers. Guidelines for migration to
advanced approaches under Basel II have been issued
and many challenges - availability of robust data and
skilled personnel, need to develop internal rating
systems to support the quantification of default and loss
estimates, sound stress testing processes and
validated risk models, etc. - are likely to emerge. Efforts
are ongoing to improve the supervisory arrangements
for FCs though issues such as orderly resolution remain
germane.
4.63 The structure of the FSDC and its Sub-Committee
attempts to strike a balance between the sovereign’s
objective of ensuring financial stability and the operative
arrangements involving the central bank and other
regulators. Legislative reforms to banking sector laws are
expected to render the regulatory powers of the Reserve
Bank more effective. Gaps in the regulatory perimeter for
NBFCs and scope for regulatory arbitrage remain – a
Working Group constituted by the Reserve Bank is
examining the gamut of these issues. The exemption to
Government sponsored NBFCs from Reserve Bank
regulations needs to be revisited as the systemic
importance of these entities have grown. The existing
regulatory framework for wealth management activities
and for structured products needs strengthening.
4.64 The Indian banking system is substantially
connected and clustered, which leaves the system
vulnerable to domino effects in case of idiosyncratic
failure of one or more banks.
4.65 The clearing and settlement facilites offered by spot
exchanges are currently not regulated in terms of the PSS
Act, 2007 or under any other arrangement. Liquidity risks
for CCPs in India, if they materialise, could have significant
systemic impact. Access to central bank liquidity for CCPs
is fraught with moral hazard risks and may necessitate
efforts to enhance the private sector bail-in mechanisms
for CCPs, just as is being considered for systemically
important banks. A single repository for all OTC products
offers several advantages. In the Indian context, existing
reporting arrangements developed by CCIL for foreign
exchange, interest rate, government securities, corporate
bonds and money market instruments could be leveraged
for the purpose. Introduction of a trade repository
potentially paves the way for portfolio compression of
derivative contracts with a view to reducing systemic risks.
There is strong evidence of system and institution based
interdependencies in the Indian payments systems
implying that an idiosyncratic event affecting any single
system can spread very fast throughout the entire system.
4.66 Issues related to ensuring the adequacy of the fund
ratio of DICGC, reducing the time taken to reimburse
depositors, improving the coverage of the deposit
insurance system and broadening the mandate of DICGC
to include bank resolution remain relevant and are being
examined by a Working Group set up by DICGC.
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Chapter V
Macrofinancial Stress Testing
The relevance of systemic risk in the financial sector has been underscored by the global financial
crisis. It is the risk of disruption to financial services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or
parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the
real economy. The importance of the measurement of systemic risk in the financial sector is growing
significantly.The importance of the measurement of systemic risk in the financial sector is growing
significantly. In fact, measuring aggregate financial sector risk, i.e. the occurrence of a systemic
event which would have severe implications not only on the stability of the financial system but also
on the economy at large, has become one of the key area of research worldwide. Systemic risk
measurement is clearly in its early stages of evolution. There are various approaches for the
measurement of systemic risk and financial statement-based measures, exposure-based network models
and measures based on capital market data are the prominent ones. However, these measures are not
fully consistent and over-reliance on one measure may lead to biased inference. This requires a
comprehensive approach to arrive at a conclusive decision by considering measures achieved through
different methodologies.
Monitoring of financial stability indicators and conducting stress-testing exercises are the main
practical approaches of macroprudential oversight. Stress testing is forward looking and can be tailored
to the specifics of a given financial system. Stress tests are meant to evaluate the resilience of individual
financial institutions and of financial sectors to highly adverse but plausible events. They are used to
quantify vulnerabilities, both from a microprudential perspective within Supervisory Risk Assessments,
where financial institutions are analysed individually, and from a macroprudential perspective within
Financial Stability Analyses, where the resilience of the entire financial sector to adverse macroeconomic
shocks is tested.
1 This model for Indian banking system has been developed by Mr. Miguel A. Segoviano, CNBV (Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores :
Mexican financial Regulatory-Supervisory Agency).
2 In this study twenty scheduled commercial banks have been considered comprising about seventy five per cent of total assets of commercial banks.
5.1 In this report, the stability of banks has been
studied through the Joint Probability of Distress
(JPoD) and the Banking Stability Index (BSI), which
takes into account the impact of one bank on others
through direct or indirect links. Further, the resilience
of the commercial banks in respect of credit, interest
rate and liquidity risks were also studied through stress
testing by imparting extreme but plausible shocks. A
stress test on the projected balance sheet was
undertaken for the commercial banking system which
included both baseline and stressed scenarios. The
credit risk of the commercial banks has also been tested
through macro-stress test models, which link measures
of credit risk to the macroeconomic variables using
multivariate regression equation as well as a Vector
Autoregressive (VAR) approach. Single factor sensitivity
analysis of credit risk of scheduled urban co-operative
banks and non-banking financial companies were also
conducted. The methodologies used in these stress
tests are described in the Annex.
Banking Stability Measures1
5.2 During times of distress, the fortunes of banks
typically decline concurrently through direct links or
through indirect links which include mark-to-market
asset values, interbank lending and information
asymmetries. This section models distress dependencies
as the financial system is conceptualised as a portfolio
of a specific group of banks (Segoviano and Goodhart,
2009)2. In particular, the Banking System’s Portfolio
Multivariate Density (BSMD), which characterises both
the individual and joint asset value movements of the
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portfolio of banks, is recovered from the empirically
observed Probabilities of Distress (PoDs) of the banks
under analysis (Box 5.1 CIMDO-Approach)3. The BSMD
embeds banks’ distress dependence structure, which
captures banks’ linear (correlations) and non-linear
distress dependence, and their changes throughout the
economic cycle, reflecting the fact that dependence
increases in periods of distress. By recovering the (entire)
portfolio multivariate density that describes the system;
the CIMDO-approach allows to analyse financial stability
from three different, yet, complementary perspectives;
viz., (i) common distress of the financial institutions in
a system, (ii) distress between specific institutions, and
(iii) distress in the system associated by distress in a
specific institution. The possibility to analyse financial
stability from complementary perspectives represents
a key advantage over the analysis of any single
perspective by providing policy makers with an enhanced
set of information that might be useful to identify how
risks are evolving, and where contagion might most
easily develop. This methodology also offers great
flexibility for implementation, since the PoDs of
individual bank represent the input variables, which can
be estimated using alternative approaches4.
3 The BSMD is recovered using the Consistent Information Multivariate Density Optimizing (CIMDO) methodology Segoviano Miguel ( 2006)
which is a non-parametric framework based on the cross-entropy approach (Kullback, 1959). Segoviano Miguel ( 2006): Consistent Information
Multivariate Density Optimizing Methodology, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics, Discussion Paper 557.
4 There are also other methodologies to estimate probabilities of distress (PoDs), notably using CAMEL ratings, Merton approach, etc.
The PoDs for banks were estimated from their equity return distributions. Under this approach, first, banks’ historical distributions of
equity returns are estimated. Then, the probability of returns falling under the historical worse .05 per cent of the cases (99.5 VaR) is
quantified. Therefore, the PoD of a specific bank represents the probability that the bank’s equity return would fall in the worse.05 historical
percentile.
Box 5.1. CIMDO-Approach
In modeling distress dependence, methodology
described by Goodhart and Segoviano (2009) has been
followed. First, the financial system has been
conceptualised as a portfolio of institutions (FIs). Then,
the PoD of the individual institutions, comprising the
portfolio, has been inferred from equity prices
(Figure 5.1). Subsequently, using as inputs (exogenous
variables) such PoDs, and employing the Consistent
Information Multivariate Density Optimizing (CIMDO)
methodology (Segoviano, 2006), a novel non-parametric
approach based on cross-entropy, the financial system’s
portfolio multivariate density (FSMD) have been
derived. Lastly, from the FSMD a set of conditional
PoDs of specific pairs of FIs, and the financial system’s
JPoD are estimated.
The FSMD and thus, the estimated conditional
probabilities and the JPoD, embed the institutions’
distress dependence. This captures the linear
(correlation) and non-linear dependencies among the
FIs in the portfolio, and allows for these to change
throughout the economic cycle. These are key
advantages over traditional risk models that most of
the time incorporate only correlations, and assume that
they are constant throughout the economic cycle.
The distress dependence structure embedded
in the FSMD is characterised by the CIMDO-copula
(Segoviano, 2006). The structure of linear and non-
linear dependencies among the assets in a portfolio
can be represented by copula functions. This approach
infers copulas directly from the joint movement of
individual PoDs. This is in comparison to parametric
copula approaches, in which parametric copula
functions have to be chosen and calibrated explicitly—
usually a difficult task, especially under data
constraints.Source: Goodhart and Segoviano 2009.
Figure 5.1 The Financial System's Multivariate Density
1. View the financial system as a ''portfolio'' of two institutions
3. Infer the financial system multivariate distribution
(FSMD) with CIMDO
4. Estimate
Conditional
Probabilities of
Default and the
J PoD from the
FSMD
2. Estimate the PoD
of institutions X
2. Estimate the PoD
of institutions Y
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Common distress in the system: JPoD and BSI
Distress dependence down from crisis period, but
cropping up again
5.3 For the first perspective, two indicators, the Joint
Probability of Distress (JPoD) and the Banking Stability
Index (BSI) have been used5. The JPoD represents the
probability of all the banks in the system (portfolio)
becoming distressed. Whereas, BSI reflects the expected
number of banks becoming distressed given that at least
one bank has become distressed. The JPoD and BSI were
estimated for the period from October 2007 up to
February 2011 and are presented in Chart 5.1. It may be
observed that the expected number of banks (out of the
sample of 20) which was under distress was 4 during
the crisis has declined to 1 by the last quarter of 2010.
But, it has again increased to 2 during the first quarter
of 2011. Distress dependence across banks rises during
times of crisis, indicating that systemic risks, as implied
by the JPoD and the BSI, rise faster than individual risks.
The JPoD and the BSI not only take account of individual
banks’ probabilities of distress, but these measures also
embed banks’ distress dependence. Therefore, these
measures may experience larger and nonlinear increases
than those experienced by the probabilities of distress
(PoDs) of individual banks. Chart 5.2 shows that daily
percentage changes of the JPoD are larger than
daily percentage changes of the average of individual
PoDs. This empirical fact provides evidence that
in times of distress, not only do individual PoDs
increase, but so does distress dependence. Therefore,
measures of financial stability that are based on averages
or indices may not be able to indicate the proper
estimates.
Distress between specific institutions
5.4 To analyse stability from the second perspective,
a set of pair wise conditional probabilities of distress,
have been estimated which are described as a Distress
Dependence (DiDe) Matrix. The matrix shows the
conditional probability of distress of the bank on a row
given that the bank on the column falls in distress. The
distress dependences are estimated daily. The distress
dependency of a bank is analysed through a Toxicity
Index which shows that if that bank is in distress what
is the expected probability of it causing distress to
another bank in the system.
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5 See Segoviano and Goodhart (2009): Banking Stability Measures. IMF.WP/09/4 for definitions.
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6 For example for a system with three FIs, the VI for the financial institution A would be estimated as P(A/B)*P(B) + P(A/C)*P(C)
5.5 The distress dependence across major banks
increased substantially (Chart 5.3). For the purpose of
comparative analysis, October 10, 2007 and September
20, 2008 have been chosen to evaluate how conditional
probabilities of distress evolved from an initial stage
of the crisis to the aftermath of Lehman Brothers filing
for bankruptcy. On average, if any of the banks fell into
distress, the average probability of the other banks
being distressed increased from 17 percent on October
10, 2007 to 42 percent on September 20, 2008.
Moreover, on an average, distress of a specific bank
would have caused the highest distress in the
system (toxicity) in October 2007 (29 percent) while
in September 2008, it would have been another bank
that would have caused the highest toxicity (53
percent).
5.6 From the DiDe matrix, Vulnerability Index (VI),
which quantifies the vulnerability of a bank given
distress in the other banks in the system6, is derived
and presented in Chart 5.4. It may be observed from the
chart that the vulnerability of banks was high during
the recent financial crisis but declined substantially
during the subsequent period. Whereas, during the
recent period, a marginal increase in vulnerability has
been observed.
Even though distress dependence does not imply
causality, these results show that the analysis of distress
dependence, even several weeks prior to a distress event,
can provide useful insights into how distress in a specific
institution can affect other institutions and ultimately
the stability of the system.
Cascade Effects
5.7 To analyse stability from the third perspective,
the Probability of Cascade Effects (PCE) has been used.
This represents the likelihood that one or more banks
in the system become distressed, given a specific bank
becomes distressed. Thus, this indicator is useful to
quantify the systemic importance of a specific bank,
if it becomes distressed, signaling the possible
“domino” effects of that specific institution.
Chart 5.5 shows bank-wise indicator across time for
select banks. It is clear from the chart that cascade effect
of select banks declined substantially after the crisis
period.
Chart 5.4: Vulnerability Index : Bank-wise
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Chart 5.5: Cascade Effects : Bank-wise
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Chart 5.3: Toxicity Index: Bank-wise
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Chapter V Macrofinancial Stress Testing
Credit Risk
Under stress conditions, profits lowered but not much
pressure on capital adequacy
5.8 A scenario analysis was undertaken for testing the
credit risk using a balance sheet approach. The balance
sheet and profit and loss account of the banks were
projected for March 2012. Along with an enhancement
in the provisioning requirements as proposed in the
Monetary Policy Statement for the year 2011-12, the
scenario framework also assumed that 30 per cent of
restructured standard assets would turn into NPAs.
Plausible shocks were administered on the projected
financials of the banks to gauge their impact and the
resilience of the system. The analysis was carried out
both at the aggregate level as well as at the individual
bank level based on supervisory data for March 2011.
5.9 Under the stress condition, profitability of banks
were adversely affected (Chart 5.6). The Return on Assets
(RoA) density function under stress conditions shifted
towards negative values indicating more and more banks
unable to earn positive returns under the assumed stress
conditions. However, the banking system was able to
withstand an adverse NPA shock reasonably with their
capital fund (Table 5.1). At end-March 2012, the projected
system level CRAR remained at 11.27 per cent, while at
individual bank level, except for one small bank, all
banks maintained the CRAR above 9 per cent. The
percentage of gross NPAs to total advances increased to
2.92 per cent as at end-March 2012 from 2.34 per cent
as at end-March 2011 mainly on account of assumption
of 30 per cent of restructured standard assets turning
into NPAs. Under the most stringent credit quality shock
of 150 per cent on the baseline, when the NPA level
increased to 6.33 per cent, the system CRAR stood at
9.33 per cent. However, the system level CRAR was
adversely affected under very extreme deterioration of
asset quality, when the NPA rose by 168 per cent,
impacting 25 banks having a share of 46.00 per cent in
total assets, whose CRAR fell below 9 per cent.
Interest Rate Risk - Duration of Equity
DoE at elevated level… Not much negative impact on
capital, though
5.10 Duration of Equity (DoE) of commercial banks,
which shows extent of erosion in capital due to unit
increase in interest rates, continued to remain at an
elevated level, albeit a short detour, in recent quarters.
This suggests active involvement of banks in managing
interest rate risks (Chart 5.7). Further, the distribution
Table 5.1 : Stress Test on Projected Balance Sheet
Gross NPAs CRAR (%) Number of Share in
per cent to banks total assets
Total whose CRAR of banks
Advances(%) falls below whose CRAR
9% falls below
9% (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
March 2011 2.34 13.09 0 0
Projected Baseline: March 2012
Baseline 2.92 11.27 1 0.15
Assumed Stress Conditions: March 2012
Increase in NPA
 50 % 4.06 10.79 8 23.27
100 % 5.19 10.15 15 34.58
150 % 6.33 9.33 22 43.41
Reverse Stress Testing: March 2012
Threshold Level (System level CRAR)
168 % 6.74 9.00 25 46.00
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations
Scenario I - Savings Deposits withdrawal within 1 month
Scenario II - Savings Deposits withdrawal in 3 - 6
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations.
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Chart 5.7: Duration of Equity - Trend (Commercial Banks)
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations.
Chart 5.6: Simulation of Stress Conditions:
Change in Density of Aggregate Risk Indicator -
Return on Assets – March 2011
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of DoE under the two scenarios showing movement of
banks from higher duration to lower duration time
buckets (Charts 5.8 and 5.9) indicates that the banks’
vulnerability to increase in interest rate will not be very
significant under normal conditions. On the balance,
need for maintaining a lower level of DoE on sustained
basis, may be a possible recourse available to the banks.
Liquidity Risk
Lurking liquidity constraints under stringent stress
scenarios while no potential strains at hand
5.11 Liquidity stress tests showed that a few banks
did not have adequate liquid assets to meet the
withdrawals on the first day itself. The number of such
banks increased in March 2011 as compared to March
2010. However, the total number of banks unable to
withstand the stress scenario at the end of five days
was higher in March 2010 (Charts 5.10 and 5.11)
indicating a slight improvement of the position under
the liquidity stress tests relative to the previous
assessment.
5.12 The analysis of liquidity of banks for the quarter
March 2011 is also done using Liquidity Sustainability
Ratio (LSR) which has been defined as (Liquid Assets/
Outflows in 1-14 days time bucket). Under the stress
scenario the outflow is assumed to be increased by a
factor of 3. In the baseline scenario only 5 banks had
LSR less than 1, which increased to 29 banks under the
stress scenario. These banks have to meet the outflow
through purchased liquidity, which is expensive. Further,
Negative 0 to 5 years 5 to 10 years
10 to 20 years 20 years and above
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations.
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Chart 5.8: Duration of Equity – Frequency Distribution
(Scenario I - Savings Deposits withdrawal within 1 month)
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations.
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Chart 5.9: Duration of Equity - Frequency Distribution
(Scenario II - Savings Deposits withdrawal in 3 - 6 months)
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Chart 5.10: Liquidity Position of Banks:
March 2010 Baseline and Stressed Scenario
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Chart 5.11: Liquidity Position of Banks:
March 2011 Baseline and Stressed Scenario
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Chapter V Macrofinancial Stress Testing
under stress situation, with falling confidence, these
banks may face extreme liquidity constraints showing
signs of vulnerability for the system (Chart 5.12).
Macro-stress tests: Multivariate Regression7
Impact of macroeconomic shocks on banking sector
not substantial
5.13 The model based approach for the macro-stress
test used a multivariate equation which directly links
macroeconomic variables to measures of bank
performance. The impact of macro variables on non-
performing advances (NPAs), defined as ratio of gross
non-performing advances to total advances, was
estimated. The NPA-ratio was observed to be strongly
auto-correlated. Though related negatively to agricultural
and industrial GDP growth rates, it was seen to have
positive relationship with short term nominal interest
rate and inversely related to export-to-GDP ratio.
5.14 The model was used to forecast NPAs under the
baseline as well as stress scenarios, with a stress test
risk horizon of one year. The baseline and stress
scenarios were constructed based on assumptions
detailed in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
5.15 The results (Charts 5.13 and 5.14) show that
impact of select macroeconomic variables, in the
aforesaid macro-stress testing model, are not very
significant. The results, under different scenarios,
therefore, suggest that the macroeconomic shocks would
not substantially threaten the Indian banking sector.
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Chart 5.12: Liquidity Sustainability Ratio: March 2011
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations.
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Chart 5.13: Non-Performing Advances Ratio under Stress Scenarios
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Chart 5.14: Banks Capital Adequacy Ratios: Translated from
NPAs under Stress Scenarios
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7 i) Cihak, M. (2007). Introduction to Applied Stress Testing. IMF Working Paper WP/07/59.
ii) Juraj Zemen, Pavol Jurca (2008): Macro Stress Testing of Slovak Banking Sector. Working Paper 1/2008. National Bank of Slovakia.
iii) Marco, Sorge (2004). Stress-testing financial systems: an overview of current methodologies. BIS Working Papers No 165.
iv) Philippines: Financial System Stability Assessment Update (2010). IMF Country Report No. 10/90. April 2010.
Table 5.2: Baseline Projections
Forecast Real GDP Nominal Exports to
Period Growth Interest rate GDP Ratio
(Short Term)
2011-12 Q1 8.00 7.00 14.40
Q2 7.80 7.00 14.30
Q3 7.30 7.00 15.40
Q4 7.00 7.00 15.60
Table 5.3: Stress Scenarios
Shock level(basis points)
Time horizon Real GDP Nominal Exports to
Growth Shock Interest GDP Ratio
Rate (Short Shock
Term) Shock
2011-12 - 150 + 150 - 300
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Macro-stress tests: VAR Model
With interest rates rising, loan losses may follow suit
5.16 A vast body of literature endorses the fact that
changes in macroeconomic conditions of any economy
do impact banks’ performance, simultaneously or with
a lag. It is also possible that the feedback effects of bank
instability on real economic activity could amplify the
fluctuations especially during recessions. Therefore, in
order to judge the resilience of banking sector to various
macroeconomic shocks, Vector Autoregressive (VAR)
approach has been adopted. The advantage of VAR model
is that, it allows to fully capture the interaction among
macroeconomic variables and banks’ stability variable.
It also captures the entailed feedback effect.
5.17 This exercise has been done using quarterly data
since Q1 of 2001-02 to Q4 of 2010-11 on four
macroeconomic variables, namely, GDP growth, inflation
based on WPI, call money rate and Real Effective
Exchange Rate (REER). Further, to reflect banks’ stability,
slippage ratio has been considered.
5.18 Based on the estimated VAR(2), the impulse
response was generated. The accumulated response of
slippage ratio to innovation in growth rate, inflation,
call rate and REER is presented in the Chart 5.15. It is
observed that one standard deviation (positive) shock
to GDP growth will lead to decline in slippage ratio by
0.10 over a period of nine quarters. Though inflation
has positive impact on slippage ratio, this impact was
observed to be marginal: one standard deviation
(positive) shock in inflation would raise the slippage ratio
by 0.02 over two quarters. However, interest rate has
not only significant impact on slippage ratio, such impact
was also seen to be long lasting. One standard deviation
(positive) shock in call rate tended to raise slippage ratio
by 0.22 over twelve quarter. Whereas, REER had negative
impact on slippage ratio, one standard deviation
(positive) shock in REER prompted a fall in slippage ratio
by 0.07 over six quarters.
Under stress scenarios of lower GDP growth and higher
rates of inflation & interest, NPA ratio would increase
further
5.19 Based on the impulse response function of the
VAR, Gross NPA ratio was estimated under two stress
scenarios and is presented in Table 5.4.
Accumulated Response of Slippage Ratio to Cholesky
One S.D. GDP Growth Innovation
Chart 5.15: Movement of Accumulated Impulse Response
Table 5.4: Non Performing Advances Ratio
Under Stress Conditions
Quarter Baseline Scenario I Scenario II
Jun-11 2.53 2.53 2.53
Sep-11 2.69 2.71 2.74
Dec-11 2.79 2.87 2.95
Mar-12 2.95 3.13 3.31
Accumulated Response of Slippage Ratio to Cholesky
One S.D. Inflation Innovation
Accumulated Response of Slippage Ratio to Cholesky
One S.D. Call Rate Innovation
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Scenario I: GDP growth will decline by 150 basis points
(negative shock), WPI based inflation will increase by
150 basis points, interest rate will increase by 100 basis
points and rupee will depreciate by 10 per cent (negative
shock).
Scenario II: GDP growth will decline by 250 basis points
(negative shock), WPI based inflation will increase by
250 basis points, interest rate will increase by 200 basis
points and rupee will depreciate by 20 per cent (negative
shock).
The results indicated that under the baseline scenario,
the Gross NPA ratio is expected to be around 2.95 per
cent by March 2012 a rise of 64 basis points over the
March 2011 figures, while under the extreme stress
conditions, this ratio is projected to rise further to
around 3.31 per cent.
5.20 It is observed from impulse response and variance
decomposition that among all the four selected
macroeconomic variables, viz., GDP growth, inflation,
interest rate and exchange rate; interest rate has the
highest (negative) impact on slippage ratio of the banks.
This may have profound implications at this point of
time considering the fact that stubborn inflation rate
would prompt interest rates to keep on hardening
impacting adversely asset quality of banks.
Urban Co-operative Banks
Credit risk not alarming
5.21 Stress tests on credit risk were conducted on
Scheduled Urban Co-operative Banks (SUCBs) using their
asset portfolio as at end-March 2011. The results are
based on single factor sensitivity analysis. Impact of
shocks on CRAR was tested under three different
scenarios, which assumes (i) increase in NPA ratio by 50
per cent, (ii) increase in NPA ratio by 100 per cent and
(iii) no profit earned by banks (Chart 5.16). It is observed
that SUCBs could withstand shocks assumed under
scenarios I and III easily. However, the sector would come
under some stress under the stringent scenario II.
Non-Banking Financial Companies (ND-SI)
Impact of credit risk on capital not very significant
5.22 A stress test on credit risk for NBFC-ND-SI sector
was carried out as on March 2010 under two scenarios
(i) Gross NPA increased two times and (ii) Gross NPA
increased 5 times from current level. It was observed
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations
Accumulated Response of Slippage Ratio to Cholesky
One S.D. in (REER) Innovation
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations
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Chart 5.16 Stress Testing Scheduled UCBs: Impact of Shocks on
Capital Position
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that first scenario did not warrant any additional
provision as the sector had excess provision towards
NPAs while in the second scenario, it was observed that
even though there was shortfall in provisioning the
impact on CRAR was negligible as the sector had a higher
level of CRAR of 37.1 per cent as against the required
level of 12 per cent.
Concluding Remarks
5.23 Distress dependence across banks rises during
times of crisis, indicating that systemic risks, as implied
by the JPoD and the BSI, rise faster than individual risks.
The distress dependence across major banks increased
substantially during the global crisis period. The
vulnerability of banks was high during the recent
financial crisis but declined substantially during the
subsequent period. However, during the recent period,
a marginal increase in vulnerability has been observed
for Indian banks. The cascade indicator quantifies the
systemic importance of a specific bank, if it becomes
distressed, signaling the possible “domino” effects of
that specific institution. The cascade effect of select
banks declined substantially after the crisis period.
5.24 Projected balance sheet analysis indicated that
under stressful conditions, profitability of commercial
banks may get adversely affected. However, the banking
system would be able to withstand an adverse NPA shock
reasonably easily because of its high capital levels. The
interest rate risk through the Duration of Equity (DoE)
method showed that the DoE continued to remain at
elevated level, with an improvement in recent quarters,
suggesting active involvement of banks in managing
interest rate risks. Regarding liquidity stress test, under
severe stress situation, when market sentiment is poor,
some banks may face extreme liquidity constrain and
may show a sign of vulnerability. The results of macro-
stress test under different scenarios suggested that
macroeconomic shocks would not substantially threaten
the Indian banking sector. The VAR methodology
indicated that in the current environment of stubborn
inflation, which may prompt the interest to be hardened,
the asset quality of banks may be impacted adversely.
The credit risk stress tests on NBFC-ND-SI and scheduled
UCBs revealed that the impact on CRAR under different
scenarios would not be alarming.
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Annex: Stress Testing Methodologies
As a part of quarterly surveillance, stress tests were conducted covering the following risks:
• Credit risk, which estimates the impact on capital adequacy by stressing the Non-Performing Advances (NPAs)
for the entire credit portfolio. This was done using scenario analysis, multivariate regression model and
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) approach.
• Interest rate risk, which estimates the erosion in economic value of the balance sheet for a given interest
rate shock using the “Duration of Equity” method both at the system and the individual bank levels.
• Liquidity risk, using different scenarios, which include sudden withdrawal of deposits on account of loss of
confidence due to adverse economic conditions.
The resilience of the commercial banks in response to the above shocks has been studied from the above three
perspectives. The analysis covered all scheduled commercial banks. Single factor sensitivity analysis on credit risk
of scheduled urban co-operative banks and non-banking financial companies were also conducted. The methodology
adopted for the stress tests is in line with the stress tests conducted for the first FSR and second FSR and there is
further evolvement in a few methodologies.
Credit Risk - Scenario Analysis
For scenario analysis, the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the banks are projected for March 2012.
Plausible shocks are administered on the projected financials of the banks to gauge the impact and resilience of
the system. The analysis is carried out both at the aggregate level as well as at the individual bank level based on
supervisory data for March 2011. Under the assumed baseline scenario, the growth projection for balance sheet as
well as profit and loss components are computed by applying compound growth rates as well as by using March
2011 proportions and applying adverse impact factors on them. The regulatory capital growth is assumed to
remain at the minimum by assuming minimum mandated transfer of twenty five per cent of the profit to the
reserves account. In addition to an enhancement in the provisioning requirements as proposed in the Monetary
Policy Statement for the year 2011-12, it is also assumed that 30 per cent of outstanding restructured standards
assets turn into NPAs. The baseline assumes that the existing loan loss provisioning coverage ratios remain intact.
The result thus obtained in the baseline scenario is subjected to increase in NPAs by 50 per cent, 100 per cent and
150 per cent at the aggregate loan portfolio level for each bank. The systemic impact of such shocks is also worked
out.
Interest Rate Risk
The duration of equity (DoE) or the net-worth duration approach in stress tests could help in calculating the
erosion in capital due to unit increase in interest rates. The analysis takes into account the interest rate sensitive
items in balance sheet of the banks’ portfolio and also the off balance sheet items. Subject to certain limitations,
DoE captures the interest rate risk and helps in moving towards the assessment of risk based capital. The higher
the duration of equity, more is the interest rate risk and accordingly greater the requirement of capital.
• Duration Gap = (Duration of assets * total assets – Duration of liabilities * total liabilities ) / total assets
• Duration of Equity = Duration Gap * Leverage Ratio
= (Duration of assets * total assets – Duration of liabilities * total liabilities) / Capital & Reserves
• Interest rate shock required to wipe out the capital funds = % Change in Price / DoE = 100/ DoE
Under this approach, the duration of equity of a bank’s portfolio is computed under two scenarios: the savings
deposits are assumed to be withdrawn in the first time band viz. 1 to 28 days (scenario I); the savings deposits are
assumed to be withdrawn in 3 to 6 months time band (scenario II). The time band-wise rate sensitive liabilities
have been accordingly adjusted under the two scenarios.
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Liquidity Risk
The aim of liquidity stress tests is to assess the ability of a bank to withstand unexpected liquidity drain without
taking recourse to any outside liquidity support. The scenarios developed are based on very stringent assumptions,
which are extreme. The analysis is done as at end-March 2011.
The scenario depicts different proportions (depending on the type of deposits) of unexpected deposit withdrawals
on account of sudden loss of depositors’ confidence and assesses the adequacy of liquid assets available to fund
them. The deposit run is assumed to continue for five days.
• The objective is to capture the ability of the bank to meet unexpected withdrawal of deposits through sale of
its available liquid assets without any outside support.
• Deposits are segregated into three types, current deposits, savings deposits and term deposits.
• Liquid assets consist of cash funds, excess CRR balances with the Reserve Bank, balances with other banks
payable within one year and investments maturing within one year.
• Under the stress scenario the total unexpected withdrawal of deposits is assumed to take place in the following
proportion:
• Current deposits – three times the proportion of reported outflows of current deposits in 1-14 days
time bucket.
• Savings deposits – three times the proportion of reported outflows of savings deposits in 1-14 days
time bucket.
• Term deposits – two times the proportion of reported outflows of term deposits in 1-14 days time
bucket.
• The bank is assumed to meet stressed withdrawal of deposits through sale of liquid assets.
• The sale of investments is done with a hair cut of 10 per cent of their market value.
• The stress test is done on a static mode.
Liquidity Sustainability Ratio = Liquid Assets / Outflows in 1-14 days time bucket
Macro-Stress Test – Multivariate Regression
To ascertain the resilience of banks, the credit risk was modeled as functions of macroeconomic variables. The
analysis was carried out on ratio of non-performing advances to total advances at the aggregate level for the
commercial banking system as a whole. With the help of the developed model the NPA ratio was forecasted for
next few quarters. This included both baseline and stressed scenarios. On the forecasted values of NPAs, the
capital adequacy ratios were derived keeping the existing loan loss provisions intact. The detailed methodology is
described in the Financial Stability Report – December 2010.
Macro-Stress Test – VAR Model
A vast body of literature endorses the fact that the changes in the macroeconomic conditions of any economy do
impact banks’ performance, simultaneously or with lag.  It is also possible that the feedback effects of bank
instability on real economic activity could amplify the fluctuations especially during recessions. Therefore, in
order to judge the resilience of banking on various macroeconomic shocks, Vector Autoregressive (VAR) approach
has been adopted as done by Hoggarth, Sorensen and Zicchino (2005), Marcucci and Quagliariello (2005) and
Renato Filosa (2007). The advantage of VAR model is that, it allows to fully capture the interaction among
macroeconomic variables and banks’ stability variable. It also captures the entailed feedback effect.
In notational form, mean-adjusted VAR of order p (VAR(p)) can be written as
                             1 1 ....... t pt t p ty A y A y u−−= + + +  ; t=0,1,2,3,….
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This exercise has been done using quarterly data since first quarter of 2001-02 to third quarter of 2010-11 on four
macroeconomic variables, namely, GDP growth, inflation based on WPI, call money rate and Real Effective Exchange
Rate (REER). However, to judge banks’ stability, slippage ratio has been taken. Further, call rate, REER and slippage
ratio were tested for seasonality and since seasonality was found in call rate and slippage ratio, these variables
were adjusted for seasonality.
Stationarity of the variables was tested based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test. The null hypothesis that the
variable has unit root was tested to be negative for slippage ratio, inflation, call rate and REER at 5 per cent level
of significance and for growth at 10 per cent level of significance. Therefore, all the selected variables were found
to be stationary.
Table: Unit-Root test
Slippage Ratio Growth Inflation Call Rate REER
ADF Test Statistics -3.102467 -2.860975 -5.486368 -3.927392 -3.291593
P-value 0.0350 0.0595 0.0001 0.0044 0.0227
The appropriate order of VAR has been selected based on minimum information criteria as well as other diagnostics
and suitable order was found to be two. Accordingly, VAR of order 2 (VAR(2)) was estimated and stability of the
model was checked based on roots of AR characteristic polynomial. Since, all roots are found to be inside the unit
circle, this selected model was found to be fulfilling the stability condition.
Chart: Stability of VAR(2)
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
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Urban Co-operative Banks – Credit Risk
Stress tests on credit risk were conducted on Scheduled Urban Co-operative Banks (SUCBs) using their asset
portfolio as at end-March 2011. The tests were based on single factor sensitivity analysis. The impact on CRAR
was studied under three different scenarios.  The assumed scenarios were as under:
Scenario I:
• Shock applied: 50% increase in gross NPAs.
• Provisioning requirement is increased by 50%.
• Capital (Tier I & II) is reduced by additional provisions.
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Scenario II:
• Shock applied: 100% increase in gross NPAs.
• Provisioning requirement is increased by 100%.
• Capital (Tier I & II) is reduced by additional provisions.
Scenario III:
• Shock applied: Loss or Zero profit by all SUCBs due to adverse macroeconomic conditions.
• Capital (Tier I & II) is reduced by amount of profits in respect of those banks that reported profit (no
change if reported loss).
Non-Banking Financial Companies (ND-SI) – Credit Risk
Stress tests on credit risk were conducted on Non-Banking Financial Companies (Non-Deposit taking and
Systemically Important) using their asset portfolio as at end-March 2010. The tests were based on single factor
sensitivity analysis. The impact on CRAR was studied under two different scenarios.  The scenario assumed
increase in the existing stock of NPAs by 200 and 500 per cent. The assumed increase in NPAs was distributed
across sub-standard, doubtful and loss categories in the same proportion as prevailing in the existing stock of
NPAs. The additional provisioning requirement was adjusted from the current capital position.
